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I N T R O D U C T I O N
As the title of the book suggests, we would like to present a scientific line of thought 
to address the inseparable relationship between nation and migration. When we 
began dealing with the issue of nations in the 1970s this relationship was not at all 
visible. This was even more the case because the nation as a topic of sociology or 
social psychology did not appear particularly important or as a well-researched 
phenomenon. Excluding Karl Deutsch’s (1966) book, which analyzed the nation 
as a communications community in a pioneering fashion, there were no essential 
sociological theories or empirical studies on the topic of national identity. The study 
of the problem set of the nation concept was fully monopolized by historical 
sciences. This situation was changed by Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernst 
Gellner (1983) whose works are now considered classics. The phenomenon of mi-
gration was a part of the sphere of interest of sociology but was primarily viewed 
as a problem of assimilation and modernization, which was well illustrated by the 
now illusory social expectation of the “melting pot.”
 We argue that national identification is primarily a problem of large social 
groups examined through social-psychological experiments. The results of experi- 
ments have shown (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971) that functions between 
groups are evolution-rooted dichotomy categorization mechanisms, which Sumner 
had much earlier defined as ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906). Following this real-
ization, we launched studies in the 1970s to uncover the sociological aspects of 
affective and cognitive factors in Hungarian national identity (Csepeli 1997). We 
realized that national identity has a wide, public emotional base in a sociological 
or social-psychological sense, upon which elements attitudes, values and con-
tents of knowledge are built in a pyramid fashion. At the top of the pyramid we 
were able to identify the ideological elements of national identity, which had been 
worked out, communicated and popularized by elite groups of society. We named 
this group the special audience of national identity.
 A turning point in our research came when the nations of East Central Europe, 
including Hungary, were freed from the ideological and political prison of state 
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socialism and entered Western political space (Csepeli and Örkény 1999b). One 
of the relevant consequences of this change was that in 1995, when the ISSP chose 
national identity as the topic for its upcoming international study, Hungary was 
able to participate. Based on our earlier research we were invited to participate in 
the study as researchers.
 Following this, there were two more waves in this series of studies. We con-
structed an unparalleled longitudinal dataset, the only drawback of which was 
that the sets of participating countries across waves were not completely identical. 
We have reported on the findings of the waves separately and comprehensively 
in various publications. (Csepeli and Örkény 1999a; 2004; 2006; 2011; 2012) 
The summary volume by Max Haller et al. (2009) contained results from only the 
1995 and 2003 waves, and was a great help to us. The part of this volume that deals 
with the nation summarizes these two decades of research.
 While we considered summarizing the results of our five decades of research, 
we were invited to participate in the Group Focused Enmity research project co-
ordinated by Bielefeld University in 2009. It was during this research project 
that we realized (Örkény and Váradi 2010) that the new situation of the nation 
could no longer be articulated and conceptualized as we had done previously. It 
became clear that we should pay particular attention to the relationships between 
new groups arising from migration and national majority societies, which partly 
accepted and partly rejected the new groups.
 The unbreakable relation between nation and migration is explained by the 
accelerated processes of globalization in the twenty-first century. Physical space 
lost its earlier ability to solidify and maintain political-cultural borders that sep-
arated groups of various cultures, nations and religions from one another. As a 
result, borders changed from spatial to cultural entities, as described by Hunting-
ton (1996), and brought various cultural-ethnic groups that had no direct expe-
rience of one another into close contact. This change, as proven in this volume, 
has deeply transformed national identity patterns in Europe based on historical 
foundations and has liquefied the borders between nation types in both political 
and cultural terms (Bianchini 2017; Brubaker 1996).
 In the chapters of the volume dealing with migration we rely partially on the 
Group Focused Enmity (GFE) study results and partially on our own research in 
Hungary to reconstruct the various scripts on the development of relations between 
given host societies defined by the national category, and the religious, cultural, and 
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various other migrant minority groups that have appeared among the former. This 
relationship can unfold through assimilation, but we think it is more likely that 
majority-minority relations develop partly through conflict and partly through har-
mony. We speak of conflict when the values of the host society and the minority 
groups clash and social entropy is obstructed, which results in the segregation of the 
minority group and an interpretation of their experience as unjust. The path out of 
this situation can be opposition, or in some cases terrorism, to which the majority 
society responds with refusal and xenophobia. The harmonious scripts of coexis-
tence make possible the presence of both the majority and minority alongside one 
another. The most desirable situation is where this coexistence takes place based on 
civic equality ensured by the rule of law and a respect for human rights.
 But whichever script unfolds, the most definitive message of this volume is 
that as a result of migration, neither the nations nor the minorities arising from 
migration can continue from where they left off. A new story is beginning, the 
arrival of which we can only signal, but of which we have no concrete knowledge.
 We can see that the accelerated and irrevocable migration processes global-
ization has caused have radically changed the patterns of national identity among 
European nations, this volume also shows that Europe’s historically rooted division 
into eastern and western regions has not been superseded by the new tendencies. 
The East-West line dividing Europe, which was previously described by outstanding 
historians like Jenő Szűcs, Perry Anderson and Anthony Smith, has not disappeared. 
There is a paradox whereby the mutual effect of migration and the nation in the 
western half of Europe has created a new sociological and social psychological 
reality of coexistence. This did not emerge immediately or easily, but these societies 
appear ready to respond in manners that are democratic and respect human rights. 
In contrast, in the eastern half of Europe, new minorities arising from migration 
exist only in the media and in political propaganda, they not having found accepting 
communities. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the symbolic presence and actual 
absence of migrants has strengthened the ethnocentric basis of national identity and 
fed xenophobia, damaging the democratic transition process that ensued after the 
1989–90 regime changes. This too is the beginning of a new story, which unfortu-
nately diverges from the story begun in Western European societies. 
 In our judgment, the divergent approaches of Eastern and Western Europe 
to the challenges of nation and migration is one of the European Union’s greatest 
challenges in the twenty-first century.
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R E S E A R C H  Q U E S T I O N S 
The starting point for the set of problems discussed in this book is Szűcs’s reflec-
tions on István Bibó’s life work (Szűcs 1983). The significance of these reflections 
is clearer today than forty years ago, when Szűcs’s book was published. European 
political and economic integration has apparently been established, but behind 
unification it is impossible to ignore the differences between Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe. Further, it is clear that the operation of democratic civic society 
is facing challenges, not only in Eastern Europe, but in Western Europe as well. 
The basic research question of our book is the degree to which Szűcs’s theory on 
three developmental regions, the origins of which the author locates at the split 
of the Roman Empire into eastern and western spheres, is valid today. Which is 
stronger, divergence or convergence? The theory differentiates the Western Euro-
pean developmental region from the Eastern European one. The historical roots of 
the differences stem from the social structure of the one-time Carolingian Empire. 
This region later expanded to include the societies of Scandinavia. Szűcs claims 
that it was in this region that the micro-structural conditions were met for the 
foundation of later mezzo and macro levels of the political and social psychologi-
cal structures necessary for the construction of capitalism and democracy. In con-
trast, in the eastern half of the Roman Empire, which was centered in Byzantium, 
empires formed that were centralized and bureaucratic, where personal liberty, 
mutuality and the rule of law never came to fruition. The most interesting area 
is the hybrid region between the western and eastern regions, where, in Szűcs’s 
analysis, elements of Western and Eastern European social development mixed. 
In this book we examine how this tri-regional model persists through issues of na-
tional identity, the nation state, nationalism, European identity, xenophobia and 
migration. We hypothetically assume and proceed to prove in the chapters of the 
volume, that even though there is convergence among the three regions, historical 
causes mean divergence is dominant.
 A closely related issue is the dichotomy of the cultural nation and the civic 
nation, the existence of which we strive to verify through the examination and 
analysis of the results of several sociological questionnaire studies, which led us to 
loosen the typology.
 A separate research concern is the integration of minority and majority groups 
into nation states. As a part of this issue we deal with social entropy and entropy- 
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resistant groups. Globalization has led to a new situation, and we assume that the 
migrant minorities arising through new migration in given European countries 
will be resistant to entropy, as they have been in the past.
 The integration in Europe from the second half of the twentieth century and 
through the first decades of the twenty-first has softened conflicts between certain 
national identities and has brought to the fore the development of a European 
identity, the study of which is one of the key research priorities of this volume. 
From a methodological point of view, the greatest challenge—the one we had to 
face when writing this book—is the international comparison of various national 
identity patterns. In the interest of undertaking such comparisons we developed 
a cognitive sociological national identity model, the variables of which we could 
identify and measure in representative samples of the given societies. The details 
are described in the chapter on national identity. The most important issue we 
dealt with was the relationship between ethnocentrism and nationalism, through 
which the limits of the validity of Szűcs’s social development models become clear. 
It seems that differences between Western European and Central European re-
gions are declining, while the Eastern Europe region, rooted in the East European 
Byzantine past, stands strongly apart. We present the extreme eastern poles of 
Western and Eastern European national identity development through the examples 
of Russia and Turkey.
 The new manifestations of xenophobia, which can be traced back primarily 
to migration, are also key research issues in this volume. We found important 
theoretical inspiration in the GFE theory (Zick et al. 2008), which locates behind 
manifest prejudice and discrimination the assumed existence of general affective 
and cognitive patterns which define potential conflict between groups. One of 
our research questions asked how this pattern appears vis-à-vis minorities arising 
from the new migration, with a special focus on Muslim minorities arriving from 
regions outside Europe. In this book we also address how the migration challenge 
in Europe has activated the rhetoric of right-wing radicalism and populism in the 
East and the West. We assume that the European Union is aware of the contradic-
tions in the unique operation of the new migration, but we are not yet aware of 
a solution or whether there can be one at all.
 The European Union’s decision makers, the Parliament, Commission and Coun-
cil have either not taken measure of, or misinterpreted, the effects of globalization 
on the entirety of the European Union and on its member states individually. 
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Migration is merely one unmeasured and misinterpreted consequence of global-
ization, with others include Europe’s diminishing role in the world economy, 
lagging behind in research and development and innovation, shortcomings de-
veloping and propagating cultural patterns of an attractive European identity, and 
managing the demographic crises in member states.
 Another key research issue of our volume is the identification of conflictual 
or harmonious patterns in the relationship between minorities created by the new 
migration and the majority societies of the host countries. The answers provided 
are based on the results of research projects, partly in Hungary and partly inter-
national in their scope. Our questions are primarily focused on exploring what 
threats the members of majority societies see from migration and what strategies 
migrants follow when developing their relationships with majority societies.
 The final question we deal with in the book is one that refers back to Szűcs’s 
analysis of three European regions and the divergent but striking appearance of 
othering arising from migration. In Western Europe, where daily contact with the 
presence of migrants is normal (though not necessarily positive) the cognitive 
argumentative force of “othering” is necessarily weak, whereas in Eastern Europe 
fears generated by populist policies and media dominated by a central political 
will have demonized and scattered the migrant presence, which happens less often 
in Western Europe.
C H A P T E R  1 . 
T H E  R I S E  O F  N A T I O N S : 
M O D E R N I T Y  A N D  N A T I O N S 
C O M I N G  I N T O  E X I S T E N C E
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It has taken a long time for the communal societies of the world to turn into modern 
ones—this historical process has been slow, gradual, and unevenly distributed in 
geographical space. The decisive factor of this shift was literacy, the written word 
released ideas from the constraints of orally transmitted tradition. Written texts 
opened up new vistas for the accumulation of knowledge, thus creating the possi-
bility of limitless cognitive growth. Interpersonal relationships became bifurcated 
by modernity based on whether the actors encountered one another in formal 
(non-elected) or informal (elected) roles. Up to the present day, the incest taboo 
related to us through King Oedipus’s tragic fate admonishes humans of the fault 
line between the two types of role relations marking the origins of the modern 
western individual—one who is free and accountable for their deeds. And while 
inclined to live by the pleasure principle, they cannot do so under the pressure of 
the reality principle. Modernity has recreated the social world, laid the grounds 
for new values, and set off new processes and institutions that blocked the paths 
of return to the communal structures of society.
 In antiquity, three values fundamental to modern societal development were 
born. The individual’s freedom redefined their nexus with the community for-
merly grounded in the oppression of individual will. Each person can choose 
to act but is held accountable for the consequences of their actions. The right 
choices lead to success, and the wrong ones to defeat. Freedom is inseparable from 
the social value attributed to property, providing its owners with the security to 
choose one action over another. Finally, the third value is equality, the realization 
of which prevents individuals from exercising undue power over others.
 The sustenance of modern society depends on three institutions. The market- 
place released the economy from the restrictions of chance individual transactions, 
thus establishing the framework of trade based on the universal exchange of goods 
and services. The nation-state created the structures of political power responsible 
for maintaining order within the physical, social, and symbolic space controlled 
by the national imagination. Finally, the social class system, as construed in 
Gellner’s theory (2009), liberates individuals from the forced trajectories of collec-
tive determinations operating beyond their control and opens up the opportunity 
to occupy a place in society based upon their performance, knowledge, and merits. 
This entails the possibility to either rise or fall on the social ladder, but since the 
subjects of these movements are free, society as a whole is in continuous flux, with 
ever-shifting social structures.
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 In the center of modern society is the autonomous individual whose choices 
are shaped by considerations of attainability and desirability. Rationality implies 
the simultaneous reckoning with the attainability and favorableness of one’s aspi-
rations in relation to which all other configurations would lead one into the realm 
of the irrational. Reason guides the free individual who no longer needs guidance 
from churches that infantilize the adult actor by subjecting them to authority.
 Modernity came into being as a protracted and a step-by-step process concen-
trated in particular geographical regions. Its onset can be traced back to antiquity, 
yet this project has never been completed. From time to time, modernization set 
off at some location but faltered and reversed. Yet on a global scale, modernization 
cannot be stopped. As the psychological burden of becoming economically, 
politically, and culturally uniform overtaxes the individuals released from the ties 
of communal societies, many would seek refuge in the past, if only they could. 
T H E  T H R E E  H I S T O R I C A L  D E V E L O P M E N T A L  R E G I O N S 
O F  E U R O P E
Europe is the birthplace of modernity. The values of freedom, property, and 
equality were formed here—along with the institutions of the market, the nation 
state as well as the processes of individualization, rationalization and secularism, 
set out to conquer the world but have not yet succeeded. As yet the entirety of the 
world is far from modern. All societies still have to face the challenges of global 
modernization. 
 In the early 1980s (1983), Szűcs formulated a thesis about Europe’s three 
developmental regions, claiming that the geopolitical status quo following the 
demise of the Roman Empire had proved enduring. Up until the present time the 
political, cultural, and social psychological boundaries evolved in the aftermath of 
the breakup into a Western and an Eastern Roman Empire have persisted. 
 It was in the Carolingian Empire established on the Western Roman territory 
where Szűcs identified a combination of ancient, Christian, barbarian, and German 
features construed ever since as the “West.” With the border situated along the 
Elbe-Saale and Leitha rivers, the eastern half fell under the reign of the Byzantium 
and held rigidly onto its Roman legacy.
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 The third region lay between the West and the East. Regarding this region, 
Szűcs stated: 
In between the twofold influence and parallel to the first boundary, another no less 
marked eastern separation line evolved reaching from the Lower Danube’s area to the 
eastern Carpathians and northward along the woodlands separating the western from 
the eastern Slavs as well as the Polish from the Russian lands, ending eventually in 
the Baltics in the 13th century. The territory west from here had already been broadly 
named by contemporaries around 1100 and 1200 as Europe Occidens (Occidental), ap-
parently ignoring the former Elbe-Leitha border. As soon as Europe had grown from 
a mere geographical entity into a cultural and even structural identity synonymous 
with the Christianitas, it bifurcated along the lines of the Roman versus the Byzantine 
influence. The zone situated from the river Elbe to the Carpathian range and from the 
Baltics to the Adriatic Sea, that is, the new region attached to the vestiges of the former 
“Caroling Europe” with an expanse close to half of it, became less and less hesitatingly 
referred to—not unlike Scandinavia—as “Western Europe.” (Szűcs 1983, 2)
 It thus appeared that the West would encompass the middle part of Europe as 
well. The new boundaries were marked by the exemplars of Roman, Gothic, and 
Renaissance architecture. The absence of such architecture beyond the territories 
once possessed by the Hungarian and Polish kingdoms and the Knights of Prussia 
signified the edge of the East.
 Central Europe, however, only became incorporated into the West temporarily. 
As Szűcs explained: 
The sharp demarcation line of economic and social structural difference dividing Europe 
into two parts after 1500, and marking the predominantly more spacious eastern half 
to be the site of the “second serfdom” in effect reproduced with stunning exactitude 
the earlier Elbe-Leitha border of circa 800. Moreover, following nearly half a millenni-
um—in the present day—Europe finds itself, once again, cut more definitely than ever, 
into two “camps” practically by the same geographical boundary—with some minor 
deviations around Thuringia. One might wonder if Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt 
had studied carefully the status quo in the era of Charlemagne on the anniversary of 
the 1130th anniversary of the emperor’s death. (Szűcs 1983, 3)
 The end of the cold war finally lifted the iron curtain. Within the European 
Union’s organizational framework, Central Europe once again became part of 
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 The differences between the three regions, however, have persisted. In Western 
Europe, societies since the Carolingian era have developed in an organic fashion, 
gradually broadening individual freedoms and the autonomous associations built 
on those freedoms. This was the foundation on which modern political, economic, 
and cultural progress took place. Eastern European social development, on the 
other hand, carried the mark of the Byzantine model from the start, involving an 
overbearing state, the centralization of power, and a lack of recognition of individ-
ual freedom. Even though the Byzantium fell, new empires rose in its place, built 
upon similar principles. 
 The Western model of societal organization premised upon autonomous 
networks enabled the continuous increase of goods, the flourishing of culture, 
urbanization, industrialization, and the solidification of civil society. In contrast, 
the Eastern model, centralized and inimical toward individual and collective 
autonomies, as it was, has permanently lagged behind its Western counterpart, 
which necessitated reforms to modernize. Once launched, the reforms came to 
a standstill. No organic modernization has ever transpired.
 Drawing on István Széchenyi’s (2002) ideas, one could describe the social- 
psychological effects of Western versus Eastern societal trajectory by reference to 
the paradigms of “credit culture” as opposed to the “tribute culture.” In Széchenyi’s 
understanding, credit is far from merely an economic category; it is a social- 
psychological construct allowing for a person to have trust in another and in the law. 
Credit is predicated upon the creditor’s belief in getting paid back. Tribute, on the 
contrary, is an act of taking away or dispossession breeding suspicion and distrust.
 The dynamism and growth of Western European society is rendered possible 
by the credit culture that shapes institutional and personal relationships, implying 
that the parties of a transaction trust one another, present themselves favorably, 
and have faith both in themselves and in others. All of this works as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as it improves the quality of interpersonal relationships. The culture of 
tribute operates inversely in effecting a negative psychic spiral. In Central Europe 
a combination of the two ideal types can be found ensuring either one or the 
other’s dominance at different points in time and geographical space. Discussing 
the Slovaks’ position in Europe, Rudolf Chmel observed a phenomenon applying to 
other Central European countries as well, namely, that the Slovaks have alternately 
displayed behaviors characteristic of the closed authoritarian, antidemocratic, and 
oligarchic East, on the one hand, and the open, more liberal and democratic West,
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on the other (Chmel 2016). Comparative research into the values held in different 
nations compellingly suggests that the past has not been bypassed in Europe. Marx 
was correct to contend that “men make their own history, but they do not make it 
as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition 
of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (1852, 1).
T H E O R I Z I N G  T H E  N A T I O N 
Nations are pivotal formations of social life, which help people place themselves 
and others in the immensity of the world and find meaning and purpose in the 
post-traditional age following the “death of God” (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 108). Not 
until the second half of the twentieth century was the concept of the nation subject 
to sociological inquiry. Before then, sociologists tended to focus on social class 
issues without considering their national context. However, they had to confront 
the reality of classes existing within nations.
 Sociological thought about the nation is fraught with controversy. Theorists 
disagree whether the nation should be viewed as a modern or a historically long- 
standing formation. Those who claim that the nation is historically “old” would 
also argue that “nothing is new under the sun,” therefore everything to study in 
a nation’s life has been around for a long time. On the other side of the trench, 
theorists construing the nation as a modern formation would claim that the habitual 
behaviors observed in earlier formations have little in common with those shaped 
by contemporary national frameworks. 
 The perennialists approach the diversity of nations as an essential response to 
the indeterminacy that intrinsically characterizes the human condition, enabling 
the members of such groups to self-identify as a nation and to carve their own 
time and space out of Nothingness. In this way, they forged a unique formation 
unmistakable for any other group in the human world. Modernists, on the con-
trary, believe that national uniqueness is merely imagined and was invented by 
an intellectual elite in order to restrain the limitless drive for individualism as 
well as to strengthen social cohesion that had been shattered by the dissolution 
of communal ties rooted in tradition. The nation, according to this perception, 
is but a mere construct without any essential qualities to it.
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 Further dimensions may be added to this debate. One may ask what is essen-
tially collective or supra-individual about the nation—a question which can be 
undermined by claiming there is nothing preexisting the individual choosing by 
his or her own will to become a member of the community of a nation. This 
dilemma is fundamental to theorizing about the nation, allowing one to argue 
either that the nation is a cultural community or, alternately, it is a political one.
 Each of these standpoints is present in the literature. Yet most authors attempt 
to reconcile the opposing arguments. Stalin’s definition of the nation is intriguing 
since in the empire under his rule he had the opportunity to adjust his policies to 
his conception. Even by contemporary standards, Stalin’s approach is valid, even 
though precisely the element of the political is absent from it. It asserts that 
“A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the 
basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture” (Stalin 1953, chap. 1). More than seven decades 
later Anthony Smith, in essence, replicated Stalin’s idea. Smith opines that the 
nation is a historical and cultural community with a name of its own, inhabiting 
a unified territory, and instituting mass public education and common rights for 
its people (1991).
 A crucial dimension of the clashing definitions is the historicity of the nation’s 
concept, setting the so called “perennialists” against the “modernists.” The former 
construe the nation to be continuous with the ancient and medieval formations, 
explaining it in reference to the endurance of the community’s name, its semantic 
space thus created, its symbols, historical narrative, dwelling space, and the tra-
ditions incorporated into the culture. As a result of these long-standing features, 
the pronoun “we” became the time-transcending psychosocial core of communal 
imaginaries as opposed to “strangeness.”
 According to the modernists, the intellectual procedures and contents pre-
sented the nation as an imagined entity. The contents and symbols of national 
identity were knowingly invented and propagated by the intellectuals’ and pol-
iticians’ discontent with the feudal order. The nation, in this approach, is the 
outcome of modern social developments that produced a unified marketplace, 
an all-encompassing legal system, and a universal school system furthering cul-
tural uniformity within the country’s territorial boundaries. The protagonist of 
this process is the individual bound to others via their national consciousness and 
national sentiments, which in turn are grounded in civic rights and duties.
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The modern nation state did not inherit but simply utilized the identities that had 
been forged on ethnic and religious bases. The crux of national development is 
sovereignty deriving from the nation’s will. It was up to the pattern of national 
development, that the concept of the nation implied the “Volk” or the “People.” 
National sovereignty involves total control over the territory and its residents 
exercised by governmental leaders whose power is earned through elections.
 Owing to the meaning-making potential of national ideology, the land vindicated 
by the nation thus becomes “homeland,” a site of shared destiny demarcated by “natu-
ral” borders. The nation is not a naturally given group of people, yet it can be made 
to seem like one by “translating” the national ideology into the individual’s lifeworld. 
 Max Weber has integrated successfully the opposing poles of the theories of 
nation pointing out that the “nation” is nothing else than a realm of common values, 
patterning uniquely the collective experiences and meanings, seen as a community, 
and simultaneously increasing the internal assimilation of its members and the 
external differentiation from the other national groups (Fleet 2011, 38). Weber 
is right to emphasize the role of beliefs in common descent in the formation of 
national consciousness warning that “it does not matter whether or not an objective 
blood relationship exists” (1968, 389). 
 Gellner (2009) argues that nationalism, inevitably, is the ideological product 
of the transformation from agrarian into industrial society, offering rights even to 
those lacking them prior to societal change. The expansion of such rights offers 
equal opportunities for success to all ethnic, religious, and regional groups and 
orders. National society in a sense is the “melting pot” of feudal society randomly 
redistributing members of the preexisting groups into the newly forming social 
classes. National unity, predicated upon general schooling and a unified cultural 
canon producing workable psychic effects, has the capacity to override the in-
equalities generated by a class system.
 Taking either perspective, it is evident that the nation is part of a human drama 
animated by language. The name of a nation engenders the semantic space 
nurturing the national imaginary, which enables the nation’s members to inhabit 
the drama’s space and time setting.
 Nationalism cements the goals of national existence. This ideology is more 
aggressive when national existence is merely willed as opposed to it being an attained 
reality. The difference is theorized by historian Miklós Szabó who distinguishes 
between the “ideology of a program” and the “ideology of a situation” (Szabó 1977).
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 As a secular religion, nationalism filters into the semantic space emptied by 
secularization providing meaning, goals, and a sense of mission to the orphans 
of the slayed God. Nietzsche powerfully evokes the imagined moment when the 
“madman” warns his ignorant fellows that God no longer exists. “Where has God 
gone?” he calls out:
I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how 
have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to 
wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its 
sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not 
dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an 
above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty 
space breathe upon us? (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 125) 
 Nationalism as a secular religion (Gerő 2006) embeds humans in historical 
time, offers them a place, a perspective, and ties to those akin to them, besides en-
suring the security of challenging other people perceived as different. It is through 
symbolism that the nation’s historical chronology and the spaces of its holidays 
are created: rituals, ceremonies and speech acts are performed according to the 
dictates of role expectations concomitant with national membership.
 The citizenry made legally and mentally uniform through realizing the nation-
alist project is called the “people,” who is the carrier of sovereignty and the com-
municator of the nation’s will. Nation states differ in terms of the manner they let 
the will of the people find expression through the periodical election of individuals 
into decision making bodies. In liberal democracies the legislative, executive, and 
juridical functions are separate, and it is through the power of the constitution 
that human and civil rights such as the right to property, freedom of speech, and 
religion are guaranteed as the unalterable and inalienable rights of every citizen. In 
the so called “people’s” democracies the branches of governance are not separated 
as the legal arrangement is subject to lineage, social psychological, and cultural 
inheritance. Election is but a periodical act of voting confidence to a leader. 
 The infrastructure of the modern nation state includes a capital city, a central-
ized bureaucracy, an army and police, a uniform cultural and historical canon, 
a national bank, a currency and a legal system. Yet the most important aspect of 
the nation state’s existence is international recognition, since if it is not recognized 
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T H E  F U L F I L L M E N T  A N D  F A I L U R E  O F  S O C I A L  E N T R O P Y
Gellner (2009) deems the rise of nations to be the necessary outcome of the tran-
sition from agrarian to industrial society. In the agrarian society there is no social 
mobility. No movement is possible between the agrarian workers and the ruling 
elite of the society. The division between the rulers and the ruled is sustained 
by political and cultural power warranting the reproduction of this system from 
generation to generation.
 In contrast, industrial society is predicated upon change. The economic and 
cognitive products of industrial society continuously proliferate, which implies 
that new generations cannot continue whence their parents lefts off. Even though 
goods are distributed inequitably in society, theoretically the opportunities for 
success are equal. The foundation of social stratification is merit rather than in-
herited privilege. Continuous economic growth inspires new forms of activity and 
professions requiring knowledge, expertise, and skills. This is only rendered possible 
by a universal, mandatory public school system which provides the opportunity for 
all students to acquire the factual and cultural knowledge needed to move ahead in 
the national society.
 The national society is a knowledge and communicational community, ide-
ally every member of which is capable of having him or herself understood by all 
other members. Karl Deutsch was one of the first theorist of nation highlighting 
the theme of communication bounding the members of nations. As Deutsch ob-
serves “people are held together ‘from within’ by this communicative efficiency, 
the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members” 
(Deutsch 1966, 98). Entropy in physics means a transition from the orderly to the 
disorderly, from regular to irregular states. Entropy in sociology is a metaphor 
meaning that, in the course of the transition to industrial society, the groups and 
strata of agrarian society did not stay together. Instead their members randomly 
found their new social position in the entirety of the continuously growing eco-
nomic and cognitive structures of labor division. Social entropy is the individuals’ 
social movement dictated by the dynamism of industrialization, which privileges 
personal capabilities, motivation, and goals to succeed.
 As opposed to the collective determinations prevalent in agrarian society, the 
new social stratification based on the indeterminacy resulting from a multitude 
of individual wills is an ideal type. A resistance to social entropy developed in 
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societies where, within the framework of industrialization, the collective social 
trajectories of the agrarian era stayed in place, keeping together groups apparently 
based on ethnicity, religion or race. For the majority of the populace structured 
according the laws of entropy, the entropy resistant groups seemed like the “other” 
or the “stranger.” Such perceptions called forth stereotypes and prejudices further 
deepening the divide between the majority and the minority groups.
 Gellner (2009) gives the following example to illustrate how groups resisting 
social entropy are formed. Let us assume that there is a collection of people in 
agrarian society whose members have genetically inherited blue skin. Despite pol-
icies offering equal opportunities to everyone, most of the blue-skinned end up in 
the upper echelons of society as it transitions into an industrial one, leading the 
non-blue-skinned to believe that an undue number of blue-skinned have gotten 
into privileged positions. Being “blue” therefore becomes the source of prejudice 
and stereotypes, which will cause these people to be seen as “intruders,” “parasites,” 
and “exploiters.”
 There might be another group whose genetic inheritance is yellow skin. Despite 
policies ensuring equal opportunities to all, most of the yellow-skinned would end 
up in the lower social classes in the wake of transition into an industrial society, 
prompting the non-yellow-skinned to think that an inordinate number of “yellows” 
are in the lower classes. This will spawn stereotypes and prejudice towards “yellowness” 
associated with traits such as being “lazy,” “averse to work,” or “dumb.” 
 Stereotypes and prejudices afflicting given social groups in industrial society 
are only produced by resistance to social entropy if the original group-forming 
category appears to be naturally given. Such traits may include skin color, body 
type or facial characteristics. Stereotypes and prejudice require visibility as a basis 
for discrimination.
 The conflicts arising from resistance to social entropy mask the class structure 
of industrial society whose fundamental feature is the concentration of resources 
in the hands of a few, while many are deprived of economic, cultural, and political 
goods. If there were no entropy resistant groups in industrial society, each gener-
ation would start anew the class struggle to acquire these possessions, assuming 
that the distribution of goods was independent of preexisting social ranking. In 
such a scenario, the essence of these struggles would not be concealed by stereo-
types and prejudices affecting groups that resist social entropy. 
 An industrial society exempt from entropy resistant groups, however, is a 
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utopia. Immigration involves the continuous influx of “strangers” who, due to 
their cultural, religious, and ethnic differences, would not become included in the 
“social melting pot.” Along their given determinations, the members of immigrant 
groups tend to organize themselves into networks whose potency is multi-
plied by the opportunities offered by new information and communication tech-
nologies.
 In the modern globalized world, wealthy countries attract like a magnet the cit-
izens of poorer countries. The less these immigrants are willing to assimilate 
themselves along the spectrum of the host society’s structures, the more acute 
forms of xenophobic attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices they will face from the 
majority population. In that case they become ghettoized and involuntarily ex-
cluded from the division of labor. If they remain outsiders to the economic, cultur-
al, and political system as a whole, their existence will spark severe majority versus 
minority conflicts. 
E T H N O N A T I O N A L  M I N O R I T I E S  I N  T H E  M O D E R N  N A T I O N 
S T A T E
Minority is a relational category. A group may be considered a minority if there 
is a majority in relation to which a minority is separated by a category relevant 
to both parties. Only in the modern nation state does the majority vs. minority 
relationship present itself as an issue, since the nation state cannot operate its 
economic, political, and cultural institutions unless its members are psychologically 
alike. Moreover, their image of the national group to which they belong makes 
it possible for everyone to have that invariable and constraining imaginary con-
struct of reality rooted in a national knowledge base. Those situated outside of 
this imaginary group are considered strangers threatening the unity of the nation.
Discussing the sociological processes characterizing the European nation states, 
we have established that, in the course of national development, the members of 
all the various groups within the feudal social structure end up “distributed” ran-
domly, according to the law of entropy, in the emergent social structures within 
the geographical, economic, and cultural space defined by the nation state. Earlier 
ties based in locality, profession, order, religion, and ethnicity give way to a new 
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bond with the nation state, a national identity that everyone can accept as their 
own, which helps make sense of the world for those carrying the identity. 
 A minority may be regarded as a group whose members in the process of 
nation formation do not randomly find their place in the new structure but hold 
together more or less collectively in one strata. In the eyes of the national majority, 
they appear as a minority and this affects their members disadvantageously in 
several respects.
 The first disadvantage is semantic in nature. The term “minority” connotes 
“smallness,” “weakness,” and “sporadic” as opposed to “largeness,” “strength,” and 
“multitudes” associated with the term “majority.” In everyday language use, “minority” 
is laden with negative value judgments, while “majority” is laden with positive 
ones. In a 1970s experiment we asked six-year-old Hungarian children (not yet 
attending school) to draw a picture of their own country and of the Soviet Union, 
the United States, and China next to it. At this age, children imagined Hungary 
as big and, accordingly, the drawings showed Hungary at least the size of the 
Soviet Union, the United States, and China. By school age, this tendency was no 
longer observed. The children depicted their country in its actual proportion, that 
is, small.
 The semantics of the word “minority” evidently played a role in Lenin’s deci-
sion when, in breaking his faction away from the Russian Social Democratic Party, 
he called it “Bolshevik,” meaning “of the majority” as opposed to the other faction 
designated as “Menshevik,” meaning minority, overlooking the actual numerical 
proportions of the two factions.
 To belong to a minority entails disadvantages in perception as well. Studies by 
Hamilton and Gifford showed that when the subjects of an experiment had to 
describe groups “A” and “B,” of which one group’s members were half as many 
as the other groups, the smaller group’s members were more negatively charac-
terized by the respondents than those of the bigger group. Fewness and negativity 
forms an illusory correlation in the mind, a tendency more pronounced when 
it comes to actual minorities. This explains why phrases like “Gypsy crime” or 
“migrant rape” catch on in the majority’s consciousness (Hamilton and Gifford 1976).
 Discriminatory practices occur on different spheres in the society. In every-
day life the most common forms of discrimination on social and mainstream 
media sites are hate speech, offensive jokes, and slurs. Of particular significance 
is discrimination by police officers, health care providers, teachers and other pub-
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lic service personnel. Another social sphere is legislation rejecting human rights 
such as the case of Jewish laws enacted in Germany and other Central and East 
European countries between the two world wars or the apartheid regime of South 
Africa sustained as recently as until 1994.
 Minority existence means not only an inequitable share from the socially pro-
duced goods and services but political and cultural barriers as well. Semantic and 
cognitive difficulties tend to justify social disadvantages, concealing the injustice 
involved. Only by removing the stigma attached by the majority group can the 
minorities stand up for themselves to restore justice. This necessitates the finding 
of their voice, empowering themselves, and connecting with an authentic leader 
like Martin Luther King. Kurt Lewin identified the obstacles of minority emanci-
pation as self-loathing, the difficulty of finding a credible leader, and self-effacing 
assimilation (Lewin 1948).
 The “pure” nation state without minorities in the strict sense of the word is 
near to a utopia. Even though some entropy-resistant minorities have ceased to 
exist as such via assimilation or evacuation, new groups have kept arriving via 
immigration whose religion, language, ethnic origin, and value system have been 
different from those of the majority. In addition, there are sexual minorities and 
deviants stigmatized and ostracized by the dominant group. 
 During World War Two, Bettelheim and Janowitz examined the majority rep-
resentations of Jewish and African American (or, in the language of those times, 
“Negro”) groups in the US army. They found that it was “success” with regard to the 
Jews and “failure” regarding the African Americans that came up as the excuse for 
discrimination (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1950). 
 The success of a minority provokes collective jealousy or resentment among 
members of the majority who, in assessing the achievements of the minority 
group members, do not see them as the result of high performance, diligence, and 
effort but instead group loyalty, exclusion of the majority members or, in the lingo 
of the anti-Jewish Laws in Hungary, “taking up living space” (térfoglalás).
 The failure, on the other hand, of a minority group is an admonition for the 
majority group as to the precarity of their own position and the possibility of 
downward mobility, which is held at bay by mentally maximizing the distance 
from the given minority. An example of this is the majority’s perception of the 
Roma in European societies as a dirty, lumpen, crooked, and sexually licentious 
underclass, a perception expressing the repressed anxieties of the majority.
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 Discrimination, which is unjust toward minorities, may be eliminated by 
altering the relationship between the majority and the minority groups, which 
demands efforts to be made by both parties. The minority group needs authentic 
leaders, finding a voice of their own, and a strategy for social mobility. The major-
ity must be led by an elite that makes no concessions to racism. In public service 
there must be zero tolerance for violating human rights. Segregation in preschools 
and public schools is forbidden by the law. Civil movements must work to 
enhance tolerance between social groups exemplified by organizations like the 
Not in Our Town movement in the United States1 or the Theatre of Witness in 
Northern Ireland.2
E T H N O P O L I T I C S  A N D  G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
In general, globalization seems to be a process that incessantly and unstoppably 
homogenizes the societies of this world, erasing its differences and realizing 
the free movement of people, ideas, goods, and services. On the other hand, we 
can argue that the process of globalization is far from linear, there are recessions, 
counter tendencies, increasing resistance and other serious pitfalls. It has been 
disputed when this phenomenon began. Some trace it back to antiquity, while 
others believe it started with the colonizing expeditions of Western and Southern 
European states. All the authors concur, however, that capitalism has accelerated 
globalization, turning it into a process that indeed traverses the entire world 
(Wallerstein 2005).
  Recognizing the intrinsic connection between capitalism and globalization, 
Marx surmised that as a result of the internationalization of the economy the so-
cial structure of national societies would emerge everywhere in the world creat-
ing an international bourgeoisie and proletariat. He predicted that, with the class 
struggle transposed onto the international level, the existing national, religious, 
ethnic separations would be transcended, the nation states would be politically 
meaningless, and a world government of the proletariat triumphant in the global 
revolution would come into being.
1  See https://www.niot.org/.
2  See https://www.culturenorthernireland.org/features/performing-arts/theatre-witness.
I    37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   T H E  R I S E  O F  N A T I O N S
  Contrary to Marx’s position, globalization did not eliminate but rather intensi-
fied the ethnic, national, and religious differences on a global scale. In the new 
world order of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the battle is waged 
not between classes but, in Huntington’s phrase, between “civilizations” (1996). 
Sociologists had to come to terms with the reality that their concepts, theories, 
and methodologies, which were tailored to the study of capitalist societies’ class 
structure in a national context, unsuitable for inquiry into the international and 
intercultural processes spawned by globalization. The interpretative space of human 
activities has been irreversibly transformed (Tomlinson 2007).
 The space that appears meaningful to people is a cultural product which, given 
the semiotic uncertainties brought about by globalization, is the sole reference 
in answering the existential question “who am I?” It seemed that modernization 
rendered this question moot by foregrounding the rational, free, and responsible 
individual who presumably rid themselves of the prejudices called “idols” by 
Francis Bacon (2000). The events of the twentieth century, however, have refuted 
this expectation. Two world wars and a cold war made it clear that multitudes of 
individuals disillusioned by modernization would seek refuge in autocratic regimes 
deploying buzzwords like race, nation, or “the people” (Fromm 1994).
 With the end of the Cold War, the security offered by a bipolar world evapo-
rated. The West found itself on its own. New centers of power emerged reordering 
the state of affairs. Yet the distribution of goods required for material well-being 
continued to follow Pareto’s rule even in the new world order: 80 percent of the 
goods are consumed in regions inhabited by 20 percent of the global population, 
while the remaining 20 percent of goods are distributed to 80 percent of the 
world’s population (Pareto 1897).
 Some of this disproportion is due to the drastic growth of the world’s popu-
lation. The following table (1.1) regarding growth trends was published by Péter 
Kende, based on the summer 2015 issue of the Paris periodical Commentaire 
(Kende 2016, 56): 
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Table 1.1. Changes in the world’s population between 1900 and 2050 
(in millions and percent)
 1900 2014 2020* 2030* 2050* 
The entire world’s population 
(in million)  1625 6067 7238 8444 9683
Europe (in percent) (1)  17.9 8.6 7.4 6.5 5.7 
The broadly understood “West” 
(in percent) (2)  26.5 22.7 21.4 20.1 18.8
The Russian Empire (in percent) 
(3)  7.7 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.4
All Muslim-majority countries 
(in percent) (4)  9.8 16.6 18.0 19.4 21.4
(*) projected
(1) EU-28 + Norway and Switzerland
(2) The same group complemented with North and South America, Australia, and Israel
(3) In 1900: Czarist Russia; from 2000 onward: The Russian Federation
(4) Muslim countries of Africa and Asia only.
 The figures of the table show that in the twentieth century the West’s and, 
within it, Europe’s share of the world’s population significantly decreased, and will 
continue to do so, unless millions migrate from the Muslim countries to the West. 
The direction of migration will be discussed in detail later in the book. At this 
point we would merely like to state that the Western countries’ level of material 
well-being may be sensed as an injustice by the countries failing to provide for 
their populations—an issue addressed by colonial independence wars and, subse-
quently, by the radical Muslim movements.
 All the countries on Earth have had to face the challenges of modernization, to 
which local societies responded with various degrees of resilience. Following the end 
of colonial dominance, new countries were established on the former colonies’ ter-
ritory whose borders became drawn—with calipers and rulers—by the ex-colonial 
states, irrespective of the inhabitants’ religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions. The 
citizens of the new states could not always develop a solid sense of identity, the ma-
jority continuing to define themselves while the other groups were seen as strangers 
according to the religious and ethnic categories of the pre-colonization era. After being 
forced into the new states, these societies responded to modernization in diverse ways.
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 Eisenstadt (1973) believes that some societies reacted to modernization with 
completely passive and negative attitudes. Other societies chose the path of active 
organized resistance, in the course of which they strove to preserve traditional 
values as much as possible. Finally, there have been societies capable of transfor-
mation, creating the new economic, political, and cultural conditions necessary 
for modern life.
 Huntington’s (1996) typology as to how non-western societies responded to 
modernization is quite similar to Eisenstadt’s model. Huntington also discusses re-
jection as being the most extreme fundamentalist answer to modernization. Fun-
damentalists revolt against the most basic prerequisites of modern development, 
with the exception of the armament, of which they, unmistakably, would prefer 
the most technologically advanced. The fundamentalist rebels speak the language 
of terrorism, the only one with which they can communicate.
 According to Huntington, another trajectory is Kemalism, which persecutes 
all possible manifestations of traditional society in working towards total societal 
modernization. This was a path taken by Peter the Great in eighteenth century 
Russia, followed by many other modernizing dictators in the twentieth century. In 
the absence of the social reforms needed to fully realize the modernization project, the 
idea of “progress” as interpreted by the dictator would not necessarily overlap with 
the will of the majority upon whom the changes are imposed. Sooner or later such 
a scenario would induce fundamentalist reactions, bringing about the fall of the ruler 
and the emergence of a new “people’s” dictatorship in its place (Kapuściński 1992).
 The modernization puzzle can best be solved via reformism, carrying out 
social change gradually, one step at a time, thus leaving traditional values intact. 
Huntington argues that reformism accepts modernization but refuses overt forms 
of Westernization (1996). Singapore might serve as the best example of this model 
(Magasházi 2019).
 The countries incapable of the reformist solution have faced political crises 
inducing conflicts between social groups identifying themselves along ethnic and 
religious categories. While some conflicts stayed within the boundaries of the na-
tion state, others inflamed into wars between them, leading in turn to the splintering 
of existing countries and the emergence of new ones. Where the government’s 
authority was shattered or destroyed entirely, genocidal forces were more easily 
unleashed (Snyder 2015). Failed states can seldom restore order from chaos, re-
sulting in escalating fights via the revival of former ethnic and national identities. 
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 The endless wars urged new migrations, with masses of people seeking out 
regions believed to be safe.
 Of the civilizations that reacted poorly to the challenge of global moderniza-
tion, Islam, which comprises one fifth of the world’s population, must be noted. 
Kemalism in Turkey seemed to be a successful mode of adaptation in the twentieth 
century, but the events of the twenty-first century suggest otherwise. In other 
Islamic countries adaptation failed from the start. Various explanations can be 
offered for the cause of failure. A most compelling one is the resistance of social 
organization premised on Islamic principles of secularization, an essential facet of 
modernization. This resistance makes Islam-based societies impervious to the 
establishment of modern nation states with its separation of the secular political 
realm from organized religion. In the wealthy Islamic states, the merging of the 
religious and the political realms does not present potential for conflict, at least not 
as long as there is enough wealth to go around. In contrast, countries with popu-
lations in the tens of millions may hold a grudge against the West for dominating 
and exploiting some of the Muslim societies, including a minority of twenty-first 
century Muslims who believe it to be their duty to restore justice by re-arranging 
the world’s regions (Huntington 1996).
 Our initial hypothesis in this book draws on Hans Kohn’s (1965) theory of the 
nation, distinguishing between its “political” and “cultural” variants. The “political 
nation” overlooks ethnic ties, considering everyone as the citizen of the nation 
state. The “cultural nation,” on the contrary, rests on ethnic bonds. We will see that 
in reality the two types do not differ very sharply at all. The insecurities produced 
by globalizing processes favored the ethnic principle, reviving it even in countries 
where nation building originally had followed the principles of “political nation.” 
Aktürk (2012) classifies nation states in terms of their relationship to the ethnic 
principle.
 The identity policy of par excellence political nations does not recognize ethnic 
principles. The United States represents the classic example of this, granting citizen-
ship to every individual born on its territory, irrespective of their native language, 
religion, and ethnicity. A similar national policy characterized the French Republic 
from the earliest times. 
 Our sociological data concerning national identities suggests that in the Euro-
pean Union’s nation states both models—the political and the cultural nation—are 
present. In the past one could observe the growing prevalence of the political national 
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principle at the expense of the cultural one in all of the EU’s’ member states. Yet 
the massive and continuous migration has been a challenge for both the mono-
ethnic and multiethnic national policy regimes. In the former regimes relying on 
the cultural national concept, the assimilation of minorities has always been a 
vexed and slow process involving, in the past, evacuation, cultural discrimination, 
forced assimilation, and the majority’s intolerant behaviors toward minorities. To 
remedy the “minority-problem” caused by migration, monoethnic nations had no 
other option but the expansion of legal space to obtain citizenship, a move exem-
plified recently by Germany (Aktürk 2012).
 As a result of the migration to Europe accelerating in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, the European nation states rejecting the ethnic prin-
ciple are less and less able to maintain a national identity centered merely on 
citizenship, which is seen as threatened by immigrants of diverse cultural, ethnic, 
and religious backgrounds.
 The example of Germany shows that the monoethnic national regime is, evidently, 
not suited to the needs of the new minorities arising from migration as they do 
not want to assimilate themselves to the majority population’s culture, history, and 
religious traditions not their own. The case of France indicates that the monoethnic 
regime does not work either since many of the immigrants cannot or do not want 
to live in a secular modern society where they are forced to shed their communal 
ties, they cannot fare merely as individuals.
 The large numbers of immigrants arriving from non-Western civilizations 
pressed by global modernizing forces entail problems of identity which are rarely 
resolved through the act of immigration. In numerous cases these individuals would 
carry along the traumas of wars waged in the border zones of civilizations, thus 
further aggravating the process of their integration into the European majority 
society that they have chosen to be their new home.
 For the nation states of the European Union, an obvious solution could be the 
multiethnic national policy regime. For the people dwelling in the EU’s territory 
that would imply the cultivation of an identity which would produce a sense of 
belonging via the category of “Europeanness,” while also retaining their specific 
national and ethnic heritage integral to their identities.
 The multiethnic national policy regime of the Russian Federation exemplifies 
that the category “of Russia” ensures identification for all the citizens of the Feder-
ation, irrespective of whether one self-identifies as Russian or not. The frames of 
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identification for the non-Russians are provided by the 21 republics formed on the 
Federation’s territory on the basis of ethnic and cultural parameters. This system 
was not known in the Russian Empire where social mobility required from one to 
join such outspokenly Russian state institutions as the army, the police, the public 
administration, jurisdiction, the railway or the postal service. The Soviet Union 
eliminated this legacy of assimilation, which led to the establishment of a network 
of formally autonomous republics grounded in ethnic and cultural categories 
within the territory of the Russian Empire. These republics operated as the vehicles 
of social success and mobility with no pressure on assimilation. Some republics 
were among the member states of the Soviet Union, while others formed part of 
the Russian Federation. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s fall and the secession 
of the member republics, the Russian Federation stood by itself while preserving 
the ethnic and cultural frameworks developed in the Soviet era. The unity of the 
Federation was successfully secured by the multiethnic organizational regime.
 The multiethnic state, however, can only operate if there is a mediator lan-
guage understood by all the people inhabiting it. In the Russian Federation this is 
the Russian language. While the integration of the different ethnic and religious
group under the banner of the Russian Federation can be successful, we should 
not forget about the deeply rooted character of the pattern of coexistence which is 
conspicuously impressive. Aside from this political difference, the greatest practical 
problem hindering the transition of the EU into a multiethnic state is the absence 
of a mediator language. No doubt that the European Union has a very strong dem-
ocratic foundation, while the Russian Federation is lacking democratic legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, the means of providing a strong European identity, like a common 
language, a common stock of knowledge of European identity, and symbols of 
unity are missing in the European Union.
  
C H A P T E R  2 .
N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  I N  E U R O P E :
T H E  K N O W L E D G E  B A S E  O F  N A T I O N A L 
I D E N T I T Y
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The nation forms part of social existence and if language is the “house of being,” 
as Heidegger (1998) has suggested, the nation would have no place in this house 
without the linguistic tools helping its members believe that nations exist, and that 
they belong to one.
 As established earlier in this book, the nation becomes conceivable to its 
members (and non-members) via its name. The name of the nation marks the 
individuals that belong to it. The negative word “not” is also significant since it 
allows to draw a dividing line between things that are in a positive versus negative 
relationship with the nation. National semantic universes are as many as nations 
themselves (Benveniste 1935).
 The first delegates to the first Roma World Congress held in London in 1971 
were well aware of the significance of naming when they decided to choose a 
name for themselves. This was the event where the designation “Roma” came into 
being, devoid of the negative connotations of the earlier term “Gypsy” (Zigauner, 
cigány, etc.). This name provided the ground for the Roma nation building 
by opening up the possibility for an extremely fragmented and diverse ethnicity, 
living all over the world, to identify its members as such, and thus construct and 
cultivate a shared identity.
  Any fact of our physical reality may be transposed into the metaphysical world 
merely by placing it into the semantic space evoked by the nation’s name. Whether 
taking our own or another nation’s perspective, any theme can easily and clearly 
enter the national knowledge base via the adjectival structures thus formed 
(Berlant 1991). It is through the adjectival structures that utterances like “English 
weather,” “Hungarian Vizsla,” “Dutch landscape,” “Russian summer,” or “Chinese 
panorama,” (Picture 2.1) gain tangible reality—and any number of similar examples 
could be given to illustrate this point.
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Picture 2.1. Adjectival structures
Russian summer                   Hungarian Vizsla
Dutch landscape                                      Chinese panorama
 The human world fragmented by names and groups enables us to “own” a place 
somewhere that we may call home—a place that seems close and familiar to us 
both in time and physical space. The social identity theory by Tajfel et al. (1971) 
stresses the significance of categorization focusing on one’s group, which orga-
nizes the human world cognitively and affectively, thereby offering individuals 
a sense of order, security, and identification. In the case of categorization by 
name, the outcome is a spontaneous national identification that is immediate, 
taken-for-granted, and requires no justification. People that consider themselves 
members of a particular nation inhabit an environment graspable in space and 
time, with the potential to be experienced and communicated through national 
themes for the members of present and future generations. The thematizations of 
nature, for example, make possible the incorporation of the landscape and some 
of its components (for example, rivers, mountains, lakes or seas), the weather, as 
well as plants and animals into the nation’s knowledge base.
 As the “national gaze” has produced the environment inhabited by members 
of the nation, the anthropological thematization has created the human bodies 
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whose build, clothing, and community constitute and “live” the events of national 
existence. Such events appear in contexts spawned by a great variety of thematiza-
tions for the nation’s members. History evokes the times of the dead for the present 
time, portraying scenes of conflict and harmony, relating stories of epochal change, 
as well as “great men” and the nameless. The theme of culture contributes to the 
nation’s capacity of giving meaning (Kántor 2004).
 The themes of politics, law, society, economy, and the military offer the 
opportunity for the nation to exhibit its achievements and highlight its values for its 
own and other peoples (Gellner 2009). Due to their visibility and communicability 
in the international arena, sports are of utmost significance. Of the themes from 
everyday life, food, drinks, sex, fashion, and leisure are most suited to represent the 
peculiarities of the nation. The usefulness of these themes can be aptly illustrated by 
the commercials produced to boost tourism for international audiences.1
 Thematizations merely disclose what happens or has happened on the 
national stage and they convey scarcely anything about qualities and values that 
could offer guidance to the nation’s members regarding what would serve the 
nation and what would not. Evaluations take place with the help of relevancies 
determining what is good or bad in the nation’s life and what’s attractive and un-
attractive in national performance. Psychological relevancies facilitate the assess-
ment of traits attributed to the national character. Economic relevancies ascertain 
the relative share of particular economic areas in the nation’s life such as industry, 
agriculture, commerce, and services. Political relevancies ascertain the limits of 
desired and undesired behaviors and occurrences in themes like statehood, leg-
islature, and conformity to the law. With regard to international thematization, 
relevancies determine whether the nation’s members would follow the principle 
of national self-centeredness or interdependence (Leersen 2006).
 Typifications enabling the nations’ members to view “typical” features as 
essential national characteristics will render fuzzy and vague differences noticeable 
and visible. National attitudes are forged and cultivated on the ground of rele-
vancies and typifications. It is through these national attitudes that an individual 
can make sense of the nationally constructed reality in every theme. Not only 
would they reckon to know a particular object but, in assessing it in the field of 
attraction and repulsion, they would be able to instantly place it as well. Moreover, 
1  “Magyarország—Think Hungary—commercial,” November 14, 2013, video, 2:18, https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=M4ZjYJOmX80&t=3s
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in their acts and behavior, they would follow the “suggestions” of the attitudes’ 
mental components. The investigation of attitudes in sociological surveys gives 
snapshots of the actual concepts that a population holds true about their nation 
and identity (Csepeli 1997).
 Stereotypes are pivotal components of the national knowledge base, making 
ideas about one’s own and other nations accessible (Hunyady 1998). A late eigh-
teenth century guide to Europe’s nations has been preserved (see Picture 2.2), 
which links each people with characteristics along a set of surprisingly well- 
selected criteria.
 The inside walls of Styria’s inns were decorated with the so called Völkertafel’s 
pictures and delineations, which allegedly represented Europe’s nations. Styria, 
laying as it does on the border of Europe’s western and eastern regions, could 
have hosted in its inns guests who traveled from East to West or vice versa—
travelers curious about what to expect on their journeys to different lands.
Picture 2.2. A brief characterization of European peoples
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Table 2.1. A brief characterization of European peoples 
Spanish French Italian German English Swedish Polish Hungar-ian Russian
Turkish
or Greek
Morals vainglori-ous tireless servile candid shapely
strong 
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Leisure games betrayals gossiping drinking working eating arguing doing nothing sleeping
com-
plaining
Animals elephant fox bobcat lion horse ox bear wolf monkey cat
How do 
they die? on ship in war
in a 




stable by sword in snow
by 
treachery
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 Table 2.1 represents eleven peoples along seventeen dimensions. Even by 
contemporary standards, the selection of dimensions seems insightful. Particular 
emphasis was placed on the psychological and behavioral aspects, which included 
morals, temperament, character, knowledge, and religiosity. Negative traits, mil-
itary virtues as well as leisure activities and the things admired (referred to as 
“relevances” in modern language use) were mentioned separately. Clothing, too, 
received its own row, demonstrating the authors’ awareness of the adage that “fine 
feathers make fine birds.” Illnesses were included supposedly to guide the traveler 
about primarily sexual encounters with individuals of various nationalities. The 
picture also informed the reader about what each country abounded in; what animal 
was associated with its residents; and, finally, what kind of death the members of 
particular nations could typically expect for themselves.
 The Turks and the Greeks were depicted as one people, while the information 
imparted to the other nine nationalities was featured in separate columns. As to the 
substance of the information, it appears quite distinctive for each national group; 
and, even in our days, they would not be dramatically different. The travelers, how-
ever, may not have made much of the author’s typing of the Spaniard as arrogant; 
the French as civilized; the Italian as wimps; the English as daring on the seas; 
furthermore, the Polish as boastful, the Hungarian as rebellious, the Russian as rude, 
and the Greeks-and-Turks as dishonest! Yet these detailed accounts may likely 
have helped to pin each nationality onto the travelers’ cognitive map. In many 
cases they merely reinforced what they had reckoned to know through prior experi-
ences or hearsay.
 Overall, the pictures caution to be distrustful towards every nationality, the 
difference being the unique set of reasons for distrust and caution. Entertainment 
might have been another purpose of the compilation, especially considering the 
last line where the various kinds of deaths typical of a nation were listed, or the 
mention of goods and animals generally held characteristic of them.
  Recent research into stereotypes sets out with assumptions no different than 
the Völkertafel’s images. Stereotypes help recognize the members of a group, both 
in terms of their empirically observable features and the non-observable ones that 
can be inferred (Leersen 2006).
 Besides physical attributes, contemporary studies of stereotypes concern 
assumptions about morals and competency. Our investigations based in the region 
of the Carpathian Basin indicated that national and ethnic groups’ stereotypes 
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of themselves and one another vary according to a distinctive pattern along the 
East-West axis. The groups in the “East” are viewed by “Easterners” as less competent 
but morally more solid, while the groups in the “West” are rated in the exact oppo-
site manner, as highly competent but of inferior morality. The study furthermore 
confirmed the thesis about autostereotypes being more positive than heterostereo-
types (Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi 2002).
 Interpretations facilitate the operation of the national knowledge base and the 
sorting of information perceived in a national context. They make it possible for 
us to apprehend, experience, and communicate the reality constructed on nation-
al categories with the help of thematizations, relevances, and typing. Furthermore, 
interpretations enable one to evaluate problems, dilemmas, attempted solutions 
and actions within the nation’s dramaturgical space—a space peopled by heroes 
and traitors, filled with an array of grand achievements, successes and failures, 
tragic and victorious events.
 The socially constructed world becomes mentally bifurcated through dichot-
omization: one’s own nation occupies the “familiar space,” whereas other nations, 
cultures, and civilizations are relegated to the “unfamiliar space,” and are viewed 
through the lens of one’s own national group as strange, remote, and often threat-
ening.
 Rationalization is a well-known psychological mechanism the purpose of 
which is to protect the self by, first, keeping things that are incongruous with the 
positive self-image at a distance and, second, by discarding such items once they 
pop up. This mechanism is activated whenever facts, information or communication 
eroding the positivity of national identity arise. National rationalization knows no 
other truths than its own. Consequently, every nation would privilege self-justifying 
rationalizations and stave off alternative perspectives which would hold the nation 
accountable for mistakes and failures that transpired. At the opposing end of national 
pride and rationalization is self-loathing and the admission of guilt and shame, 
a relatively rare occurrence. 
 Creating and sustaining a consistently positive national self-image depends 
on properly identified causes that emphasize the nation’s own attributes like its 
creative force, intelligence, and heroism when it comes to its successful endeavors. 
On the contrary, mostly outside agents (foreigners, minorities or enemies) are 
blamed for the nation’s failures. Of particular relevance is scapegoating through 
which the causes of social ills become palpable and immediately graspable.
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  Compensation is rooted in a sense of inferiority, which may surface on both 
an individual and a collective level. Compensation occurs when the national perfor-
mance lags behind other, similarly positioned nations’ performance in empirically 
quantifiable areas (for example, economic growth, living standards, the number 
of victories scored in battles and wars and so forth). What compensation enables 
for the nation’s members is a sense of national superiority over members of other 
peoples concerning any arbitrarily selected areas such as the size of the hunted 
stags’ antlers of or the number of Olympic gold medals per capita. The same social 
psychological mechanism lies behind the cliché of “small country of great accomplish-
ments.” The ultimate dread of national existence for a nationalist is the prospect of 
extinction, and members of the national community are mobilized to fend it off 
via faith in collective survival and hope for the future.
  Symbols constitute a vital part of the national knowledge base in that they convey, 
on a non-rational level, a sense of belonging, common fate, and timeless existence 
to the community. Flags, coat-of-arms, anthems, and other national symbols are 
indispensable requisites of the scripts enacted on festive events. The roles of the 
script provide the opportunity for all participants to unite under the sacred idea 
of the nation.
 The revered sites of national past such as the heroes’ tombs and birthplaces 
are also charged with symbolic power, a reason why nations struggle so bitterly 
to reconcile themselves with relinquished territories related to epochal historic 
events, the birth, life, or death of the protagonists of national culture and history. 
The capital of every modern nation state has a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 
which serves as a veritable catalog of essential patriotic symbols.
 National ideology is the most elaborate yet the least accessible segment of 
the national knowledge base in terms of its social reach, being as it is a system 
of explicitly and elaborately stated ideas. Its rationale is to provide justification 
for the nation’s existence. The closed version of national ideology is exclusive and 
restrictive with regard to its membership, proclaiming separateness and national 
self-centeredness. The open version, in contrast, is an inclusive system of ideas 
striking a balance between nationality and human rights. While the closed type is 
centered on ethnic and biological ties, the open is grounded in the notion of 
citizenship.
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It was with considerable delay—in the second half of the twentieth century—that 
the social sciences set out to study the problem of the nation more systematically. 
Social psychology was the first to achieve considerable progress in revisiting the 
issue of national identity. It defined the nation as a social group, hence the assump-
tion that the specificities of national belonging may be captured in the framework 
of inter-group relations. The most favored research questions addressed the concept 
of national identity itself: the roots and development of identity in individual 
psychology, the examination of ethnic and national attitudes, the depiction of 
inter-ethnic relations, as well as the study of stereotypes (Hamilton and Gifford 
1976), prejudices and conflicts (Sherif and Sherif 1953). Only recently did sociology 
engage with similar questions. The first systematic international empirical inves-
tigation took place in 1995 with the purpose of offering a sociological explanation 
for the problem of national identity. Prior to this, research had been conducted, by 
and large, in individual countries starting in the mid-1980s.
 Sociology’s delayed interest in this topic may be traced back to the discipline’s 
long-standing proclivity to conceptualize social differences and inequalities with 
reference to socioeconomic groups and principles of stratification. Only since the 
1960s have cultural systems and group formation rooted in these systems received 
increased attention. In addition, sociologists’ reliance on data collection from 
individual subjects—both in micro or macro-level surveys—also hindered the 
growth of this area, since national identity studies focus on collective conscious-
ness and thus draw on symbolic and narrative data. The current popularity of this 
topic, on the other hand, is well-served with the increasingly common inclusion 
of symbolic and cognitive phenomena in the depiction of social conflicts. Fur-
thermore, in the explanation of collective behaviors, the organization of cultural 
identity, double or plural identities, and social conflicts with symbolic or cultural 
roots have come to the fore (Örkény 2011).
 The knowledge base of national identity may be approached, firstly through 
various historical, political, and cultural components. Secondly, it may be investigated 
through the political and intellectual process whereby the knowledge is formed and 
changed, and its fabric is shaped, rewritten, and transformed by a variety of actors. 
Thirdly, the knowledge base can also be studied as a collection of representations 
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such as national symbols, objects, texts, and events. Finally, and for our project, 
it is of crucial importance that the elements of everyday knowledge and mecha-
nisms of identification are also uncovered and analyzed in their temporality. The 
subjects of our inquiry are thus ordinary people, and our primary goal is to recon-
struct the particular image of the nation as it coheres in the individual’s consciousness 
of observations, attitudes, and value judgments. We are furthermore interested in 
the manner these components congeal into a unified knowledge-based identity on 
the societal level.
 In order to “belong” to a nation and grow attached to it, the individual must 
develop some kind of relationship to his or her (national) group, in our case, to 
the Hungarian people. Evidently, everyone builds a sense of belonging via positive 
sentiments and values, otherwise the importance and meaning of national affili-
ation would be challenged. If the fact of birth into a nation assures one’s national 
affiliation in the legal sense, affective and cognitive contents must “fill” and reinforce 
one’s national identity in a psychological sense.
 The existence of one’s own group presupposes that other groups exist as well, 
and they are mutually aware of each other’s existence. In the next step of identifi-
cation, not merely a sense of difference between one’s own group and that of the 
others becomes palpable, but the difference from the members of other groups 
acquires negative features. That is how generalizations and stereotypes are formed 
such as, for example, the belief that Hungarians are talented and educated, while 
others are lazy and primitive, therefore the Hungarians are superior to others. 
This exemplifies the first level of a classic ethnocentric worldview whose essence 
is holding one’s own group in high regard and squarely deprecating the other. 
Ethnocentrism does not quite amount to nationalism unless ethnocentric ideas 
pervade the full range of the community’s activities, functioning in effect as a 
systemic ideology. In such cases nationalism governs a country’s political orientation 
as well, including its economic, foreign, and cultural policies (Örkény 2011).
 Our inquiry into the everyday social psychological characteristics of national 
consciousness and national identity is based on the model elaborated by György 
Csepeli (1997) in his research studies of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as its modified 
version employed in Henk Dekker’s (2000) studies. National identity, according 
to this model. may be construed as a cognitive and affective body of knowledge, 
consisting of tightly linked elements and thus cohering into a unified structure. 
The shape of this structure is a pyramid that represents the frequency and intensity 
of each element’s occurrence in society (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1. The pyramid structure of the elements of national identity
 On the primary level of attachment, one can find spontaneous emotional 
identification fostering a feeling of closeness to the group defined by the nation’s 
members. Onto this emotional base is grafted a diverse set of attitudes, inclina-
tions, values, and ideologies that organize identity. Through various categori-
zations, attributions, stereotypes, ethnocentrism and nationalism, the nation as 
a social group gains the particular shape and substance that comprise the frame-
work for psychological identifications—ranging from the most instinctive to the 
increasingly conscious ones. The cognitive and the affective patterns may evoke 
a variety of themes encompassing the natural environment, the construction of 
historical past, and the central issues of culture, politics, the economy, and 
ethics. Taken together all layers of the pyramid from the bottom to the top are 
equally important. However, in many cases nationalism is produced and aroused 
by intellectual and political elites profoundly who are interested in perpetuating 
the various forms of national sentiments of the masses.
 Following the logic outlined above, we will explore the characteristics of nation-
al knowledge bases, drawing on the results of an international comparative survey 
conducted in 2013. This survey has been conducted several times over the past 
25 years, so we have had the opportunity to observe the changes that occurred 
between 1995, 2003, and 2013. In the first part of our account, we examine 
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various expressions of national sentiment and mentality along the entire “pyramid.” 
Finally, the third part of our analysis will discuss how the different social psycho-
logical components affect nationalism’s penetration of one’s everyday conscious-
ness and, on that grounds, what types of attachment individuals display towards 
their nation.
A B O U T  T H E  R E S E A R C H
Our investigation rests on the data of the 2013 International Social Survey Pro-
gram’s (ISSP) comparative research series, occasionally complemented with data 
from the 1995 and 2003 surveys.2 These studies inquired into the specificities of 
national identity in various countries of the world including those of Europe, ad-
dressed the issue of how people perceived strangers and internal minorities, and 
questioned whether anything beyond national identity (such as a transnational or 
supranational identity) could be seen to arise.
 An aggravating dilemma in international comparative research is to decide 
which methods to use for comparing the information and data gleaned from in-
dividuals in nationally-based sociological studies. Understandably, international 
research significantly alters the contextual space of the conventional sociologi-
cal inquiry by expanding the interpretive field construed on the individual lev-
el (methodological individualism)3 onto culturally and politically constructed 
collective symbolic interpretive spaces. These spaces include the community of 
nation states, the supranational space of political and cultural communities, the 
regional level of similarities and differences in terms of geography, history and 
politics, and the political and economic associations organized above the level of 
nation states such as the European Union (methodological nationalism).4 Besides 
national attachments and identities, the relationship to Europe and the issues of 
European identity represent a problem that can only be approached by viewing 
2  See www.issp.org.
3  The concept of methodological individualism was introduced by Schumpeter (1909), it refers to 
approaching social phenomena through studying the characteristics of the individual.
4  Methodological nationalism refers to grasping social phenomena by taking into account the effects 
of the nation-state as a framework and the global transnational processes. The description and com-
parison of collective cultural characteristics, according to this approach, offers a path to understanding 
complex social processes (Wimmer and Schiller 2003).
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them at the intersection of all the mentioned interpretive spaces. The citizens of 
the modern world socialized into national communities are pressured to come to 
terms with their personal relationships to Europe and its various regions, all in the 
context of emerging new collective identities and old residual ones that either fade 
away or seek to survive under new circumstances.
 Whereas international comparative research projects date back to the early 
1960s, they only entered the canon of officially accepted sociological perspectives 
with the 1987 general meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), 
which highlighted the comparative paradigm as the meeting’s main theme. In his 
programmatic speech, Melvin L. Kohn (1987), the ASA’s president at the time, dis-
tinguished between four types of such investigations. In the first one the nation 
itself is the object of study; in the second, the nation is the context of the research; 
the third type conceptualizes the nation as a research unit; and the fourth type 
addresses transnational relations. The earliest international comparative projects 
belonged to the first category, conceived as they were, within an epistemological 
paradigm where the focus of inquiry was society organized in the framework of the 
nation state. The question that this research raised was whether the observed socio-
logical phenomena exhibited differences from country to country. In a wide variety 
of themes these studies aimed to call attention to the specific, diverse patterns of 
political, economic, and social institutions and phenomena in individual countries. 
The second type of comparative effort went further to examine the degree to which 
the workings of various social institutions and structural processes could be gen-
eralized, and whether in explaining them, their national context does or does not 
play a role. Classic examples of this approach include the study of stratification and 
social mobility of industrializing societies. The genuine paradigm shift, however, 
came along with the third and fourth types of studies where the similarities and 
differences between countries served as the initial assumption for addressing ques-
tions like “what, beyond a universal or individual vantage point, is the contribution 
of various types of nations and countries to the grasping of particular issues?” and 
“Are there shared or divergent cultural specificities that explain people’s ways of 
thinking and behavior beyond their national context?” (Örkény 2011).
 Significant developments occurred in the sociological study of national iden-
tity in a number of countries during the 1980s. They did not, however, go beyond 
exploring the nature of concepts such as the nation, national attachment, and na-
tionalism within the confines of the nation state, in conjunction with their his-
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torical political, social and psychological background and peculiarities. The first 
impulse to develop a more complex comparative paradigm dates back to the ISSP 
research in 1995. Certainly, the ISSP’s unparalleled data bank offers an exquisite 
opportunity for the in-depth study of any country’s national identity with the help 
of quantitative methods. It furthermore facilitates research beyond the national 
idea in terms of its ideological, political, historical, symbolic, and narrative dimen-
sions to examine the social psychological and value-related facets of people’s ties 
toward their nation (Haller, Jowel, and Smith 2009). Our own analysis is more am-
bitious in that we attempt to uncover the more comprehensive cultural and struc-
tural trends corresponding to the third and fourth types of Kohn’s scheme. The ISSP 
series of research relied on national representative samples and questionnaire-based 
surveys from numerous countries all over the world. The large number of European 
participant countries afforded us to test the contemporary relevance of Szűcs’s 
(1983) theory of Europe’s three historically formed regions. Likewise, we were in-
terested in the plausibility of his distinction between the “political” and “cultural” 
nation. In our book (Csepeli et al. 2007) drawing on data from 1995 and 2003, we 
developed an analysis which only partially corroborated such a distinction. 
 Both in the first and second rounds fifteen European countries participated; 
in 2013 the number of participants increased (see Table 2.2)5 In the present anal-
ysis respondents’ attitudes in twenty-three European countries will be compared 
regarding issues like national affiliation and supranational identity. These coun-
tries accurately represent the nations that originally formed the European Union 
or joined it soon after its establishment; the mixed group of countries admitted in 
several rounds of the Union’s enlargement; and, the post-socialist states joining in 
the last enlargement.
 Given the notably broader international participation in the third round of the 
investigation, we chose a different, regional classification, one more differentiat-
ed and sensitive to differences than Szűcs’s (1983) threefold typology. Taking into 
account the original theory’s historical, political, and cultural criteria, we set up a 
system of European regions. Our decision was motivated not merely by our con-
cern with the knowledge base of national identity but by the special significance we 
attributed to the European context and identification with the European Union.
5  Germany’s data bank traditionally marks the west and east German territories, thus offering the oppor-
tunity to compare the respective relationships between the political past and national sentiments. Given 
our current focus on the present and the recent past, we did not separate the two sets of German data 
but instead analyzed the common sample of the new Germany unified in the wake of the regime change.
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We have arranged the examined 23 countries into six regions.
(1) The first region “EU core countries,” has been set up to include the core countries of the European 
Union (Belgium, France, and Germany), plus Switzerland.
(2) The second region “Northern EU countries” consists of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, irrespective of EU membership).
(3) The third region is the “off-the-continent EU countries,” has been identified to include the two 
island nations (Great Britain and Ireland)
(4) The fourth region is “Southern EU countries” includes two Mediterranean countries (Portugal 
and Spain).
(5) The placing of the post-Soviet central and Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) into one separate region, 
“Central European countries,” seemed a sensible choice. And, finally,
(6) Russia and Turkey constitute a separate region as inheritors of Byzantine Empire.
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 Considering their geographical situation, history, pattern of modernization, 
political history, and a number of cultural features, we assumed that, besides their 
differences, the countries of each region share a great deal of characteristics. The 
identification of six regions offers an interpretive framework to study the various 
patterns of intensity with which people are attached to Europe. Furthermore, the 
question as to whether citizens dwelling in different regions have (or don’t have) 
faith in a unified European future will be addressed as well.
 International quantitative comparative projects pose multiple methodological 
difficulties which nationally-based studies working with homogeneous samples 
do not have to address (Elder 1976). Let us discuss one in detail: the representa-
tiveness of the sample. As established earlier, the individual countries’ research 
studies tend to be based on national representative samples. However, since we are 
dealing with regions, a problem is presented by large deviations in population size 
among the countries of the specific region. When comparing regions rather than 
countries, we set up weighted sample units proportionate with the size of the pop-
ulations involved. In attempting to represent the entire continent, we weighted 
the regions as well in order to reconstruct the effect mechanisms in an accurate 
manner.
S P O N T A N E O U S  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y ,  M E M B E R S H I P  I N 
T H E  N A T I O N A L  G R O U P,  A N D  P R I D E  I N  O N E ’ S  N A T I O N
In discussing the structure of national knowledge base, we argued that one’s spon-
taneous national identity is the Archimedean point on which the entire affective 
and cognitive structure of national self-identity is built. Clearly, however, the iden-
tity of men and women raised in modern society consists of multiple dimensions, 
merely one of which has to do with national affiliation. In the framework of the 
ISSP research, one question concerned the extent to which respondents attributed 
differential importance to various categories of self-identification. Unfortunately, in 
the 2013 survey this question was dropped from the questionnaire due to time 
constraints. Given the availability of the 2003 data, we wish to present its results, 
since it is unlikely that measurable change would have been recorded ten years later.
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 Table 2.3 exhibits the relative weight attributed to criteria forming one’s social 
identity in 16 countries.6 Respondents were asked to choose among ten criteria of 
identity formation the three most important ones. The frequencies of occurrence 
of the single most important criterion are presented below. 
Table 2.3. The relative importance of criteria attributed to social identity forma-




































Austria 17.2 5.0 8.8 2.5 3.9 1.0 8.5 39.0 3.1 5.5 5.6
Czech 
Republic
26.0 4.2 15.3 8.9 2.3 0.9 8.5 25.6 3.1 4.6 0.5 
Denmark 7.4 0.8 3.4 2.0 1.4 0.5 3.5 41.3 1.0 1.2 37.5 
Finland 13.8 1.0 5.4 5.4 2.4 0.9 12.4 10.5 1.4 1.5 45.3
France 13.6 6.9 19.7 5.5 4.2 1.8 14.7 18.7 5.5 5.9 3.5 
Germany 
(eastern)
17.8 4.1 18.3 5.5 1.6 0.0 5.3 24.5 3.4 5.7 13.7
Germany 
(western)
14.7 5.1 13.3 4.1 3.1 1.1 3.1 27.8 2.0 3.8 22.1
Great
Britain
 9.1 1.7 7.0 3.0 2.2 0.2 6.7 40.6 1.5 1.4 26.7 
Hungary 13.0 7.9 7.0 12.0 3.1 1.2 0.3 31.9 5.7 11.7 6.5 
Ireland 14.5 2.9 7.9 2.8 7.4 0.5 14.9 37.3 0.7 3.8 7.4 
Lithuania  22.4 12.2 8.0 10.1 2.9 0.0 1.2 35.3 4.1 2.6 1.2
Poland 16.0 1.6 9.2 3.8 9.6 0.3 12.0 29.9 2.3 4.0 11.2
Portugal 12.7 2.7 18.0 5.4 3.2 1.1 14.7 29.6 1.9 5.5 5.2 
Russia 25.5 10.2 8.5 8.0 2.1 0.6 2.9 27.5 6.5 7.2 1.0 
Slovakia 14.5 1.5 10.9 3.7 12.2 0.6 4.8 40.6 0.8 6.4 4.0
Slovenia 17.5 11.4 9.8 5.9 2.8 0.3 10.0 24.4 1.6 11.6 4.7
Sweden  7.0 0.4 6.5 2.1 1.1 0.7 2.8 24.6 0.4 1.3 53.1 
Average 15.9 4.9 10.4 5.5 3.8 0.7 7.7 29.3 2.9 5.0
6  This question was not featured either in 1995 or 2013. In this particular case we retained the distinc-
tion between the two regions of Germany.
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 This table shows that the majority of people, when supplied with a range of 
identity categories, would not select nationality as their top choice. Generally, Eu-
ropeans place their role in the family as the most significant, followed by their 
professional and gender roles.
 The respondents’ social identity is determined to the largest degree by cate-
gories whose potency lies in everyday life. Categories removed from everyday life 
contribute far less to one’s identity. Merely 8 percent of the interviewees appear 
to be identified primarily via their nationality. Countries, however, exhibit great 
variability: in Finland, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia 10 percent 
or more chose the nation as their primary object of identification as opposed to 
the rest of the countries where this figure was considerably below 10 percent. The 
preeminence of the nation in identity formation appears quite small in Denmark, 
Lithuania, eastern Germany, Russia, and Sweden.
 Hungary was no exception to this trend where family ties were strongly em-
phasized, along with regional belonging and professional identity. Surprisingly, 
however, age also featured here more than in other nations. Additionally, Hungar-
ians ascribed more significance to ethnicity than to nationality. While almost no 
one mentioned national identity in the first place, ethnicity was the primary con-
sideration among 8 percent of respondents. Russia exhibited a similar picture with 
a particularly high relative importance attached to ethnic identity (10 percent).
The nation is not the exclusive platform on which a feeling of closeness rooted 
in spontaneous identification is centered. The neighborhood or district where a 
person grew up or is living forms the most immediate circle associated with secu-
rity and familiarity. This is followed by a circle larger than the neighborhood but 
narrower than the nation: one’s region. The broadest spatial reference of identity 
is the continent.
 In the ISSP study the local, regional, national, and continental identity was 
assessed through answering one question (Figure 2.2). Respondents had to check, 
on a four-point scale, the degree of closeness felt toward their immediate region, 
their country, and their continent.7 The maximum closeness was marked with 1 
and the minimum as 4.
7  The question was the following: How close do you feel to your town or city; your [county]; 
[COUNTRY]; [continent; e.g. Europe].
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We were interested in the degree of 
closeness depicted with the broad-
ening circles of spontaneous identi-
fication within the European Union. 
The heights of the columns on Figure 
2.3 show the distance reported by 
our respondents to feel toward their 
country and Europe, respectively. 
The higher the value of the column, 
the larger is distance felt toward the 
residence, their immediate region, 
their country, and their continent. 
Correspondingly, the closer the value, 
the smaller is the distance perceived 
toward these spaces of identity.
Figure 2.3. Spontaneous affective identification in Europe, 2013 (averages on 









































local regional naonal European
Figure 2.2. Local, regional, national, and 
continent-based identities, 2013 (aver-
ages on a 4-point scale)
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 The most general characteristic of European societies is the powerful affec-
tive binding capacity of national identity indicated by the consistency of values 
between 0.6 and 0.8 on the 4-point scale. However intense are the processes of 
globalization and the European integration, the nation as a communal space 
and an identity-forging relation has not significantly faded over the past decades. 
This finding is supported by the lack of sizable shifts across the data recorded in 
1995, 2003, and 2013. However, the two island nations, Great Britain and Ireland 
(lumped together in one group based on geography), display considerable diver-
gence. In Ireland the sense of belonging is much stronger both on the local (0.9) 
and the national (1.7) levels than in Great Britain where we found a strikingly 
low value (2.0) in comparison to other European countries.
 In contrast to the “nation,” Europe as a continental and cultural space shows 
a very weak spontaneous affective potential for identification. In the core countries, 
Northern and Southern Europe as well as in the Central European region, the per-
ceived affiliation is of medium strength, while in Russia and Turkey an appreciable 
sense of distance was detected (2.3 and 2.4, respectively). Despite living in a country 
partially belonging to Europe, for Russia’s and Turkey’s residents, the continent 
appears remote in an affective and psychological sense (see Figure 2.3).
 Furthermore, it is remarkable how removed, three years prior to Brexit, Great 
Britain’s residents felt toward the continent. This was hardly a fresh development. 
The surveys of 1995 and 2003 already indicated a similar trend, which we called the 
“island effect” (Csepeli and Örkény 1998). In 1995 the figure for the perceived distance 
from Europe was 1.9, in 2003, it was 1.8. Through time-based comparison we detected 
another intriguing trend: as opposed to the Brits, the Irish and the Scandinavians 
grew increasingly close to Europe (for 1995: 1.7; for 2003: 1.5, and for 2013: 1.4).
 Regional comparisons, however, tend to conceal the differences among 
individual countries. In every region some countries exhibited stronger national 
adherence than others as exemplified by Denmark, France, Iceland, and Norway. 
In contrast, the national ties are weaker than the average in countries like Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Portugal, 
and Spain displayed intense identification with Europe—compared to the average
—while the figures for the Baltic states, especially Latvia, were low.
 To conclude, in every region the national bond is the most powerful one. With 
the exception of Great Britain and Ireland, the distance felt toward Europe has leveled 
out among the EU member countries during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. This is remarkable considering that the 2003 data suggested that the EU 
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core countries showed the lowest level of spontaneous identification in contrast to 
the prospective EU countries, which were filled with hopes and positive sentiments. 
By 2013, apparently, the illusions about membership in a common Europe in Southern 
and Central Europe were shattered by the realities of belonging.
 Within the elements of the national knowledge base, the ISSP survey also 
interrogated the criteria on which respondents relied to determine membership 
in the nation. In each country the survey intended to uncover the “substance” 
of national membership—who may or may not be considered part of the nation. 
Respondents ranked the relative degree of importance attributed to the following 
criteria: birthplace, citizenship, residence, native tongue, religion, the fundamen-
tal political and legal principles characteristic of the given country, a subjective 
sense of belonging and self-identification, and ethnic and national origins. For 
each criterion, they used a four-point scale. The more importance attributed to 
a component, the higher value was assigned to them on the scale. 
 On Figure 2.4 we present the data received in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey. 
Figure 2.4. Criteria of national membership: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 
2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)8
8  The question was the following: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly 
[Nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following are?”
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 As can be read off the chart, with the exception of religion and ethnic/national 
origins, each component was deemed quite significant for our respondents. In 
every country there were many who listed a number of criteria as simultaneously 
contributing to national membership. Requiring several criteria for such member-
ship implies posing, intentionally or not, difficulties for those pursuing, for what-
ever reason, the goal of becoming part of the national community. The less criteria 
mentioned, the less exclusive their concept of nationality may be, since to meet 
fewer criteria is obviously easier than meeting many.
 Citizenship, language proficiency, and the freedom of choosing one’s identity 
ranked important in every country. Of the three-criteria, language proficiency 
(whether native or acquired) stood out as almost unanimously supported. The 
only exception was represented by Ireland where the majority did not consider 
this factor important.
 With respect to the other components of national membership, however, inter-
esting differences could be observed. Moving from West to East, religion and ethnic 
background appear to gain in relative significance. Owing to secularization, religion 
barely matters in the western region. Strikingly only 20 percent or less of respon-
dents connected religion and national identity in Belgium, France, Finland, and 
Sweden. In Russia and Turkey, in contrast, a fairly large proportion of research sub-
jects thought religious identity to be bound up with nationality (68 and 84 percent, 
respectively). A comparison over time threw a light on the conspicuous growth of 
religion’s relevance between 1995 and 2013. Especially notable is the bump around 
2003, which may be associated with a shift occurring in Russia’s political outlook and 
the tightening of the nexus between the state and the Orthodox Church. Even more 
marked is the divergence between the “West” and the “East” of Europe with regard 
to ethnic descent. Again, moving eastward, ethnicity as a determinant of national 
identity and national boundaries matters increasingly. Yet our data do not indicate 
the total lack of ethnicity’s importance in the western regions. Sweden is the only 
country to demonstrate a unanimous and extreme rejection of ethnic background 
as relevant to one’s national membership. In the rest of the countries responses were 
divided with a generally moderate emphasis placed on this criterion.9
9  Curiously, back in 1995 researchers entirely refused to include this category, led by theoretical consid-
erations. They did not even approve our proposal to place a question about the role of ethnicity on the 
ISSP questionnaire. But in 2003 and 2013 “descent” was readily accepted among the category choices, 
which, to our surprise, proved relevant in every single country, albeit to various degrees. This might 
be explained by the prevalence of the political concept of nation in the academic perspectives; few 
believed that essentialist national ideas had disappeared from contemporary views.
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 The “West” displays the opposite trend. Here political loyalty and the consti-
tutional idea of citizenship plays a prominent role at the expense of religion and 
ethnicity. In France and Sweden, practically everyone appears to agree that 
belonging to the nation presupposes unconditional political loyalty. Compared to 
the other regions, respondents in the EU’s core countries and Scandinavia set less 
of an expectation for a person to have been born in the country to be considered 
a first-class citizen. A preference or dismissal of a person as would-be citizens 
based on their birth on the nation’s territory is a reliable predictor as to which 
regions of Europe would accept or reject refugees and migrants. The countries 
situated off the continent, such as Great Britain and Ireland, display a less inclusive 
mindset than the Western Europeans. Both one’s residence and birthplace ranked 
here as more significant than in the core countries and Scandinavia.
  Since our respondents could not make sharp distinctions among the eight 
criteria as a whole, we attempted to uncover the relative differences with the help 
of a mathematical statistical procedure. The factor analysis brought three hidden 
dimensions to surface. The results are shown on Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5. The structure of national categorization in Europe: EU regions, Russia, 
and Turkey, 2013 (average of factor scores)
UK and
Ireland
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 The first factor exhibits a response profile that excludes the criteria of reli-
gion and ethnic descent, while retaining all the other criteria as a whole without 
making distinctions among them. We see this pattern of thinking everywhere 
except in the Scandinavian region. The factors’ values of the response profile that 
is sensitive to religion and descent vary widely across the regions. On the western 
and northern parts of Europe (including Great Britain) no considerable role was 
attributed to religion and descent. In the Mediterranean and Central European 
countries religion and descent mattered but only showed a moderate significance 
for national identity. In contrast, Russians and Turks stressed religion and descent 
as key aspects of national identity. The pattern of categorization ascribing a strong 
role to political loyalty is predominantly a Western European feature not present 
in the Southern and Central regions of the continent. Particularly heavy emphasis 
is placed on the relationship between political loyalty and national identity in 
France, Norway, and Sweden. In these countries support for political loyalty 
exceeds 90 percent.
 
Figure 2.6. Support for the significance of the eight criteria of national categori-
zation in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (incidence of significant and 
highly significant choices, average of indices, max. value is 8).
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 We have examined how large or small was the group of criteria set up by our 
respondents for national identification. As we established earlier, exclusive national 
categorization implies that the group of preferred criteria is large, while an open 
and inclusive categorization signifies that the group of criteria required for national 
membership is small. The table shows the varying occurrence of the closed (exclu-
sive) concept of nationality measured by the support of exclusionary categories 
(eight of them altogether) in the different regions of Europe (Figure 2.6).
 Our data clearly indicates that the two concepts of nationality apply differently 
to the European regions. Although the difference is relative, one can observe that 
in the West the exclusive idea of nationality is less prevalent. Respondents here 
set up the least narrow range of criteria for national categorization. In the Eastern 
countries, on the other hand, less inclusiveness was displayed, especially in Russia 
and Turkey.
 Spontaneous national identity implies a division of the human world into an 
in-group and an out-group. The primordial ethnocentric pattern of positive iden-
tification with the in-group (Sumner 1906) resurfaces as national pride among the 
citizens of the modern nation state. Such pride can be occasioned by various aspects 
of reality constructed by national existence. Ten such aspects of reality were listed 
in our questionnaire; our subjects had to determine the degree to which each aspect 
induced national pride in their own country. The questionnaire featured the 
following themes: democracy, equality, international influence, economy, culture, 
the army, history, human rights, social welfare programs, and sport (Smith 2009).
 The mathematical statistical analysis of the responses indicated a bifurcation 
of themes stimulating national pride (Figure 2.7). The first group featured themes 
like: democracy, international influence, economy, social welfare programs, and 
the protection of minorities, all of which represent the values of modernity. The 
second group consisted of themes like: science, sports, the arts, the army, and 
history. The themes of the first group rest on empirically verifiable facts. People 
whose pride is centered on them can therefore refer to facts to justify their pride. 
The themes of the second group, on the other hand, offer “data” not based on em-
pirical grounding. National pride built on them usually relies on others’ opinions 
and value judgments for support. Festinger (1954) has called this process “social 
comparison.”
 The figure below shows the typical themes evoking pride and the extent to 
which respondents identified with them.
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Figure 2.7. Ten sources of national pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Tur-
key, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)10
 The trends are similar in the various regions. Pride in the nation is dominated by 
themes whose effectivity largely derives from social comparison rather than empirical 
facts. The sources of these themes include historical accomplishments, cultural and 
scientific achievements, and success in sports. We may also see that the themes linked 
to modernity’s values and based on empirical facts (democracy, economy, political 
influence, welfare system, and minority rights) are treated very differently in the West 
and the East. In Southern and Central Europe and Russia they are less likely to evoke 
pride while the trend is the opposite in the West. Turkey is an exception, where themes 
related to modernization are quite popular—a fact reflective of the country’s econom-
ic, political, and social welfare accomplishments over the past few decades.
 Carrying out the analysis on the European countries’ data bank, we see three 
prominent sets of themes (Figure 2.8.) The first group’s themes are relevant to 
national pride such as science, sports, the arts, the army, and national history. The 
second group’s themes relate to classic modernization such as economic capacities and 
global political influence, and the third group’s themes are democracy, human rights 
and human welfare, all of which carry great significance in postmodern society.
10  The question was the following: “How proud are you of [Country] in each of the following? (Please, 
check one box on each line)”
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Figure 2.8. Symbolic-narrative, modernizing, and postmodern themes of national 
pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on a 4-point 
scale)
 The more one moves toward the West, the more one finds modern and post-
modern themes as sources of national pride. Citizens in the Eastern regions are 
less likely to consider such accomplishments as their own, with Turkey repre-
senting the only exception where modernizing values enjoy considerable support 
in the population. Besides the differences among the regions, variations among 
those in the West are noteworthy as well. In the three western regions, Germany, 
Norway, and Switzerland stand out with the highest level of pride in achievements 
in modernization; Denmark, Finland, France, and Great Britain are quite a bit be-
hind them. However, as regards national pride in themes tied up with postmodern 
values, the prominent countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
All the other countries appear less interested in them. The Irish seem the least 
concerned with their country’s modern and postmodern achievements.
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 Yet our analysis intimates that pride evoked by conventional symbolic themes 
is present in every region in equal measure.11 It is interesting to note that the 
post-Soviet societies of Russia and Central Europe produced vast achievements in 
quite a few areas during the quarter century following the regime changes. How-
ever, these results, apparently, did not register in people’s perception.
 A deficit in national self-esteem may have many reasons. First, while the for-
mer Soviet zone’s countries made progress, so did the other European countries 
that had never been affected by Soviet hegemony, leaving the gap between them 
unchanged. Another reason may be that capitalism has produced few winners and 
too many losers. These losers may not be enthused by the political and economic 
achievements of the post-communist era. For this group patriotic pride using 
symbolic, cultural, and traditional themes could serve as a time-honored means 
of deflecting tension built up through social frustration.
 In Turkey, however, the recent decades have spawned an unparalleled economic 
upturn in tandem with the country’s increasing political influence and broader 
social redistribution of wealth. This explains why the Turks’ pride in modernization 
and traditional themes complement one another harmoniously. However, this con-
tentment is not exempt from contradictions. National bias may have led the Turkish 
respondents to be proud of their democracy at a time—in 2013—when the rise of 
a dictatorship and the persecution of the Kurd minority may have been evident.
N A T I O N A L I S M :  T Y P E S  O F  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N
Atop the pyramid of national knowledge base, one may see the ideological con-
tents of the world’s representation through a national prism, which enables people 
to imagine and experience “national self-centeredness” or national uniqueness. 
These contents are sustained by the affective and cognitive structures described 
earlier, present and operating in the consciousness of broad strata of the national 
society. The contents of national ideology, however, do not reach but a narrower 
social stratum since their acquisition rests on knowledge of the arts, history, 
11   Even though in every country the values measured for symbolic-narrative pride were high, the 
exceedingly high values of Great Britain, Ireland and Iceland still surprised and intrigued us, provid-
ing yet another aspect to understanding the background and peculiar resources of the off-continent 
countries’ national identity.
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politics, economics, and sociology. Elevating the nation above universal humanity, 
nationalist ideology represents it as the carrier of special aesthetic, ethical, and 
mental values. Once absorbed into one’s identity, nationalism affords a person—on 
the grounds of spontaneous national identification and fueled by national pride—to 
view themselves as superior to people belonging to other nations, irrespective of 
their individual talents and achievements. This “added value” granted by nation-
alism is available and effective in every situation when nations compete with each 
other. The Olympic Games, for instance, present such a situation where the victories 
bring glory not only to the winners but to their nation states. Wars waged between 
nation states likewise arouse nationalist emotions, through the fun house mirror in 
which one’s own country appears superior and the nemesis inferior.
 Drawing on the pyramid model of the national knowledge base, the following 
scale set up by Dekker and Malova (2003) serves to reveal the nationalist potential 
based on a series of statements that range from spontaneous national identity to 
nationalist identification.
Figure 2.9. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (ag-
gregated average on a 5-point scale)
 As argued earlier, the positive affective core of modern national identity is 
ethnocentrism, which classifies the human world according to the conceptual binary 
of in-group versus out-group (Smith 1993). On the ISSP survey’s questionnaire, four 
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statements represented the ethnocentric antecedents of modern national identity. 
The respondents were asked to determine the extent to which they agreed or dis-
agreed with the content of each statement. Taking all the answers together, we set 
up a 5-point scale demonstrating the degree of general ethnocentrism observed in 
each country (see Figure 2.9).12
 The highest values of ethnocentrism were found in Turkey and Russia; the 
lowest ones in the core countries and Central Europe of the EU. These differences 
are relative, however, since all the regions’ citizens expressed ethnocentric senti-
ments. At least one half of the population in every European country, according 
to the figure above, approves ethnocentrism. Yet, as with the choice of criteria for 
national categorization, the similarities were larger than the differences across the 
regions. Therefore, once again, we attempted to uncover the relative differenc-
es. Drawing on our mathematical statistical procedure, we have created the main 
component that measures ethnocentrism, whose values for the different regions 
can be seen on Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10. The relative weight of ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, 
and Turkey, 2013 (averaged factor scores)
12  Ethnocentrism was measured with the following statements: “Rather be a citizen of [Country],” 
“World would be a better place if people were more like the [Country Nationality],” “[Country] is a 
better country than most other countries.” 5-point scales were used. The agreement scores of last items 
were reversed.
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 Within Europe, the ethnocentric approach to national community is the least 
present in the EU core countries and the south EU countries. Among the excep-
tions are EU countries outside the continent and north EU countries with rela-
tively higher values of ethnocentrism. No less surprising is the relatively moderate 
presence of this attitude found in Central Europe, although it may be due to the 
conspicuously high levels measured in Russia and Turkey. The latter, especially, 
stands out with an extreme level of ethnocentrism. The question is, how did the 
intensity of this attitude changed over time? Figure 2.11 provides an answer.
 Ethnocentrism may be seen as the unchanging tribal component of collective 
identity. We could not observe substantial fluctuations between 1995 and 2003 in 
any of the regions. When the countries are viewed separately, only Great Britain 
exhibits a moderate yet continuous rise, possibly forecasting the Brexit in 2016, 
while in Ireland the decline has persisted. Pride and ethnocentrism nourish the 
positive sentiments of national identity. Besides these, fears, uneasy sentiments, 
tragic experiences and traumas occur in the life of every nation, adding a darker 
tone to national identity. Some nations are more apt to resolve these issues than 
others.
Figure 2.11. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, 1995–2013 (aggregate averages 
on a 5-point scale)
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 In the survey, one question inquired about these negative sentiments asking 
respondents whether they felt ashamed of their respective countries. The resultant 
figures’ breakdown is shown for individual countries since the contribution of 
regonal context is negligible in this case (Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.12. The incidence of shame toward one’s nation in Europe, by countries, 
2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)13
 A cursory look at our data suggests that in European countries the feeling 
of shame is present in one’s national identity. At least to a medium degree, in 
every country this controversial feeling is part of people’s sense of belonging to 
the nation, although some countries are apparently more affected by shame than 
others where this feature is less characteristic. The Czech Republic tops the list 
with Croatia right behind it, which in turn is followed by Ireland, Sweden, three 
Baltic nations, and Great Britain. Citizens of Turkey, Switzerland, Hungary, and 
Germany appear to be less fraught with shame for their country.
 Certainly, we would be hard pressed to find a nation whose history would 
offer no reason for shame. Crimes have been committed in every nation’s past—
some acknowledged, others swept under the rug. It is quite possible that the ratio 
of owned and disowned collective crimes would account for the degree to which 
shame is common or generally viewed as a legitimate sentiment.
13  “Things about [Country] feel ashamed”
I    77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  I N  E U R O P E
 It is of particular interest to observe on a timeline how in each country the 
sense of shame (or lack thereof) changed during a period of nearly a quarter cen-
tury (Figure 2.13).
Figure 2.13. The incidence of shame felt about one’s country in Europe in 1995, 
2003, and 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)
 The most intriguing finding is that, with the exceptions of Russia and Hungary, 
the subjective sense of shame about one’s nation rose in all the observed European 
countries between 1995 and 2003. The table shows that the Russians stood apart 
since the start of our study. In 1995 and 2003 they reported the highest levels of 
shame, which subsequently dropped to the average of the figures from European 
nations. It may be argued that shame among the Russian people became “normal-
ized.” In contrast, the Hungarians did not express a strong sense of shame at all. 
While the figures dwindled later, the shift was not too significant. In the majority 
of the countries, however, we see a trend of growing shame.
 Underlying the fluctuations over time of the expression of shame, no corre-
sponding increase or decrease of perpetrators could be found but rather a shift in 
the politics of national remembrance. In the twenty-first century, the majority of 
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Europe’s countries reevaluated their histories, resulting in an enhanced awareness 
of morally reprehensible past acts and actors and, subsequently, the rehabilitation 
of victims with a focus on their grievances. The turn of memory politics that ac-
counts for the rising trend in people expressing shame toward their country was 
associated with various deeds and victims: the colonial past in Great Britain, the 
Civil War in Spain, the ambiguous neutrality during World War Two in Sweden, or 
the amicable relationships sustained in Lithuania and Slovakia with Nazi Ger-
many. In the same vein, national self-image in Ireland was tarnished by terrorism 
in Northern Ireland, while in Germany the revival of horrendous memories from 
the Nazi era could have aroused this crisis of national identity. Slovenia had to face 
the negative memories from the Yugoslav era, whereas the Hungarians have yet to 
undergo their own memory political turn. While Russians have had such a turn in 
remembrance, it will take a long time before they are able to reflect on their national 
past without controversial feelings (Bernhard and Kubik 2014).
 Nationalist ideology is the next element of the national knowledge base. 
Earlier we discussed the segments of the pyramid-shaped knowledge base helping 
to uncover the national potential. We set out discussing the feeling of closeness 
toward one’s country, then proceeded to address national categorization and ana-
lyzed the substance of national pride and ethnocentrism. Finally, as a counter test, 
we discussed the sentiment of national shame.
 Exclusive national categorization, admiration for one’s country, the absence of 
shame arising from historical guilt, and ethnocentrism do not necessarily amount 
to nationalism. It is only when ethnocentrism entirely pervades the community’s 
life and functions as a systemic ideology to generate ideas about national exis-
tence, that one can claim the prevalence of nationalism. In such cases the political 
character of a country as a whole is defined by nationalism—from the economic 
to foreign and cultural policies. 
 Nationalism was quantified with reference to six statements in the ISSP in-
vestigations. Some of them measured its political manifestations such as the claim 
that “international organizations vindicate too much power vis-à-vis national 
governments, which should stand up for the nation’s interests under all circum-
stances, even at the risk of conflicts.” Other statements probed the economic 
facets of this ideology such as the claim that “domestic goods have to enjoy pride 
of place over foreign ones,” “foreigners should be barred from purchasing land,” 
or that “multinationals bankrupt domestic producers.” Statements expressing 
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cultural nationalism included the imperative of airing domestic shows on televi-
sion. All statements boiled down to the unconditional privileging of one’s own 
country over others. The respondents had a 5-grade scale to mark the extent to 
which they did or did not agree with each claim. The values of support for particu-
lar claims measured in the European region can be seen on Figure 2.14, on 5-point 
scales.
 The overall image of Europe shows that, irrespective of addressing political, 
economic or cultural issues, nationalism is present with more than medium-lev-
el intensity on the continent. The only comment to add is that economy-related 
nationalist views and political nationalism are slightly more popular than views 
about the cultural field where they were not put forward very forcefully.
Figure 2.14. Support for nationalist themes in Europe as a whole, 2013 (averages 
on a 5-point scale)
 The above figures lead us to conclude that nationalist beliefs about particular 
themes hinge on a latent nationalist disposition. Therefore, we devised a general 
aggregated nationalism index based on the six items, once again on a 5-point scale 
(see Figure 2.15). We assumed that the penetration of general nationalism would 
vary more markedly across different regions in 2013.
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Figure 2.15. The intensity of nationalism in Europe measured by an aggregate 
index: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on 5-point scale)14
 The figures suggest that, even though differences on nationalism can be detected 
between regions, it penetrates all of them, including Russia and Turkey at a level 
exceeding the 3.5 score average. It is well-known that the European Union was 
established to further the political and economic integration of its member states, 
which assumes a balance between national and European interests. This equilib-
rium may be jeopardized by the ubiquity of nationalism across Europe, whether 
it concerns economic issues, political power, national sovereignty or the cultural 
terrain.
 Nationalism and the autonomy of national policies are comparatively less 
favored in the European Union’s core countries and Scandinavia, a shade more so 
in Great Britain and the Mediterranean countries, whereas it is quite popular in 
Central Europe, Russia, and Turkey. The differences accurately reflect the diverse 
perspectives and strategies applied to current European conflicts.
14  The statements operationalizing nationalism were the following: “TV should prefer [Country] 
films and programs”; “[Country] should follow its own interests even if conflict results”; “International 
organizations are taking too much power from the government”; “Large international companies dam-
age local business”; “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [Country]”; “[Country] should 
limit import of foreign products”; “People should support country even if it is wrong.”
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 Yet we cannot contend that the spread of nationalism in present-day European 
thinking and politics is the negative consequence of actual crises. A look at the 
period between 1995 and 2013 in terms of nationalism’s penetration will convince 
the reader that it is a phenomenon deeply embedded in all the European societies 
(see Figure 2.16).
Figure 2.16. The penetration of nationalist thought in Europe: EU regions 1995, 
2003, 2013 (averages on 5-point scale) 
 Figure 2.16 shows that nationalism has had a solid and continuous popular 
support in Europe over twenty-five years. Despite some fluctuation occurring in 
every region, stability has persisted. While the EU has been engaged in its enlarge- 
ment, along making the national borders increasingly porous and establishing 
transnational cooperation in the economic, political, and cultural areas, the robust 
forces of nationalism have not disappeared.
 Of course, the regional trends, once again, may conceal the more pronounced 
differences among the countries. Neither Russia nor Turkey are members of the 
European Union. In 2013 these countries exhibited the most susceptibility toward 
nationalist ideology scoring 3.6 support shown in Turkey. Support of nationalism 
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was found the highest among the all countries observed between 2002 and 2013, a 
slight decline can be seen. In 2013 in Hungary and Czech Republic, despite becom-
ing member states of the EU, appear no less attracted to nationalism. The respective 
scores are 3.5 in the Czech Republic and 3.6 in Hungary. Croatia which became an 
EU member much later reached a core of 3.4 score. Also, surprisingly enough in 
France we founded extensive adherence to the nationalist thought (score 3.2).
 Societies that gravitate the least toward nationalist ideology can be found in 
Germany (score 2.7), Norway (score 2.8), Sweden (score 2.6), Belgium (score 3.0), 
Iceland (score 3.1), and Denmark (score 3.2). For the sake of interest, we can men-
tion that within Belgium, Brussels produced a somewhat lower score (2.9). 
 Nationalism is present in every country and may well be around in the future, 
too. The question is the extent of its penetration. Nationalism as a dominant ideol-
ogy may fare especially well in countries that fall behind in the competition among 
nations; the underdogs will likely blame integration, globalization, and transnational 
economic, political and cultural forces for their failures. However, the struggle for 
transnational cooperation, economic, political, and cultural inclusion, on the one 
hand, and parochial nationalism, on the other, will last for a long time.
 The positive emotional foundation of one’s national identity rests on belonging 
to a group perceived to be familiar, close, and natural, whose power draws on en-
dogenous and exogenous determinants. It is a sign of one’s solid national identity if 
its positive foundations are formed, primarily, of endogenous determinants. If iden-
tification with the nation is fraught with complexes and insecurities, one’s capacity 
to maintain positive sentiments will require reliance on external determinants. This, 
in turn, would result in a gap between the national in-group and the out-group.
 Xenophobia is a powerful means of distancing oneself from the out-group. 
Through the looking glass of the negative image drawn of the out-group, the 
in-group gains superior valuation, thus becoming a refuge for those who are ridden 
by uncertainties. We measured the extent of xenophobia using nine statements. 
Some statements formulated pejorative judgments about strangers, in this case, 
immigrants. For example, associating them with crime, accusing them of taking 
away of jobs from the locals or posing a threat to the host culture. Other state-
ments contained favorable judgments such as immigrants enrich the host culture, 
they bring economic benefits, and legal migrants must be integrated into the host 
country. Xenophobia could be inferred when the respondent agreed with the nega-
tive judgments and rejected the positive ones.
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 As to the extent of agreement and disagreement with particular statements in 
the entire European region, the overall image seems quite varied (see Figure 2.17).
Figure 2.17. The extent of agreement regarding migration and migrants in Europe: EU 
regions, Russia, and Turkey together, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)
 Opinions strikingly converged in disagreement with the statement that the 
quota of immigrants could be raised in the respondent’s own country. As to the 
negative and positive statements, responses tended to diverge as reflected by the 
values in the medium range. There was relatively strong consensus on two other 
statements: one urging sanctions against illegal immigrants, and another—a posi-
tive one—underscoring the essential importance of providing equal educational 
opportunities for immigrant youths.
 In comparing regions in terms of level of xenophobia, we can see that all are 
affected by it. In Western Europe, the hatred for strangers was somewhat more 
restrained, with the exception of Great Britain, where it reached virulent levels as 
early as 2013, possibly forecasting the Brexit that took place three years later. In 
contrast, in Southern European countries we found a relatively moderate level of 
aversion toward migrants despite the rise of immigration at the time. In Eastern 
Europe, Russia, and Turkey resistance to foreigners was considerable (Figure 2.18).
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Figure 2.18. The strength of xenophobia’s aggregated index in Europe: EU re-
gions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)
 Beyond the regional differences, there are also differences among the countries. 
In Western Europe, xenophobia is higher than average in Belgium and Great Britain; 
in the north, Finland stands out with 50 percent. In the Southern European 
countries, the figures are markedly low, barely exceeding 40 percent. Moving 
to Eastern Europe, we measured values around 50 percent in the Baltic states as 
compared to 55 percent found in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and 
the considerably lower figures, 46 to 48 percent, measured in the Balkans.
 As earlier in our study, it is worthwhile viewing the trends in a temporal di-
mension, as shown in Figure 2.19. 
 Retrospectively, from the perspective of the recent migration crisis, it is note-
worthy that over the period between 2003 and 2013 xenophobia receded in all the 
regions of Europe. This trend was most marked in the South and Central Europe, 
but the decrease occurred also in the EU’s core countries, including Great Britain 
and Russia.
 The reasons for the change in public opinion are not the same in the West as 
in the East. The outpouring of anti-immigrant sentiments in the West may have 
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been tempered by the continuous and, at the time seemingly successful, economic 
immigration; the contribution of newcomers to the economic achievements of the 
host countries, and the more or less effective integration processes. In the 
East a gradual shift in attitude toward inclusion and acceptance brought on by 
multi- faceted intercultural interactions could be witnessed.
Figure 2.19. The strength of xenophobia’s aggregated index in Europe in a tempo-
ral dimension in the EU regions, 1995, 2003, 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)
 Arguably, the migrant wave of 2015 cut deeply into this encouraging process. 
Due to its suddenness, predictability, sheer size, and dramatized treatment by the 
media, the arrival of refugees in Europe caused a shock effect among the popula-
tion of numerous countries. In some groups all over Europe, the event provoked 
fear, insecurity, suspicion, and plain rejection exacerbated by the tragic terror at-
tacks committed by extremist Islamists. Particularly powerful was the xenophobic 
reaction in Central Europe fueled by moral panic.
 In 2013 xenophobia was relatively low in a number of countries such as Ireland, 
Iceland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, with the level of 
immigrant rejection fluctuating between scores 2.6 and 2.8.
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 The results received in response to questions on migration made it possible 
for us to not only observe the level of general resistance to strangers but to inves-
tigate each of the multiple narratives concerning migrants. One set of questions 
presented a collection of common stereotypes related to immigration (for example, 
“they take away our jobs,” “they spur crime,” “they erode our culture,” or “they do 
not bring economic benefits”). The other set of questions focused on the political 
aspects of immigration (for example, “illegal immigration has to be stemmed,” 
“the quota of immigrants needs to be reduced,” and “integration should not be 
pushed”). The horizontal line on Figure 2.20 shows the level of xenophobia taken 
together the results from all statements concerning immigration. The left columns 
show agreement with negative stereotypes; the right columns show the agree-
ments with the statements aimed to exclude or reduce migration in policy level.
 We have found that in the Eastern European region including Russia and 
Turkey the level of xenophobia is conspicuously is high, reinforced primarily by 
the negative stereotypes. The tendency is just the opposite in Western Europe, 
where the weight of general xenophobia is lower, while agreement with the restric-
tion of migration by political means is stronger.
Figure 2.20. The strength of the aggregated index regarding general xenophobia, 
including adherence to collective stereotypes about immigrants and the support 
of anti-immigrant policies in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 
(averages on a 5-point scale)
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 Our earlier claim is thus corroborated, according to which xenophobic sen-
timents are not related immigration policies but are produced by factors such as 
psychological detachment, the incitement to collective fear, cultural dominance, 
and moral panic. On the basis of these results we can argue that the cognitive 
structure of the anti-migration attitude is different in the Western and the Eastern 
part of Europe. The resistance to migration is more pragmatic and empirical in 
Western Europe, while in Eastern Europe the xenophobia is much more detached 
from everyday experience, mediatized, and rooted in emotional responses. 
 Conventional research on xenophobia tends to concentrate on attitudes of 
discrimination and rejection. The ISSP survey went beyond these to formulate 
a number of questions about acceptance and inclusion, too. Thus, we had the 
opportunity to compare the frequency of our respondents’ approval of positive 
versus negative statements in the different regions. Our factor analysis carried 
out on the full range of statements offers a sharp image of the relative differences 
discerned among the regions, as seen on Figure 2.21.
Figure 2.21. The factor structure of agreement with statements concerning the 
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 In the EU’s core countries, and especially in the Scandinavian and the Southern 
European region, agreement with positive claims clearly prevails, while agreement 
with the negative ones is much less common. Almost a negative mirror image 
of this is presented by Central Europe, Russia and Turkey where, compared to the 
West, negative statements were more popular. Russian and Turkish respondents, 
in particular, had a hard time identifying with statements of acceptance and inclu-
sion of immigrants.
 A significantly lower level of xenophobia was measured in Western European 
societies than in those located East of them. Yet in the West, we detected also a dis-
tinct expectation from migrants to assimilate (Figure 2.22). A sizable proportion 
of respondents agreed with the claim that “those who fail to appropriate fully our 
county’s culture and traditions cannot become first class citizens.” This idea found 
few followers in Central and Eastern Europe.
Figure 2.22. Standard deviation of standpoints concerning immigrants’ assimi-
lation versus letting immigrants preserve their customs: EU regions, Russia and 
Turkey, 2013 (percentages)
 We may say that the sentiment of rejecting the “other” is observable both in 
Western and Eastern parts of Europe, but reactions are different. In the East overt 
xenophobia that denies assimilation prevails, whereas in the West the rejection is 
covered up by the imperative of assimilation.
UK and
Ireland
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T H E  E X P L A N A T O R Y  M O D E L S  O F  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y
In the following section of our analysis we will attempt to reconstruct the building 
up and functioning of a nationalist belief system as a process. In doing so, we will 
employ the path-model of linear regression. This method enables us to illuminate 
particular social psychological mechanisms in terms of their impact on the for-
mation of nationalism, as they are grafted on one another in accordance with our 
pyramid model discussed earlier.
 In unveiling the paths to nationalism, we will investigate the manner in which 
the most important variables of the national knowledge base are connected to one 
another (Figure 2.23). If nationalism is the dependent variable, the models show 
the effects of the independent variables on the formation of nationalism. The list 
of independent variables is as follows: a person’s spontaneous national identity; 
exclusionary or narrow national categorization, symbolic or modern justification 
of national pride, ethnocentrism and, finally, xenophobic sentiments.
Figure 2.23. Nationalism’s path-model of linear regression15 in the EU countries, 
ISSP 201316
15  Path analysis is a complex regression model. The outlined models show to what degree various socio-
logical and attitudinal factors can explain level of nationalism. “Explanation” refers to the strength of the tie 
between two variables, while its degree is indicated by the arrows linking different boxes. These figures are 
the beta values of regression, their signs indicate the direction of the relationship: the positive sign indicates 
that the two variables move in identical directions, while the negative sign indicates opposite directions. 
Path analysis allows us to see how independent variables affect the dependent variable directly and through 
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 Explanation: This Figure exhibits the relationships that either strengthen or 
weaken the penetration of nationalism in Europe. The arrows signify the positive or 
negative direction of the relationship, depending on the sign in front of the figures, 
which in turn indicate the strength of the relationships. We may distinguish 
between direct and indirect factors accounting for the intensity of nationalism. In 
case of the former the arrows represent a direct connection to the explanation of 
nationalism, while in the latter the arrows exert their influence on nationalism’s 
intensity indirectly, through mediating factors.
 As to the direct effects, this figure shows that almost every element of the 
national knowledge base has an immediate effect on nationalism. The strongest 
impact is produced by xenophobia and ethnocentrism. The more adamantly 
someone scorns and excludes aliens from the national community, and the more 
someone values his/her own nation over others, the more he/she will identify with 
the content of nationalist ideologies.
 An instructive outcome of our application of the path model is that national 
pride built on the themes of modern societal development precludes the appear-
ance of nationalism and negatively correlates with nationalistic beliefs. Accordingly, 
the antidote to nationalism may be found in a scenario where people take pride in 
their country’s democratic polity, affluence, and equality. However, when pride in 
modern societal values is coupled with ethnocentrism (indirect effect), the former 
becomes a supportive cognitive background to nationalist ideology.
 The symbolic/narrative pride associated with the country’s past, culture, lan-
guage, and history directly contribute to the potency of nationalism. But even 
here there is an opposite path: when pride is grounded in modernization and is 
free of ethnocentrism (indirect path), it may just as well lead to the eschewing of 
nationalism as a systemic and system-justifying belief.
 The exclusive national categorization is another critical cognitive aspect of, and 
background to, nationalist ideas. It is a direct effect but, when paired up with ethno-
centrism and xenophobia, it adds even more to one’s investment in nationalism.
 A final yet crucial point gleaned from our analysis is that emotional attachment 
to one’s nation and love for the homeland does not inevitably produce a nationalist. If 
we refuse to exclude others from the national community merely for being born in 
another land, lacking proficiency in our language, and having ancestors that look 
16  In the ISSP survey of 2003 not all of the countries (Norway, Germany, Slovakia, Russia, Turkey 
were missing) were represented.
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different from our own, and if we shun xenophobia and ethnocentrism in our af-
fection toward our country, we may still end up happy members of the national 
community, unencumbered by the ideology of nationalism. Perhaps this sums up 
best what patriotism and patriotic attachment to the national idea means.
 The individual countries’ and regions’ path models do not offer significantly 
different explanatory schemes for nationalism. The affective and cognitive back-
ground of this ideology seems universally valid in all of the Union’s countries.  
 In order to control our finding, we examined the cases of Turkey and Russia 
to detect the difference between these two countries, on the one hand, and the EU 
countries, on the other, in terms of their paths leading to nationalism (Figures 
2.24. and 2.25).
 In Russia’s case, we found a striking deviation of ethnocentrism exceeding 
xenophobia contributing to the explanation of nationalism’s intensity. The former’s 
beta value of 0.30 and the latter’s of 0.20 suggests that the penetration of nationalism 
in Russia derives foremost from overvaluing itself while undervaluing other countries, 
rather than from the lesser factor of excluding or including aliens. Neither does 
pride have a direct explanatory force whether concerning the country’s modern-
izing achievements or the symbolic narrative stature of the Russian people, ex-
cept when pride is linked with ethnocentrism. The cognitive psychological allure of 
Russian nationalism thus lies predominantly in its ethnocentrism (Thompson 2000).
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 Interestingly, the two types of national pride are far more closely related here, 
meaning that the symbiosis of the double profile of pride is stronger than in the 
case of European countries. Furthermore, the role of spontaneous emotional 
attachment is appreciably more separate from the cognitive space fueling nation-
alism in Russian society. Furthermore, there is no direct link between exclusive 
ideas of the nation and nationalist ideologies.
Figure 2.25. The path-model of linear regression for Turkish nationalism, 2013
 The explanatory space of Turkish nationalism resembles the pattern of the EU 
countries more than the Russian one, albeit with some unique features of its own. 
As regards the spread of nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and the nation’s 
exclusive idea seem to play a similar role as in Europe. But the Turks’ pride in their 
nation is unrelated to their version of nationalism—whether the former is rooted 
in the country’s modernizing accomplishments or its symbolic/narrative aspects. 
And in Turkey—like elsewhere—spontaneous emotional attachment cannot be 
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T Y P E S  O F  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y
Whereas path-models display the structure of national identity and the variables 
determining nationalism as its end point, nothing can be uncovered about as to 
how a population is divided in terms of their national identity, if relying on these 
models only. To answer this question, we have conducted a cluster analysis relying 
on variables employed in the path-model.
 Cluster analysis made on the European countries’ samples was helpful in iden-
tifying four groups whose members show marked differences along the variables 
determining national identity. Combining all the samples we found that the mem-
bers of the second most frequent group (28 percent) gave responses suggestive of 
a robust nationalist ideology in all the dimensions of our cluster analysis. Therefore, 
we have tagged this group as radical nationalists. The second group—the smallest 
one in our sample—has received the label ordinary nationalists (15 percent). For 
this type, national identity, more than anything, is a taken-for-granted relation-
ship, subject to temporary mobilization by extreme situations (for example, war, 
terrorist attacks or outstanding sports achievements). The third rather large group 
came across as what we have called moderate nationalists (31 percent). This group 
cannot be defined as excessively nationalist, ethnocentric or xenophobic either. 
Yet they take considerable pride in their nation both for modernizing achieve-
ments and symbolic/narrative themes. Although considering themselves part of 
the national community, they only listed a narrow set of requirements for “others” 
to become citizens. The fourth significant type has been called illiberal nationalists 
(25 percent). The primary difference between them and the radical nationalists 
is their dependence on symbolic themes for their pride in the nation. Also, this 
group is not made up of committed ethnocentrists. Yet they strongly adhere to 
nationalist and xenophobic ideas and are closely attached to their home country.
 The specific groups displayed characteristic configurations across the European 
regions (Figure 2.26).
 The percentage of illiberal nationalists can be seen to rise steeply as we move 
across the map from west to east and from north to south, demonstrating the 
contemporary validity of Szűcs’s classic theory (1983). The other finding that 
corroborates this is the steep drop of moderate nationalists’ share in the countries 
from north to south and from west to east.
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Figure 2.26. Types of national identity in the EU regions, regional distribution of 
clusters, 2003 (percentages)
 Ordinary nationalism, which is immune to nationalist ideology, is least prev-
alent in the Eastern European countries. The most intriguing outcome on this 
figure is the radical nationalists’ presence, albeit not as a dominant group, in the 
whole of Europe, irrespective of the region. Even though our data goes back to 
2003, it can be read as a forecast of later developments, like Brexit and the ascend-
ing trend of Islamophobia in Western Europe.
 The overall picture barely alters with the inclusion of Russia and Turkey into 
our analysis (Figure 2.27). In the light of what transpired more recently, it is hardly 
surprising to observe the surge of radical nationalism in Turkey. In Russia, the 
presence of ordinary nationalists is quite conspicuous, albeit their percentage 
might have decreased since the 2013 data collection, as indicated by the already 
significant share of the illiberal nationalist group in that year.
UK and
Ireland
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Figure 2.27. Types of national identity in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey, re-
gional distribution of clusters, 2003 (percentages)
E U R O P E A N  V E R S U S  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y
The key issue of the European unification process lies in the EU’s ability to offer 
such powerful integration and European identity for the citizens of its member 
states as to compete with their national identities rooted, as they are, in centuries of 
political and historical traditions. In this section of our discussion we will attempt
to find out more about the current state of the progress toward a shared European 
consciousness. In which group of countries has a more-or-less tangible European 
identity formed? Have the countries’ relationships to Europe changed over the past 
decade? Presently this problem is gaining in importance, following the challenges 
and crises of the past years. The financial meltdown of 2008, the crisis in Greece, the 
quandary about migration, and Brexit have all eroded the EU’s political system and, 
along with it, the idea of a shared European polity and community of values.
 The history of the EU may be described as an expanding and ever more complex 
process of unification. Initially, integration occurred in security policy, the economy, 
and the markets, which subsequently led to the next phase of political cooperation. 
UK and
Ireland
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Political integration brought forward the need to define the Union as a political 
community, which implied that the members of this ever-enlarging organization 
should think through the actual content of belonging. As an inevitable conse-
quence of this process, re-evaluating the member states’ political legal status and 
their inter-relationships became urgent. As did the imperatives to clarify the legal 
and social norms ensuring the cohesion of the community, draft the European 
constitution, and elaborate the idea of a European identity (Deflem and Pampel 
1996). The latter problem has become of paramount significance. Over the past 
few decades, unification proceeded largely on the grounds of geopolitical realities, 
the political will of individual governments, and the interests of nation states. But 
the “confederation” thus created cannot do without the active support of the citizens 
of the EU countries and a broad-based social and political legitimacy.9
 For the EU citizens, the increasing tangle of concerns raises the question ever 
more pressingly: what will guarantee their security, well-being, and the preservation 
of their political values? Moreover, what role may national politics play in achieving 
common European solutions?
Figure 2.28. Support for the EU in the member states, measured by three ques-
tions 2013 (averages on a 5-point scale)
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 From the onset, the ISSP research on national identity focused heavily on the 
in-depth exploration of the contextual aspects of the European Union. Due to the 
constraints of the research, the scope the questions addressed was limited, yet in 
all the three survey periods, three cardinal questions were repeatedly posed on the 
questionnaire (Figure 2.28):
“In your opinion, the EU membership is advantageous or disadvantageous to your 
country?”
“Do you believe that your country’s government has to abide by the decisions made by 
the Union even when it disagrees with them?”
“Do you think that the EU should have a] quite a bit more, b] more, c] less or d] quite 
a bit less power than the governments of its member states?”
 Public opinion in the surveyed countries showed great variance in their reply as 
to whether the EU is advantageous or disadvantageous for their country. France 
stands out with its positivity on the issue (unfortunately, Germany was not 
surveyed on this question in 2013); likewise, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, 
and Iceland displayed an optimistic climate. Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Turkey, Hungary, Latvia, and Finland, however, seemed more skeptical. The picture 
offered by the off-continent EU member states was mixed: respondents in Ireland 
were quite positive, while in Great Britain they appeared highly critical toward the 
Union.
 Far smaller differences were detected among the countries in regard to the 
approval of common EU decisions and the EU’s leverage. The averages of the 
opinions in each country concentrated in the middle range. Great Britain again 
was slightly negative concerning acceptance of the decisions of the EU. 
 The statement stressing the confederal attitude was found the far more rejected 
one among all respondents. The respondents in Lithuania, Belgium and Slovenia 
were found relatedly positive concerning the confederal attitude, while Great 
Britain, Ireland, Czech Republic and Denmark were against.
 We compiled the answers to the EU-related questions in order to identify 
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Figure 2.29. Cluster typology concerning the EU’s support in the EU region, 2013 
(percentages)
 The proportion of those favoring by all means the EU membership and an 
increased leverage of Union policies is high, predominantly, in the core countries 
and Scandinavia, amounting to one third of all the respondents. At the opposite 
end are the EU skeptics whose share is less than one fourth of the respondents 
in all the regions. The exception is Great Britain where the public opinion is 
remarkably polarized. We should add that the share of Central Europe’s skeptics 
comes close to one fourth. Noteworthy is the large percentage of those empha-
sizing the EU’s benefits among the non-continental EU countries (40 percent), 
which may be attributed to Ireland. In the Mediterranean and Central European 
region, the relative majority would favor a larger decision-making power assigned 
to the Union. This by no means should be taken as evident, considering that since 
2015 this issue has been provoking fierce objection from those who worry about 
national sovereignty in Central Europe.
 A glance at individual countries allowed us to discern the following notable 
differences (Table 2.4): Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, and Spain stand out as the 
most supportive EU countries as opposed to the Czech Republic and Great Britain 
showing the highest degree of Euroscepticism. Hungary is well below the average. 
Great Britain and Ireland represent contrasting views about the Union. In 2013, 
the skeptics made up 45 percent in Britain and merely 15 percent in Ireland. Every 
other person in Ireland deems the EU beneficial.
UK and
Ireland
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Table 2.4. Cluster typology concerning the EU’s support in 15 of its member 
states in 2013 (percentages)
Country







benefits to EU 
membership 
(high value)




Belgium 36.5 30 23.3 10.2 100.0
Croatia 13.6 34.6 23.3 28.5 100.0
Czech Republic 15.4 29.8 19.5 35.4 100.0
Denmark 40.7 17.0 21.7 20.6 100.0
Finland 16.5 34.7 20.6 28.1 100.0
France 28.6 18.2 38.2 15.0 100.0
Great Britain 10.6 18.2 26.2 45.1 100.0
Hungary 21.6 53.7 6.0 18.7 100.0
Iceland 40.0 1.3 58.7 0.0 100.0
Latvia 12.6 25.5 35.1 26.8 100.0
Lithuania 22.9 25.5 42.1 9.5 100.0
Portugal 20.6 36.2 21.8 21.4 100.0
Slovenia 22.8 37.2 24.1 15.9 100.0
Spain 30.1 33.2 17.9 18.9 100.0
 After setting up a scale to measure the degree of general support and skep-
ticism for the EU based on the three statements, we obtained figures clearly 
suggestive of a pervasive uncertainty regarding the EU in the European public 
mind (Figure 2.30). None of the regions’ average value reaches the middle point 
of the scale, indicating a fundamental ambivalence and relative skepticism across 
the board. Especially small is Great Britain’s value on the scale, which, presumably, 
reflects the country’s general attitude, as compared to the already mentioned highly 
positive perspective among the Irish citizens of the EU. 
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Figure 2.30. The aggregated index of the EU’s support, 2013 (index averages of 
the regions)
Figure 2.31. The aggregate index of EU’s support, 2003 and 2013 (averages of 
the regional indices)
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 The evaluation of the overall picture offered by the 2013 data becomes more 
refined if compared with data collected in the 2003 survey. The most crucial in-
sight gained from the comparison is that the Europeans’ weary and critical stand-
point regarding the EU is far from being a recent development. It has accelerated 
throughout all Europe over the past 10 years, except in the Scandinavian countries 
(Figure 2.31).
 Finally, let us explore the connections between our respondents’ support for 
the EU and their patriotic sentiments, especially, their nationalism. The linear 
regression path-model below depicts support for the EU as an end point and the 
various determinations by factors such as spontaneous affective attachment to 
Europe, exclusive national categorization, national pride justified by moderniz-
ing or symbolic/narrative themes, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and nationalism 
(Figure 2.32).
 Support for the European Union is influenced by two, largely unrelated, cog-
nitive patterns. First, and rather surprisingly, the sense of closeness to Europe has 
the greatest immediate impact on one’s support of the EU. The larger this variable 
is, the more we can anticipate the formation of a more robust EU-based identity. 
Second, a sense of closeness to Europe directly tempers xenophobia fed by nation-
alist isolation and ethnocentrism, which then turns into support for the EU.






























102    I N A T I O N  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 The other cognitive pattern is linked with the penetration of nationalism. 
The stronger respondents identify with nationalist ideas, the less they approve of 
European integration. Underlying nationalism one can detect all the cognitive fac-
tors countering the European integration that lead to the espousal of nationalist 
ideas, such as an ethnocentric perspective, exclusive national categorization, and 
the affective rejection of the EU.
 Only xenophobia connects the two factors. The isolationist national attitude 
would by necessity refuse the acceptance and inclusion of foreigners, immigrants 
or refugees, as this would be incongruent with the shared European values and 
the affective charge of European-ness. However, when people are unaffected by 
the traditional, exclusive, culturally unitary, historicizing, and nativist concept of 
the nation superimposing its interests above and beyond others, they are culturally 
open and have an attendant sense of belonging to what Europe represents. Intrinsic 
to the above is the sentiment that one is simultaneously a member of the national 
and the European community. This is what the dual legal status of national and 
EU citizenship represents and is the true meaning of a common supranational 
identity.
  The Europe-wide migrant and refugee crisis of 2015 therefore holds special 
significance. If it has intensified xenophobia in Europe, as indicated by recent re-
search studies, and encouraged traditional nationalist political pursuits, as witnessed 
in Western and Central European states a year later, the legitimacy of European 
integration may be severely tarnished. Along with it, we might expect a decline in 
the recognition of shared interests as well as the solidity of a common European 
identity and a sense of belonging.
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C O N C L U S I O N S
The results of the comparative research studies conducted in European countries 
on national and European identity show the influence exerted by the historically 
formed regional position of particular countries on the frequency of patterns 
of national identification. Our data has indicated the persistent validity of Szűcs’s 
(1983) theory about the three historical regions of the continent. Yet we also witness 
the emergence, tentative and slow as it may be, of a minority in the member states’ 
societies that is able and willing to relinquish the symbolic rewards of nationalism 
and readily support the integration of EU members. This offers some hope that 
the regional differences in Europe will eventually fade. The examples of Turkey 
and Russia suggest, however, that the schism between countries within and with-
out the EU will continue to persist.

C H A P T E R  3 .
A T T I T U D E S  T O W A R D  I M M I G R A N T S 
I N  E U R O P E :  T H E  E U R O P E A N  C R I S I S 
A N D  X E N O P H O B I A 
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Presently, the European Union is undergoing the most severe crisis of its existence. 
The history of the EU’s past sixty years has brought about an unprecedented era 
of democracy and prosperity on the continent. It is the first time that generations 
have lived without experiencing the horrors of wars, and a growing number of 
countries came together around the ideal of cooperation and realizing common 
interests as successfully as possible. And while the EU has had its rough patches, 
such as the economic meltdown of 2008, with the exception of the Greek crisis, 
joint political efforts could effectively manage them. 
 Paradoxically, the EU’s first globally serious crisis was set off, not by the break-
down of the integration’s internal system, but by a challenge coming, essentially, 
from outside, the migration wave beginning in 2015. As it became evident, the 
dramatic events of 2015 did not simply pose the challenge of accommodating 
the refugees and migrants, but they brought to the surface some serious internal 
problems as well. 
 Only a few of them will be mentioned here. The first fundamentally important 
set of issues concerns areas which initially were less problematic, including: 
the protection of the EU’s borders, uniform border patrolling, the registration of 
asylum seekers, the fair treatment of asylum applications, the distribution of re-
sources, and the provision of broad-based humanitarian assistance. Other areas 
were even more problematic, like inadequate collaboration among the member states, 
all-pervasive mutual distrust, disunity precluding common solutions, political hos-
tilities and suspicions. The crisis further highlighted the weakness and ineffective-
ness of the EU’s power structure and governance, specifically Brussels’s inability to 
make decisions and to enforce them when finally pushed through. Clearly the EU 
lacks political institutions and executive bodies to manage a crisis situation such 
as the one in 2015. And such crises may occur at any time and on any number 
of issues in the future. Political and institutional problems have undermined the 
very idea of a United Europe. Born to overcome the traditional concept of nation 
states premised upon division and hostility, the vision of a United Europe has 
been increasingly problematized by selfish, nationalist populist schemes of mem-
ber states. Such self-seeking and self-interested policies forced onto the others 
are shattering the faith in a modern European community of values transcending 
the nation state and people are questioning fundamental values like freedom, the 
union, democracy, universal human rights, solidarity, tolerance and mutual accep-
tance, trust, cooperation, and self-limitation. As a result of these processes, even 
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in less extreme political quarters, the concept of a looser, confederative Europe 
grounded in the principle of solid national sovereignty is gaining adherents who 
are opposed to the idea of supranational integration. Moreover, in a number of 
European countries, extreme nationalist and chauvinist populist parties are flexing 
their muscles, powering a public discourse no longer free of authoritarianism and 
expressions of prejudice like cultural superiority, kulturkampf, racism, antisemi-
tism, homophobia, and islamophobia (Altemeyer 1981).
 The crisis set off by the 2015 migration wave thus directly influences peoples’ 
everyday behaviors, their common culture, and interpersonal relationships. The 
most aggravating consequence of the recent developments possibly is that in 
several EU countries the moral disarray eroding political and ethical values reaches 
the deepest layers of society as well as ordinary human relationships. A kind of 
ressentiment, antipathy, or hatred filled with envy of others have become widely 
recognizable, along with vindictiveness, aggression, and discrimination. Many 
tend to blame external causes, usually other people, for the way they themselves 
fare in the world and their misfortunes. Instead of cultivating self-esteem and 
self-confidence, they fabricate enemies to explain or justify their plight. Refugees 
and economic migrants, the “aliens,” are ideally suited to embody this enemy. 
 It is questionable whether the new, shared, and inclusive European value system 
founded on tolerance can offer an alternative to this ressentiment; and whether it 
is merely the current crisis—the breakdown of the moral framework and the mor-
al panic sprouting from it—that is responsible for the cultural tensions prevailing 
in so many countries of the region. Had the success of political and economic uni-
fication obliterated the less than model features of everyday mentality in Europe? 
Or, alternately, could the ever broadening European integration—successfully 
encompassing, besides the economy, services, and capital, the labor force, com-
petences, personal career options and the cultural field—have brought forward 
a wider and more profound political socialization affecting hundreds of millions, 
the essential outcome of which would be the citizen-consciousness of the European 
Union?
 This question may be of particular interest to professionals and intellectuals 
whose job is closely linked to the next generation’s education and political social-
ization. If we agree that the European Union is more than a project to improve 
the life of people, that it involves a common European mindset and identity, the 
success of the European Union depends on the extent that this mindset and iden-
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tity is shared by the younger generations. But then, what are the regressive forces 
that might impede the formation of a common European language, culture, and 
identity? 
 This is the question we wish to address in our study by presenting the find-
ings of two empirical research projects (Group Focused Enmity and International 
Social Survey Program). These projects preceded the 2015 refugee and migrant 
crisis by a few years. This may leave the reader dissatisfied considering how the 
2015 events have shifted attitudes towards aliens in various European countries, 
and how these events have affected our European-ness and respective national 
identities (EP 2015; Wike, Stokes, and Simmons 2016). The elapsed time, however, 
allowed us to explore people’s views about “aliens” and immigrants in a consider-
ably less tension-filled and panic-stricken era. This ties in with our larger concern, 
beyond xenophobia, to the broad sociological determinants and the cognitive and 
affective patterns of thinking that shape everyday attitudes towards migrants.
T H E O R E T I C A L  C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
In the interest of a more accurate interpretation of our findings, our theoretical 
framework needs to be laid out. We must clarify the notion of alien (or stranger) 
and how to theorize the often-experienced phenomenon of xenophobia. In his 
seminal essay “The Stranger” Alfred Schuetz suggested that, from a social philo-
sophical perspective, the stranger as a concept gains its meaning in the context of 
the comfort of one’s own group (Schuetz 1944). In general terms, this boils down 
to the fact that we all belong to a group from the moment of our birth, whether it 
is a family, a smaller community or a larger societal group. The taken-for-granted 
nature of our own group is evident for all the members. We know and understand 
each other, and this mutual understanding appears to be naturally given. We share 
a language and a culture. We belong together, and solidarity binds us. Our percep-
tions are sufficiently coherent, clear, and consistent. As Schuetz has wittily put it, 
being part of a group provides us with recipes in every walk of our lives as to how 
we should behave, think, and form our individual self and identity.
 Strangers stand at the opposite pole. They come from somewhere else; they 
are not one of us. We don’t know them, and we fear the unfamiliar, so we are afraid 
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of strangers. Our thoughts are filled with uncertainty and frustration. When meeting 
a stranger, we lack the shared code of understanding. Our ignorance of the un- 
familiar makes us prone to develop incoherent ideas, and we cut them short by not 
caring to comprehend the stranger. Habitual and spontaneous cultural patterns 
do not work in our relationship with them. We lack the tried and tested recipes 
to guide us in connecting with them and no experiences are available for such 
recipes.
 All of the above affect the strangers’ predicament, too. Lacking access to the 
behavioral patterns, language, and culture of the host group, they tend to remain 
outsiders, continuously swaying from standing apart to being comfortably inside. 
Hesitant and insecure, they will treat their hosts with suspicion, since the hosts 
appear to be strangers from their stance.
 For the individual—the host and the newcomer alike— the encounter with 
strangers and, through them, with another culture represents a peculiar psycho-
logical and sociological situation replete with suspicion, anxiety, communicational 
barriers, and conflicted interests. This unique situation determined by an amalgam 
of proximity and distance inevitably entails a sense of estrangement felt on both 
sides and conflicts arising from it.
 However, the relationship between a stranger and their host is shaped by 
more than the contradiction inherent in the objective situation they both find 
themselves in or its personal psychological effects. The collective norms of the 
groups are no less significant. Thus, it is necessary to introduce another essential 
theoretical pillar, the rejection of groups (Zick et al. 2008). As we proceed from 
the individual to the group in studying the stranger and the host, we may discern 
a primary inter-group hostility premised upon cultural differences and mutual 
inter-group rejection. As we mentioned by way of Schuetz’s theory, personal 
psychological factors may account for this hostility. But behind this hostility we 
may discern a more general mechanism which justifies using the term syndrome, 
first described by a group of researchers led by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002). 
 According to their theory it is common for the more powerful groups in a 
society to devalue and discriminate against the less powerful ones, which is an 
effect of the systemic ideology of cultural inequalities. This ideology overtly 
aims to maintain a hierarchy among groups. The risks imagined by the majority 
group associated with the cultural or civilizational condition, the different culture 
and language, the economic “uselessness” of the minority group and the effort to 
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minimize those risks, offer the justification for discriminating against them. The 
prejudices targeting various outer groups (or out-groups) thus cohere into an inter- 
connected mental scheme and attitude, which comprises xenophobia, or more 
generally a prejudiced mentality as a collective sentiment. 
 The theoretical background of the GFE research project integrated all the 
relevant social psychology theories explaining prejudice against small social groups. 
The theory of Adorno and his colleagues on the authoritarian personality, devel-
oped and empirically tested in the 1940s, was our point of departure (Adorno 
et al. 1950). Complementing this theory, Rokeach (1960) related authoritarianism 
to a closed “dogmatic” personality style. Hostility against groups, however, is a 
complex problem prevalent in societies that cannot successfully manage the polit-
ical, cultural, and social integration of their minorities. Social entropy-resistance 
(Gellner 1983) leads to discrimination against, and rejection of, minorities by ma-
jority members who monopolize economic, political, and cultural power. As 
a result, the hostilities aimed at specific groups of people are integrated into the 
dominant ideology rationalizing unfair and inequitable inter-group relations and 
blaming or scapegoating the various ethnic, religious, and cultural groups for the 
ills of society.
 Xenophobia thus may be a political or an ideological construct, mediatized 
public discourse, or an everyday sentiment. The rejected group may not belong 
to a specific ethnicity or religion; any strangers can be victimized. Xenophobia 
may appear in tandem with prejudice, racism, and cultural exclusion. It may be 
motivated by insecurity, frustration, fear of the unknown, and a sense of being 
threatened. It also may be rooted in prejudice against, and hatred for, the “other.” 
The hostilities may be ignited by moral panic, which is a mediatized response to 
a menace felt to shatter the foundations of the social order and the general value 
system favoring the majority (Kitzinger 2000). Moral panics are characterized by 
broad-based social involvement, contagiousness, and a clash between the morally 
“good” and the “bad” (Cohen 2002).
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T H E  E M P I R I C A L  T E S T I N G  O F  T H E  R E L A T I O N S H I P
B E T W E E N  X E N O P H O B I A  A N D  P R E J U D I C E 
( G F E - S Y N D R O M E ) 
In sociological research, xenophobia may be viewed either as a social phenomenon 
and attitude, or a litmus test for a prejudiced mindset. Usually, xenophobia is 
equated by sociologists with negative attitudes towards migrant groups, especially 
concerning delinquency, sexual assaults, and fear of loss of jobs. (Bernáth et al. 2015; 
Messing and Ságvári 2016). Since the stranger is difficult to define as a group, each 
research project builds on a different definition, employs a different apparatus 
for measurement, and produces different results. This makes their comparison 
difficult, but the modes of operationalization used in these studies are suitable for 
the valid testing of relationships concerning xenophobia. In terms of operational-
ization, xenophobia as a subjective feeling is not a dual variable category (unlike 
complete rejection or complete acceptance) but a position marked on an infinite 
scale between complete rejection and complete acceptance. The interpretations of 
the measurements for xenophobia may also be quite diverse. It may be:
•	 a personality characteristic involving fear of the “other,” groups of “others” 
and strangeness in general (Schuetz 1944);
•	 a social psychological symptom expressing frustration, insecurity, distrust, 
a sense of threat or negative inter-group sentiments (Tajfel 1971); 
•	 a sociologically determined sentiment such as status anxiety, dissatisfaction, 
self-interestedness, or clinging to the benefits of the social welfare system 
(welfare chauvinism) (Habermas1996);
•	 moral panic (broad social involvement, rapid spread, moral collision) (Cohen 
2002);
•	 finally, a culturally determined ideological occurrence serving to rationalize 
the social system, maintain existing inequalities and the regime of dominance, 
authoritarianism, social and cultural superiority, distance, disdain for the weak, 
and political estrangement (GFE syndrome).
 In the course of the GFE research1 in 2008 we measured the mechanisms of 
rejecting groups in a number of dimensions. Among them were attitudes toward 
1  See https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1587786.
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immigrants, but we also probed attitudes toward Muslims, Blacks, Jews, homo-
sexuals, the homeless, and people living with disabilities. On the basis of our data 
we will confine our study to comparing the intensity of xenophobia with that of 
racism,2 antisemitism,3 and homophobia4 in various countries. In each case, the 
individual dimensions were measured by aggregating the answers given to several 
questions, which produced our indices. On a four-point scale the indices measure 
the level of rejection towards the four groups. High values signify highly negative 
mental states.
 Let us proceed to discuss how the intensity of rejecting these groups varied 
across the eight European countries of our study in 2008 (Figure 3.1). The fig-
ures exhibit both general trends and regional as well as country-based specificities. 
Our first and most striking finding is that, to a smaller or larger degree, all of the 
indicated groups were subject to rejection in every country of our investigation. 
The extent of rejection, however, varied according to the country and the group in 
question (Örkény and Váradi 2010).
 For the Europeans, racist views were the least attractive, whereas the penet- 
ration of xenophobia and homophobia appeared quite high. The prevalence 
of xenophobia came as less of a surprise to us, since the process of immigra-
tion and the attendant tensions and conflicts in the economy, the labor market, 
the social and cultural life have been, albeit to varying degrees, part of Europe’s 
shared realities for several decades. What startled us was the very high incidence 
of homophobia, only traceable to possible cultural (religious) and ideological 
motives and prejudice.
2  The original items were the following: “There exists a natural hierarchy between white and black 
people.” “Some ethnic groups’ members are more talented than the members of other groups.” “Some 
cultures are superior to others beyond question.” “We need to protect our own culture from the influ-
ence of others.” “It’s better if blacks and whites do not marry each other.”
3  The original items were the following: “Jews usually don’t care about anybody and anything except 
their own kind.” “Jews have too much influence in Hungary.” “Jews enrich our culture.” “Jews nowa-
days try to take advantage of being the victims of Nazism in the past.” “Israel’s politics helps me under-
stand why people dislike the Jews.” “Israel wages a genocidal war against the Palestinians.”
4  “Marriage of two women or two men should be legal.” “There is nothing immoral about homo-
sexuality.” 
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Figure 3.1. The level of rejection of (or prejudice against) four groups by country, 
GFE data, 2008 (averages on a 4-point scale) 
 Sorted by region, Eastern European countries’ data reveal outstanding affinity 
with anti-Semitic and homophobic attitudes, even as xenophobia, too, appears 
quite prevalent. In Western Europe, however, the relative vigor of anti-immigrant 
views exceeds that of the other three GE-indicators. This seems to confirm the 
theoretical assumption concerning the mechanism of group rejection affecting 
people’s mindset in a general way in Europe’s countries, irrespective of the specific 
group being targeted. Yet there are differences among the countries and regions 
in terms of the level of disdain for minority and oppressed groups. Clearly, in 
Western Europe, anti-immigrant and, to a slightly lesser degree, homophobic 
sentiments, drive the GFE-mechanism. In eastern and southern Europe (Poland, 
Hungary, Portugal) the population spurns all minority groups.
 One may contend that the rejection of any minority group pivots on a uni-
form scheme of thinking cohering into an overarching prejudiced attitude that, in 
turn, mobilizes attitudes toward minorities.5 Variations in the individual countries 
derive from the specific group provoking most powerfully the configuration 
of prejudiced thinking. In Great Britain and Germany, xenophobia and racism 
predominate the configuration, while homophobia is of secondary significance. In 
5  We conducted a factor analysis in order to uncover the common latent background of the four indices. 
A 50 percent overlap was indicated between the four variables.
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contrast, the prejudiced mindset in France, Poland, and Hungary depends less on 
the syndrome of repudiating groups as such; prejudice in these countries extends 
to immigrants, Jews, and black Africans. In Poland, homophobia and prejudicial 
thinking strongly correlate. The smallest correlation was observed in the Nether-
lands and Portugal between a prejudiced mindset and general repudiation of mar-
ginalized groups, although in their respective cases, the connection between 
immigration and racism was stronger. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the shared space 
of group rejection and the strength of connections between its types. 
Figure 3.2. The correlation matrix of group rejection (prejudice) in the shared 
space of the countries surveyed*, GFE data, 2008
 In addition to studying the intensity of rejecting oppressed groups and the 
interrelation of these intensities, the GFE project offered a splendid opportunity 
to study the cognitive and affective mechanisms that would strengthen or weaken 
expressions of xenophobia in Europe. In attempting to explain the discrimination 
against, and rejection of, immigrants, we see that this attitude does not stand by itself 
but forms part of a cognitive space whose distinctive feature is the rigid rejection of 
some groups as “others.” Among the cognitive background variables we examined 
 * The figures indicate how each type of group rejection (prejudice) correlates with all the others 
(correlational coefficients of pairs) 
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the contribution of (1) authoritarianism,6 (2) social dominance,7 (3) political alien-
ation, (4) belief in social justice, (5) a sense of threat,8 (6) lack of social trust,9 (7) 
lack of security, and (8) maintaining social distance toward migrants. The first four 
factors lend themselves to be interpreted as the ideological effects of collective so-
cietal patterns of thought and shared norms, whereas the latter four may be seen as 
rooted in personality psychology. In the GFE project each dimension was measured 
with standard questions, of which indices were produced via aggregation. In Table 
3.1 we present an explanatory model where xenophobia is tested with the help of 
the above listed affective and cognitive variables; a linear regression model explains 
each country separately.
Table 3.1. The linear regression model explaining xenophobia*, with attitudes as 
variables, itemized for countries, GFE data, 2008 (regression beta-values and the 
models’ explanatory power)
France The Netherlands Germany Italy Portugal Poland
Great 
Britain Hungary
Belief in social justice –0.022 0.014 0.019 –0.010 0.131 0.014 0.051 0.039
Lack of security 0.046 0.094 0.154 0.038 0.054 0.159 –0.040 0.040
Political alienation 0.057 0.102 0.086 0.064 0.049 0.066 0.192 0.130
Social dominance 0.073 0.186 0.151 0.191 0,142 0.170 0.132 0.165
Social trust –0.094 –0.120 0.061 0.047 –0.120 –0.051 –0.087 –0.047
Social distance 0.179 0.083 0.032 0.123 0.119 0.187 0.171 0.166
Authoritarianism 0.309 0.179 0,330 0.278 0.160 0.225 0.194 0.116
Sense of threat 0.368 0.331 0.346 0.340 0.372 0.260 0.343 0.317
Adjusted R square 0.567 0.506 0.583 0.544 0.408 0.321 0.587 0.284
 * Dependent variable: xenophobia measured across countries (the aggregate index of responents’ 
agreement with the listed items).
6  The original items were as follows: “In order to maintain law and order, we should be tougher on the trouble- 
makers.” “Schools should teach discipline, first and foremost.” “Capital punishment should be restored.” 
“The country needs a truly powerful leader who would dismiss the parliament and the results of referendums.”
7  “Every group should be given equal opportunity in life.” “We have to do our best to eliminate inequities 
between groups.” “Members of the lower classes (groups) should stay where they are.” “There should be a 
reason why certain groups are on top of the social ladder, while others at the bottom.”
8  The original questions were the following: “Are you the kind of person who deems important to live in a safe 
environment?” “Are you someone who believes it important that the government protect you from all threats?”
9  The original questions were the following: “In your opinion, could people be trusted in general or, on 
the contrary, we can’t be sufficiently precautious with others?” “Do you feel people in general take 
advantage of you when they have a chance or, on the contrary, they do their best to act honestly?”
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  The cognitive, value-based, and personality psychological model of explanation 
offers numerous interesting findings. The first is the high explanatory power of the 
models (adjusted R square). This corroborates the previously mentioned observa-
tion that xenophobia, in every country (perhaps least so in Hungary and Poland), 
is deeply embedded in the assemblage of social ideologies, collective norms, and 
people’s tension-filled social sentiments. Most of all, aversion toward strangers is 
amplified by social ties fueled by authoritarianism and attitudes of social dominance 
(SDI), which implies the approval of, and identification with, the principle of hierar-
chy of various groups. But, with the exception of a few countries, distance from, and 
disillusion with, politics may also galvanize xenophobic attitudes. All of the above 
point to the ideological grounding of antipathy toward strangers.
 Common social sentiments (for example, fear, a sense of threat, distrust, lack 
of security, and distance felt toward strangers and other minorities) also need to 
be taken into account in making sense of xenophobia. The main reason for pre-
senting Table 3.1 is to demonstrate the presence of common social psychological 
states in all countries. These were social dominance, authoritarianism and sense 
of threat. From the point of view of GFE syndrome these states can be considered 
as the most powerful ones throughout Europe as a background of “othering” in 
negative terms. Variations across countries as results of the test of significance 
indicate are not negligible in terms of personal psychological states that induce 
it. Distrust is prevalent mostly in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
France. Lack of security is an important variable predominantly in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Poland—but only in Germany does a feeling of distance toward 
migrants not imply their rejection. Lacking enough empirical background to 
explain country differences we could have only speculated about them.
 Overall, the data confirms the conclusions drawn in the relevant literature and 
other research projects: sympathy with authoritarianism (Kurthen, Bergmann, 
and Erb 1997), social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and moral panic (Cohen 
2002), as well as a personal sense of threat (Haekwon and Sundstrom 2014) are 
the leading components of the cognitive and affective embeddedness of xenophobia. 
Earlier and recent research have both emphasized, however, that the interest motive 
and assumed or real existential anxieties play lesser or no role at all in the rejection 
of immigrants. To test this, we examined in another explanatory model of the 
impact exerted by the respondents’ sociodemographic profile, income level, per-
sonal satisfaction with their social status, political orientation, and religiosity on 
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their possible xenophobic sentiments. We also studied the role of migration in the 
respondents’ family history in shaping their views about migrants.
Table 3.2. The linear regression model of explanation for xenophobia,* with the 
inclusion of the respondents’ sociodemographic profile, by country, GFE data, 
2008 (regression beta-values and the model’s explanatory power) 
France Netherlands Germany Italy Portugal Poland Great Britain Hungary
Age 0,144 0,093 0,141 0,198 0,071 0,203 0,215 -0,046
Gender 0,083 –0,012 –0,093 0,049 –0,058 –0,066 –0,061 –0,006
Highest educational 
attainment 
–0,091 –0,244 –0,216 -0,187 –0,280 –0,237 –0,216 –0,165
Household income 0,052 –0,127 –0,150 –0,079 –0,233 –0,232 –0,016 –0,104
Employment 0,061 0,095 –0,155 0,009 –0,005 0,058 –0,054 –0,085
Unemployment –0,012 –0,053 0,048 –0,050 0,026 0,134 0,028 –0,058
Immigrant back-
ground
–0,171 –0,016 0,039 0,021 –0,066 –0,018 0,022 –0,035
Subjective status –0,082 –0,128 –0,054 –0,157 –0,004 0,085 0,047 –0,202
Political orientation  
(left vs. right)
0,202 0,306 0,288 0,277 0,048 0,065 0,209 0,121
Religiosity 0,181 0,113 –0,017 0,121 0,169 0,036 0,131 –0,050
Adjusted R-square 0,181 0,307 0,314 0,225 0,290 0,268 0,232 0,146
 * Dependent variable: xenophobia measured by country (the aggregate index of agreement with 
the items).
 The most noteworthy outcome was that in every country the models’ explana-
tory power is a great deal smaller than what we found in regard to the cognitive 
and affective effects. Several issues affecting individuals’ everyday life and circum-
stances show no correlation at all with the intensity of xenophobia. However, as far 
as social status is concerned, we may state that, with the exception of France, low 
educational level and modest family income are likely to increase the individuals’ 
rejection of aliens and immigrants. Except for Hungary and Portugal, older people 
were more inclined to feel xenophobic in the examined countries—a finding likely 
not unrelated to devout religiosity and strong religious faith resisting the acceptance 
of immigrants. Yet it may seem odd that in Poland, despite ranking as the most 
religious country in terms of day-to-day devotion to faith, no connection could 
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be detected between religiosity and the rejection of strangers. In the model country 
of secularization, France, however, the opposite was the case! The subjective percep-
tion of one’s social status, more specifically, dissatisfaction with it and the atten-
dant frustration led to xenophobia only in four countries: France, the Netherlands, 
Hungary, and Italy. All these conclusions are based on the results of test of sig-
nificance shown in Table 3.2.
 Two quite intriguing correlations emerged from our data. First, a family or 
personal history of migration exhibited neither negative, nor positive impact on 
our respondents’ attitude toward immigrants, a finding applicable to all countries 
except France, where one’s migrant status significantly decreased the respondents’ 
rejection of newcomers. Elsewhere the data may conceal the common insight 
about one’s immigrant past producing potentially opposite feelings: either solidarity 
with those having arrived later or their rejection induced by status anxiety and 
competition. Second, we observed a significant effect traceable to the rise of extreme 
attitudes on the political landscape. In the majority of European countries this 
appears to considerably animate hatred toward newcomers. However, in Portugal 
and Poland such an effect could not be detected. The intense religiosity of the 
population may account for it in the former case, and the so called “social factor” 
measured with the level of unemployment in the latter. 
 Taking all of this into account, the results of GFE research on xenophobia par-
tially support the common argument that, in terms of cognitive modernization, 
the difference between the western and eastern parts of Europe is best described 
with a slope (Szűcs 1983) meaning that people in the less developed eastern (and 
southern) countries are far more prejudiced against “others” —such as immigrants, 
religious or ethnic minorities, underprivileged and marginalized groups.
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One of the most essential group affiliations related to views, concepts and biases 
toward strangers is national membership. The complex thoughts and sentiments 
about the nation and national membership, on a collective and individual level, 
are intricately connected to sentiments and views about strangers. Moving beyond 
the previously examined sociological and social psychological explanations of xeno-
phobia as a particular manifestation of rejecting groups, we will take a look at the 
correlations between the national context, the cognitive and affective background 
of identifying with the nation, on the one hand, and the everyday attitudes toward 
strangers, on the other hand. 
 Comparative international studies such as the ISSP series conducted in 1995, 
2003, and 201310 pointed to a very distinct cognitive East-West slope regarding 
national identity, presenting yet another reason why the divergence of xenophobia’s 
patterns in western and central Europe needs to be examined in the context of 
national identification. The ISSP studies explored the various patterns of national 
identity from the perspective of membership in one’s group. And in an approach 
similar to the GFE research they also interrogated majority stereotypes (positive 
and negative) of migrants. Figure 3.3 exhibits each country’s average value on 
the xenophobia scale based on four questions.11 
 The advanced western European countries demonstrated relative openness 
toward immigrants, yet we found no reason for celebration since even in the least 
rejecting countries our xenophobia index showed just below the average value. 
The populations of former socialist countries displayed intense antipathy toward 
migrants. In the West, tolerance was coupled with aggressive assimilationism tar-
geting internal ethnic minorities—a trend exemplified by France, Great Britain, 
Sweden, and Denmark in particular. In contrast, xenophobia in the East did not 
involve any assimilationist strategies. Underlying this dissimilarity, various sociologi-
cal and social psychological processes could be at work. Western Europe championing 
multiculturalism as their prominent post-material political value has been the goal 
10  See http://www.issp.org/.
11  Xenophobia was assessed with the help of six statements. Some of them formulated negative judg-
ments about strangers (immigrants), for example, associating them with crime and loss of jobs as 
opposed to others stating that immigrants enrich our culture and are economically profitable. Xeno-
phobia was identified with the respondent’s acceptance of negative and dismissal of positive statements.
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of mounting waves of immigration. In several states in the region, the massive 
migrations generated structural xenophobia traceable to resultant social tensions
and cultural clashes. And even though tolerance of otherness is an officially sanc-
tioned value, the masses of newcomers were at times met with passionate opposition 
or inflated expectations to assimilate. The eastern European version of xenophobia 
operates according to a different logic. Migration is not an actual challenge yet; 
the number of migrants is small. However, the national revival in the aftermath of 
the regime change, along with an intensifying search for collective identity, took 
place within the framework of cultural uniformity. Strangers could only be per-
ceived as disturbing this process of identity work. Therefore, the small groups of 
immigrants were treated with suspicion, and divergence from the majority was 
often brutally rejected. Even the assimilation of the nation’s ethnic minorities has 
been a contested goal.
Figure 3.3. The intensity of anti-immigrant attitudes in fifteen countries, ISSP 
data, 2003 (averages on a 5-point scale)
 Beyond Europe’s historical, developmental, geopolitical, and cultural fault 
lines and their impact on attitudes towards immigrants, the above discussion sug-
gests a complicated relationship between national identity and xenophobia. If our 
point of departure is that the nation and national cohesion play a special role in 
people’s sense of comfort within their groups, we may presume that a closed and 
122    I N A T I O N  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
homogenizing national ideology is inevitably and invariably hostile and discrimi-
natory (Dovidio et al. 2010). But may the national cohesion independent of the 
specific values by which a nation constitutes itself and the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the individual’s firm ties to their nation? The ISSP research series have 
offered excellent empirical material to probe this assumption, inquiring into 
numerous cognitive aspects of everyday national identity such as:
•	 the categorization scheme of national membership, meaning its exclusive or 
inclusive nature;
•	  the various types of national pride:
ZZ based on the relevance of modernizing values including the country’s 
economic achievements, political influence, the effectiveness of the social 
welfare system, and the protection of human rights;
ZZ embracing mainly symbolic sources of pride like the nation’s past historical 
achievements, culture, language, artistic, scientific and sports successes;
•	 national ethnocentrism;
•	 proactive economic, political, and cultural nationalism;
•	 forced cultural and minority assimilation.
 The following apparently complicated analytic model shows the extent to 
which the listed components of national consciousness and unrelated differences 
traceable to one’s country as a variable explain the intensity of xenophobia in Europe 
and the advanced overseas countries (Table 3.3). For the sake of better compre-
hension, the factors showing strong correlation with xenophobia’s intensity are 
printed in bold type.
 When the everyday affective consciousness of a nation is predominated by 
one-sided prioritization of its economic interests, the exaggerated protection of its 
national sovereignty, and a belief in its cultural superiority over other nations, 
ethnocentrism and chauvinism, it all leads to the insulation of the national com-
munity, ethnic and cultural homogeneity, the forced assimilation of minorities, 
and a wholesale ban on immigration. Aspects of these behaviors could be recog-
nized in the background of the extreme hostility experienced by migrants in eastern 
Europe (Wagner et al. 2010). This result came as no surprise to us.
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Table 3.3. The logistic regression model* explaining revulsion toward immigrants 
in 23 countries, within the cognitive and affective relational space of national 
identity, ISSP data, 2003
B S,E, Wald df Sig Exp (B)
Immigrants’ proportion –0,528 0,093 320,078 1 0.000 0,590
Exclusive categorization 0,158 0,014 1300,877 1 0,000 10,171
Pride in modernizing 
achievements –0,524 0,032 2610,560 1 0,000 0,592
Pride in symbolic 
entities 0,031 0,029 10,142 1 0,285 10,032
Ethnocentrism 0,223 0,031 510,220 1 0,000 10,250
Nationalism 0,603 0,026 5450,949 1 0.000 10,828
Forced assimilation 0,667 0,026 6400,523 1 0.000 10,948
Countries Ref: Finland 9250,785 22 0.000
Australia –10,785 0,130 1880,400 1 0.000 0,168
Austria 0,250 0,145 20,978 1 0.084 10.284
Bulgaria –0.102 0.159 0.411 1 0.521 0.903
Canada –10,452 0,155 870,719 1 0,000 0,234
Czech Republic 10,273 0,167 580,174 1 0,000 30,571
Denmark --0,679 0,137 240,393 1 0,000 0,507
France –0,440 0,136 100,503 1 0.001 0.644
Germany 0,321 0,142 50,087 1 0,024 10,378
Great Britain –0,047 0.148 0,103 1 0,749 0,954
Hungary 0,912 0,146 380,898 1 0,000 20,490
Ireland  –0,085 0.136 0.387 1 0,534 0,919
Latvia 0,260 0,147 30,150 1 0.076 10.297
Norway –0,205 0,129 20,535 1 0,111 0.815
Poland 0,013 0,139 0,009 1 0,924 10,013
Portugal –0,924 0,131 500,027 1 0,000 0,397
Russia 0,527 0,132 150,980 1 0,000 10,694
Slovakia 0,220 0,141 20,416 1 0,120 10,246
Slovenia 0,260 0,131 30,922 1 0,048 10,296
Spain –0,856 0,131 420,418 1 0,000 0,425
Switzerland –0,314 0,166 30,590 1 0,058 0,731
USA –0,539 0,128 170,630 1 0,000 0,583
Constant –0,902 0,134 450,338 1 0,000 0,406
* The dependent variable is the aggregate variable of xenophobia; the Wald statistic equals the 
square of the ratio of beta value (B) and standard error (S.E.). 
124    I N A T I O N  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 More intriguing was the link found between pride in one’s nation and xenopho-
bia. As long as a shared history, national myths, symbolic national consciousness, 
language, and culture constitute exclusively the source of such pride, strangers are 
not likely to be welcomed. But if the concept of the nation and national pride draws 
on modern communal values, economic achievements, overall welfare, social 
solidarity, political openness, rule of law, and the acknowledgement of minority 
rights, then the idea of national community has a whole new meaning. This kind 
of national sentiment implies openness toward migrants, inclusivity and tolerance, 
possibly preparing the ground for a fresh way of conceptualizing the nation. 
Thus, welcoming or excluding national attitudes towards immigrants are not pre-
determined but rather they pivot on the nation state’s policies and the values to 
which a national community commits itself, as exemplified by several western 
European countries.
 The economic, political, and cultural climate of individual countries, nev-
ertheless, continues to considerably play a role in the acceptance of immigrants. 
Australia, Canada, the United States, Sweden, Spain, France, Denmark, and Por-
tugal belong to the more welcoming part of the world—in contrast with Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and the numerous smaller eastern European countries that 
joined the EU relatively recently. Viewing migrants with fear and suspicion, these 
states abstain from accommodating them. Germany represents a unique case with 
its more advanced western region (coinciding with the territory of the former 
Federal Republic) open toward immigrants and people coming from other cultures, 
while the eastern parts (corresponding to the former GDR’s territory) remain per-
vasively unkind toward strangers. Even before the crisis, this scenario accurately 
foreshadowed the political conflicts of Germany in 2015 along with the rising 
popularity of the right populist AFD (Alternative for Germany) and the Pegida 
movement.
 The data listed above offers empirical support for our hypothesis stating that 
the traditional ethnic and culture-based concepts of nationality and nationalism 
would by necessity promote xenophobia in politics and society at large. The ulti-
mate characteristic of a nationalist worldview rooted in an inflexible and overheat-
ed affiliation with the group one belongs to is the rebuttal of diversity, insulation, 
and advocacy for ethnic and religious uniformity. This inevitably precludes the 
acceptance of others, the recognition of minorities, and, the principle of ethnic, 
cultural, and religious pluralism that facilitates accommodating the stranger in 
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a national society. The idea of ethnicized communities appropriated for state polity, 
moreover, exerts an unfavorable influence on the entire society, counters global-
ization, and the often controversial yet unescapable trend of multiculturalism. Not 
only is this state of affairs calamitous for being discriminatory against, and de-
grading toward, the newcomer born to another culture but also for harming the 
long-term economic, social, demographic and welfare interests of the countries 
involved. 
 Our results demonstrate the existence of an alternative to this concept of nation-
hood. One could envision a modern approach to the national idea and shared 
national identity resting on an entirely different foundation of values and evolving 
from broad-based societal negotiations of interests and collaboration. Moreover, 
it would imply a version of patriotism that transcends the all-exclusive national 
self-interest and self-centeredness. Ulrich Beck (2006) has called this idea cosmo-
politan nationalism and Jürgen Habermas (1998) has theorized it via the concept 
of constitutional patriotism.
 The re-thinking of nationhood in the twenty-first century is not a sufficient 
prerequisite for creating a successful and dynamic Europe on the basis of cross-na-
tional cooperation—one that is also open, inclusive, and culturally diverse. More 
profound structural and social psychological changes will be necessary for it to 
become reality.
 Fear of the “other” is deeply ingrained in people’s everyday sentiments, and 
in this manner strangers and other minorities are held at bay, in the entrenched 
political and social ideologies and norms hailing to xenophobia. Instinctive fear of 
strangers, the motive of self-interest that drives people’s behavior; real or alleged 
existential anxiety or the breakdown of habitual cultural patterns vis-à-vis strangers 
are no less crucial components of xenophobia than sheer hostilities focused on 
subordinate groups and the dominant ideologies justifying unequal inter-group 
relations and collective scapegoating.
 Even though Europe has set the goal of an unprecedented broad-based cultural 
integration on the grounds of ever-growing cultural diversity, in our daily lives 
the cultural fault lines do not simply fail to fade but allow for more and more con-
flicts to erupt. New and proliferating fault lines are coming to the surface between 
various religious and ethnic groups, cultures, and between traditional nationhood 
and the European idea. There is an upsurge of autocratic tendencies alongside 
“illiberal” politics and displays of prejudice, racism, chauvinism, cultural dominance 
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and religious intolerance. In a few eastern European countries, notably in Hungary, 
the government has systematically and aggressively stirred up emotions against 
immigrants and refugees. They have deployed strategies like an anti-immigrant 
billboard campaign, faux “national consultations,” unilateral severe border restric-
tions, a referendum against immigrant quotas, and hate speech directed against 
migrants. The government has been working to demonize strangers, intentionally 
confusing them with terrorists, criminals, and rapists. As a result, an increasing 
segment of the population—who is insecure and frustrated, has likely never met 
a migrant, is mistrustful about their language and culture, and is fearful of the 
unfamiliar—is growing hateful and entirely rejecting of migrants and refugees, 
and is even prone to aggressive outbursts against them. Presently, it seems easier 
for Europe to focus on maximizing efficiency instead of reconciling diverse cultures, 
a problem dramatically highlighted by the 2015 crisis.
T H E  E X T R E M E  M A N I F E S T A T I O N S  O F  H O S T I L I T Y 
T O W A R D  M I N O R I T Y  G R O U P S  I N  E U R O P E
A wave of millions of migrants set out for Europe in the spring of 2015, and this 
widely reactivated the existing xenophobia in European countries. It increased 
suspicion and aversion in every country (albeit to varying degrees) and radicalized 
people’s views toward immigration and refugees, in particular due to the simul-
taneous escalation of fundamentalist Islam terrorism. Islamophobia and extreme 
anti-Arab sentiments flared up in conjunction with growing numbers of atrocities 
committed against strangers. In parallel, religious intolerance became more intense 
as anti-immigrant political parties gained traction in several countries. This may 
be explained in part by strategy of some political leaders and movements to mix 
terrorism with migration, and migrants and refugees with terrorists. For sociolo-
gists testing the intensity of this political and media influence on people’s everyday 
mindset poses a great challenge. Indirectly, however, we are able to assess it via 
analyzing the GFE research data gleaned at a time period long preceding the migrant 
wave and the widespread sense of threat in Europe triggered by terrorist attacks. 
This data reflects the penetration of radically adverse attitudes toward minority 
and other groups deviating from mainstream culture.
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 The East-West differences of extreme xenophobia and prejudice are accurately 
represented in the context of attitudes toward the four groups. In the original 
survey four choices to questions were given to the respondents: “strongly agree,” 
“agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” By separating the respondents who 
had strongly agreed with the listed items in the four group relations (xenophobia, 
racism, antisemitism, and homophobia), we could generate a measurement tool 
similar to DEREX.12 As each of the four types of prejudice was tested with the 
help of several questions, of which the individual indices were then aggregated, 
we considered a respondent’s thinking “extreme” if they preferred the extreme 
“4” as an answer to the majority of the questions for each type of prejudice. On 
Figure 3.4 the proportion of extreme responses is displayed regarding the four 
themes of group rejection.
 At the end of the 2000s Hungary was in the lead to demonstrate intense hostility 
toward strangers with close to one fourth of respondents sternly rejecting and 
unfavorably viewing migrants. Great Britain followed, exhibiting relatively extreme 
attitudes with close to one-fifth of respondents firmly repudiating immigrants.
Figure 3.4. The intensity of extreme repudiation of groups (prejudice) by country, 
GFE data, 2008 (percentages) 
12  On the DEREX index see http://derexindex.eu/About_DEREX. For discussion in Hungarian see 
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 In Germany and France, the corresponding numbers were merely one tenth, 
and were even less in the Netherlands and Portugal. Surprisingly, not even in Poland 
did we detect a large number of people displaying adverse sentiments toward 
strangers. The Polish example, however, is significant for its stunningly high per-
centage of homophobes (42 percent). In the other three relations extremist atti-
tudes occur in relatively low (antisemitism and racism) or quite low (immigrants) 
proportions.
 Hungary stands out with the high number of extreme views regarding all but 
one group relation (racism). This pattern of prejudice is unparalleled in the rest of 
the examined European countries and does not bode well for the penetration 
of extremism directed at any kind of otherness (Csepeli and Prazsák 2015).
 In the other European countries, the proportion of full-scale rejection of groups 
does not appear too large, remaining mostly below ten percent. Merely a few cases 
stand out as exceptions such as the already mentioned anti-immigrant sentiments 
in Great Britain and Italy, homophobia in Poland and, once again, Great Britain 
and Italy.
 We may conclude that, unlike the generally rather intense penetration of 
prejudiced thinking in Europe in 2008 (cf. Figure 3.1), expression of extreme atti-
tudes was not particularly predominant at the time (with the exception of Hungary 
and, concerning homophobia, a few other countries). In some segments of society 
radical and heightened prejudice was already perceptible but was not permeating 
the majority of society.
I S L A M O P H O B I A  A N D  F E A R  O F  F U N D A M E N T A L I S T 
I S L A M  T E R R O R I S M  I N  E U R O P E 
In addition to the general pattern of xenophobia studied thus far, it is important to 
address a sub-case, Islamophobia, which at present poses a major problem on the 
European landscape. In the contemporary European public opinion, the complex 
issue of Muslim terrorism has far reaching historical background. Most important, 
however, are the recent Western interferences into the politics of the islamic countries 
(Iraq, Afghanistan, and expulsion of Palestinians) that triggered extreme actions 
on behalf the frustrated members of Muslim fundamentalist sects. 
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 Owing to the fast-paced migration from Muslim-majority countries to Europe, 
Islamic faith and its adherents raise anxiety within the host populations. Members 
of the non-Muslim majority regard Muslim immigrants with fear and apprehen-
sion, accusing them of terrorist sympathies, unequal treatment of women, and 
religious intolerance. Patterns of Islamophobia vary from country to country but 
do share a few traits in common. We hypothesized that differences across the 
countries would depend on factors like the size of the Muslim minority and the 
foreign-born ethnic population, the country’s socioeconomic conditions, people’s 
living standards and subjective well-being, and, the extent of xenophobia and 
the prevalence of ideologies targeting minority groups and justifying unequal 
inter-group relations. There is no doubt that Islamophobia is gaining influence in 
contemporary Europe. In our analysis, we will point out that the antecedents of 
current Islamophobia are embedded, as a syndrome of a group focused enmity, 
in the deep recesses of common European consciousness. As a consequence of 
the accelerating Muslim immigration, the minorities appearing as Muslims are 
subjected to unfair treatment and discrimination in the European Union states. 
Islamophobia thus represents the newest form of group focused enmity in Europe.
 The masses of Muslim immigrants cannot find a melting pot in Europe, since 
the national populations are not sufficiently receptive to integrating newcomers 
with cultural backgrounds alien to their Greek-Judeo-Christian culture. Neither do 
the Muslims appear entirely willing to assimilate the values and norms of Western 
civilization. The Muslims are ready to assimilate in terms of language usage and 
work culture, but they are unwilling to give up their religion. It is possible to 
envision that, due to immigration, the conflicts Huntington has termed the “fault 
line wars” will find their way into Europe. Mass and social media portray terrorist 
events in a manner producing distress in the public.
 The 2008 GFE-research assessing hostilities toward minority groups presented 
eleven statements that, somewhat foreshadowing the present-day events, proved 
suitable to measure negative attitudes and anxieties surrounding Islam as well as 
those triggered by the terrorist threat. Table 3.4 displays reactions to the eleven 
statements, by country; the percentage of respondents’ agreement is marked.
 In every country, negative sentiments induced by cultural otherness came 
across vividly. Consternation about fundamentalist terrorism is intensely present 
everywhere as well. Yet it is noteworthy that strong fears do not inevitably entail 
the condemnation of the Muslim minority.
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Table 3.4. Negative attitudes toward, and fears of Islam in Europe, GFE-data, 
2008 (percentages) 
  France The Netherlands Poland Hungary
Great 




– 29 30 40 38 28 29 30 23
The majority of Mus-
lims regard Islamist 
terrorism righteous
22 19 26 30 26 17 22 22 17
I’m worried about 
Islamist attacks to 
happen in my home 
country
44 38 48 48 57 52 49 61 48
I’m worried that me 
or members of my 
family will become 
victims of terrorism
35 17 41 46 42 29 26 58 32
Muslim culture does 
not fit into Europe
54 61 81 70 61 83 73 50 63
Muslim men’s treat-
ment of women is 
antithetical with our 
values
76 78 72 77 82 76 82 72 73
Intolerance is the 
essence of the Islam 
faith
50 47 62 53 47 43 61 62 62
Muslims living in 
Europe demand too 
much
47 52 62 60 50 54 65 34 50
Way too many Mus-
lims live in Europe
31 42 47 61 45 46 50 27 38
I don’t like Muslims 17 25 78 79 39 35 53 52 51
Wearing hijab should 
be banned 
86 45 33 18 43 47 54 41 43
I    131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   A T T I T U D E S  T O W A R D  I M M I G R A N T S  I N  E U R O P E
 In order to uncover the latent relationships underlying the responses to the 
eleven statements, we employed a variety of methods. One of them helped us 
show the interconnections of statements in a multidimensional space. Figure 3.5 
to shows that the Muslim culture theme is separate from all the other ones. Another 
“concentration” encompasses the themes of religious intolerance and the unequal 
treatment of women, which is associated with the accusation of Muslims “demand-
ing too much.” We find fear of terrorism, part of which flows from anxieties about 
the massive Muslim expansion, removed from these themes.
Figure 3.5. Concentration of the various themes in a multidimensional space
 In order to reveal the hypothetical latent structure of the linkages between and 
underlying the themes, we conducted a factor analysis in hopes that the analysis 
of the various items would provide us a key to a more profound understanding 
of anti-Islam attitudes. Table 3.5 depicts the organization of two latent structures 
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Table 3.5. Two patterns of Islamophobia, the items’ fitting with the dimensions 








I’m worried about Islamist attacks to happen in my home country 0.143 0.893
I’m worried that me or members of my family will become victims of 
terrorism
0.096 0.909
Muslim culture fits into Europe –0.563 –0.128
Muslim men’s treatment of women is antithetical with our values 0.604 –0.133
Muslims living in Europe demand too much 0.756 0.25
Way too many Muslims live in Europe 0.661 0.376
Many Muslims celebrate Muslim terrorists as heroes 0.302 0.221
Intolerance is the essence of the Islamic faith 0.711 0.107
Figure 3.6. Two patterns of Islamophobia in eight European countries, GFE 
data, 2008 (factor score averages)
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 By applying the method of principal component analysis, we distinguished 
two separate patterns. The first pattern is comprised of statements referring to cul-
tural objections to Islam (unequal treatment of women, intolerance, cultural remote- 
ness, Muslims’ demands, massiveness). The second pattern includes negative 
feelings arising from a sense of threat. These two co-existing and complementary 
aspects of European Islamophobia shape the various countries’ public opinion in 
very different manners. This is presented on Figure 3.6. 
 In Germany, Hungary, and Poland, the graph suggests that both patterns are 
characteristically prevalent. France is unique in that neither pattern can be detected 
as typical. In Great Britain and Portugal, the population is deeply worried about 
terrorism but cultural aversion toward Muslims is not significant. The exact oppo-
site is the case in Italy and the Netherlands where anti-Muslim sentiments are 
fueled, predominantly, by cultural themes, but anxiety about the terrorist threat is 
far less present.
 To offer a more graphic portrayal of each country’s pattern of Islamophobia, 
we conducted a cluster analysis as well, through which four distinct groups of 
respondents could be identified (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7. Groups representing the four patterns of Islamophobia in eight Europe-
an countries, GFE data, 2008 (percentages)
 Thirty-five percent of all respondents in the eight countries may be considered 
unaffected by Islamophobia. Members of this group do not nurture a great deal of 
aversion to Muslims on a cultural basis; neither are they bothered by general or 
personal fears of terrorism. At the other end of the spectrum, one can find a 
Is not afraid of the terror but
islamophobic
Afraid of terrorism but only
moderately Islamophobic
Bit Islamophobic and afraid 
of terrorism
Extreme Islamophobic
and afraid of terror
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strongly Islamophobic group whose members are averse to people of Muslim faith, 
led both by cultural and psychological motives. This group’s share is twenty-one 
percent. The third group making up twenty-five percent, is culturally averse to 
Muslims but its members are not afraid or anxious about terrorism. Lastly, the 
fourth group consists of people worrying about terrorist threats but only moderately 
unsympathetic to Islam on cultural grounds; their share is twenty percent. On the 
whole, the majority, amounting to sixty-five percent, may be said to nurture some 
dislike of Muslims.
 Figure 3.8 shows the varying distribution of the four groups in individual 
countries. The bigot Islamophobes are conspicuous in every country, except for 
Portugal. Not coincidentally, Portugal stood apart in the multidimensional space 
as we showed before. In addition, Portugal is unique for having many respon-
dents that are fearful of terrorism, yet only moderately uneasy about Islam culture. 
The non-Islamophobic group is particularly large in the Netherlands. In Italy and 
Germany, the group that is culturally averse to Muslims but expresses no fear of 
terrorism is relatively sizeable.






















































Is not afraid of the terror but islamophobic
Bit Islamophobic and afraid of terrorismExtreme Islamophobic and afraid of terror
Afraid of terrorism but only moderately Islamophobic
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I S L A M O P H O B I A  A N D  X E N O P H O B I A
We hypothesized that Islamophobia forms part of the hostile attitudes generally 
targeting groups of people. If this is correct, the overlap between xenophobic and 
Islamophobic groups would be quite large. As seen on Figure 3.9, we were able 
to test this assumption by clustering the different types of attitudes. The results can 
be seen in the following distribution within the entire sample.
 Our results indicate that general xenophobia does not necessarily go in tandem 
with Islamophobia. Even when someone is xenophobic, they may not be Islam-
ophobic, and vice versa. In two groups, however, we perceive a connection between 
these two kinds of hostility: 29 percent of the respondents are neither particularly 
xenophobic, nor averse to people of the Islam faith. In the case of the other consis-
tent group, making up 17 percent, xenophobia is complemented with anti-Muslim 
sentiments and fear of terrorist attacks. The other two groups lack consistency. 
Some (28 percent) are very fearful about fundamentalist Islam terrorism but have 
no worries about strangers in general. Lastly, there are those (27 percent) that are 
both anti-Muslim and xenophobic but have no fears.
Figure 3.9. Shows the distribution of the four cluster groups produced on the 
basis of xenophobia and Islamophobia. 
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Figure 3.10. The distribution of four cluster groups formed of Islamophobia 
and xenophobia in eight European countries (percentages) 
 In reading of the graph, we may clearly see that the share of those with no ad-
verse attitudes of either kind is lowest in Hungary (17 percent), Portugal (20 percent), 
and Poland (22 percent). In light of our earlier findings, it is hardly surprising that 
the groups we dubbed “enlightened” have the largest share in France (38 percent) 
and the Netherlands (44 percent), but in Italy as well they form a sizeable group 
(31 percent). Those with xenophobic and anti-Muslim attitudes have a substantial 
presence in Great Britain and Hungary, in comparison with the European average. 
It speaks to the divided nature of French society that this group is not negligible 
there either. The proportion of those fearful about terrorism but not really averse 
to newcomers is outstanding in Portugal (58 percent) and quite significant in Poland 
and France (27 percent in both countries). With regard to the proportion of those 
who are moderately averse to strangers and not overly worried about fundamentalist 
Islam terrorism, no difference could be found among the countries.
 In addition to factors like xenophobia, Islamophobia, and fear of funda-
mentalist Islamist terrorism, the original GFE research project investigated people’s 
disposition for racism and antisemitism in these countries (Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6. The measured dimensions of the GFE research project in eight European 







France 2.17 2.63 2.32 1.94 2.16
Germany 2.34 2.83 2.44 1.99 2.28
Great Britain 2.50 2.68 2.49 1.83 2.02
Hungary 2.72 2.89 2.44 2.37 2.59
Italy 2.35 2.84 2.16 1.68 2.09
Netherlands 2.18 2.66 2.01 1.81 2.00
Poland 2.43 2.84 2.45 2.26 2.66
Portugal 2.38 2.54 2.64 2.31 2.43
All 2.38 2.74 2.37 2.02 2.27
 A country-by-country reading of the GFE variables offers the conspicuous 
observation that Hungary has quite high values in regard to all of them. A counter- 
example would be the Netherlands with all GFE variables standing at a relatively 
low level.
 Reading the variables individually, in the case of racism and antisemitism, 
one may see the perfect validation of the core-periphery theory in that the core 
countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) both racism 
and antisemitism are at a significantly lower level than in the peripheral countries 
(Hungary, Poland, and Portugal). As to xenophobia and Islamophobia, however, 
the picture is quite different. On the whole, we may see a configuration that we 
referred to earlier. In the eight countries of the study a relatively high value indicates 
the population’s leaning toward xenophobia—with the exception of France and 
the Netherlands. But when it comes to Islamophobia, we witness a generally high 
level of incidence in every country. Fear of fundamentalist Islam terrorism is also 
independent of the center versus periphery as a variable, reaching the highest val-
ue in Portugal and Great Britain, while standing at a low level in the Netherlands.
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 With the help of factor analysis, we sorted the GFE-variables into two distinct 
types (Figure 3.11). One was comprised of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and fear 
of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism, while the other consisted of racism and anti- 
semitism—deemed historically present in Europe—complemented with a moder-
ate level of xenophobia. This latter type is exempt from both Islamophobia and 
worry about Islamist fundamentalist terrorism.
Figure 3.11. The two types of GFE (new and traditional) in eight European countries 
(averages of the principal component)
 Viewed country by country, the prevalence of the two patterns of prejudice in 
public opinion places Hungary at one extreme, the Netherlands and France at the 
other; both types are strongly characteristic of Hungary as opposed to the French 
and Dutch public opinion, which resist them.
 In the rest of the countries we find a combination of the two types in various 
configurations: in Great Britain a fear of terrorism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia 
are high, whereas the historical type of hostilities directed at groups is not detectable. 
Italy exhibits a similar scenario but, in comparison to the Brits, the new GFE- 
phenomenon is less conspicuous and the old GFE type is the most resisted. In the 
strong ansemi sm and racism, moderate xenophobia,
not Islamophobic and not afraid of terrorism
I    139 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   A T T I T U D E S  T O W A R D  I M M I G R A N T S  I N  E U R O P E
Polish and Portuguese societies, the traditional GFE-variables are at a high point, 
but in Portugal especially, the new form of prejudiced mindset is less marked. In 
Germany the figures indicate restraint with regard to both patterns of attitudes.
C O N C L U S I O N S
The results of the 2008 research conducted in eight European countries unequivo-
cally demonstrated the existence of Islamophobia in every country, even though 
in varying degrees. Islamophobia was found to be least intense where the likeli-
hood of interaction with Muslim people was high, e.g., France, Great Britain and 
the Netherlands. In Germany, the anti-Muslim “potential” is relatively large, despite 
the significant proportion of Muslims among the population. Undoubtedly, Islam-
ophobia is intense and widespread in Poland and Hungary where Muslims live in 
the respondents’ minds only, and it is merely the media that produce frightful and 
distorted representations of them.
 General xenophobia, and Islamophobia in particular, are not linked in the 
countries investigated, but neither are these two attitudes mutually exclusive. The 
“strangeness” of Islam is not merely the effect of an “alien” culture and religion, it is 
exacerbated by the sense of threat people associate with fanatic Islamist terrorism. 
This feature separates Islam from the general category of the “stranger.”
 The research has enabled us to distinguish between GFE’s traditional and new 
manifestations. In the cases of racism and antisemitism, the effect of authoritari-
anism could be detected in all of the countries. In the case of GFE-related attitudes, 
their cognitive background in each country also involved the effect—besides that 
of authoritarianism—of the following factors, albeit on varying scales: lack of 
trust, insecurity, and the acceptance of social dominance. Across the board, the 
GFE’s sociological background was rather diffuse; of the conventional sociodemo-
graphic variables, the impact of educational attainment was observed in the cases 
of antisemitism and racism. The sociological background of the Islam-related 
GFE-attitudes was more colorful. Here the primary effect seemed to be personal 
frustration (discontent with one’s life and perceived poor material conditions). 
The impact of religion moreover was conspicuous in almost every country, with 
the exception of Hungary and Germany.
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 In light of the events that transpired over the years, the significance of the data 
from 2008 has greatly increased. We were able to capture the onset of a trend, the 
full course of which was rendered partly unforeseeable for our present perspective 
by the dramatic wave of migration. 
C H A P T E R  4 .
M I G R A T I O N ,  N E W  M I N O R I T I E S , 
A N D  T H E  S O C I A L  I N T E G R A T I O N 
O F  M I G R A N T  G R O U P S
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M I G R A T I O N  I N  T H E  P A S T  A N D  A T  P R E S E N T
The meaning of the word migration refers to moving to another place, leaving 
a particular territory, and settling down in another. Migration is not unknown 
in the world of animals, for instance, birds of passage set out to fly from one con-
tinent to another. Among the animals capable of migrating, changing locations 
is naturally determined, forcing the individual members of a species to set off 
or to stay. In contrast, for humans, moving from one place to another, as Creswell 
observes, is a metaphor, implying the closing off and opening up of spaces in a 
cultural, historical, and social sense. Movement has produced two possible, yet 
contrary, versions of “geographical imagination.” One posits that space is enclosed 
by fixed and well-defined boundaries; the other views space as boundless and in-
finite, only made finite by human beings moving within it (Cresswell 2006, 25–26).
Migration has been part of human history since its early days.1 The size of traveling 
nomadic hordes varied between 120 and 140 members. These sizes allowed mem-
bers to keep track of one another, defend themselves effectively from predators’ 
attacks, and fight other groups (Pléh 2016, 47). In that historical era migration was 
vital for the survival of human communities.
 Settling down brought about a crucial change. In John Armstrong’s view, the 
nomadic hordes marked the boundaries setting them apart from the world of 
others not in physical terms but by the lineage of group members. Nomadic groups 
roamed freely across vast territories. Nothing set limits to their movement, except 
perhaps the change of seasons, the climate or natural obstacles on their journey 
such as seas and high mountains. In contrast, the groups who chose a sedentary 
lifestyle set up their boundaries according to territorial principles. The formerly 
nomadic peoples, whose size far exceeded the original number estimated by Dun-
bar, settled down and established ownership over the land that was to become 
their home.2
 At that point, not only did groups break with the nomadic lifestyle but they 
grew attached to their dwelling place as they developed a sense of belonging and 
social solidarity. Since then, a bond has existed between people and the place 
where they live, defining the physical boundaries of their lives and ensuring its 
1  For an illustration of the ancient history of migration, see “Map Shows How Humans Migrated 
Across the Globe,” June 3, 2015, video, 2:23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJdT6QcSbQ0.
2  For the process through which territorial borders were formed, see “1000 Years Time Lapse Map of 
Europe,” July 6, 2016, video, 10:59, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjWVFZ5e_vo.
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continuation. Early human communities and the societies evolving from them 
rendered the dwelling place and the physical environment where people lived to 
be the foundation of their individual and collective identity.
 Nevertheless, this did not imply a limitation to their physical world, since in 
numerous instances nomadic and sedimentary living alternated. Groups that had 
settled could be forced to move again by other groups or natural disasters. An 
example of this is the wanderings of the Hungarians reaching the Carpathian 
Basin in several waves. Following their arrival, they tried to roam further to the 
West, but they could not. The defeat at the Battle of Lechfeld near Augsburg in 955 
put an end, once and for all, to the “era of wanderings.”
 Historically, people have always migrated, but the meaning of movement 
shifted with the rise of sedentarism, resulting in variously constructed realities 
by the groups separated by geographical space and culture—realities that were 
not necessarily congruent with one another. What seemed obvious through the 
prism of one group’s reality looked shocking or terrifying in the reality construct 
of other groups. Ties to a location, and on that basis, the appearance of closed 
societies, nurtured people’s awareness of their own group and their shared identity. 
On the other hand, it generated fear of strangers and other peoples. From antiquity 
through the Middle Ages, these sentiments often led to wars, persecution, genocide, 
and pogroms, which in turn contributed to massive movements of peoples, i.e. 
migration. The Middle Ages crusades, pilgrimages and, subsequently, colonization 
could be considered forms of migration as well. 
 The onset of modernity brought about a radical turning point to the contem-
porary understanding of migration processes. Capitalism and industrialization 
launched movements of people on a vast scale all over the world from the agrarian 
to the manufacturing sector, and the inequalities spawned by the market economy 
spiraled into large-scale relocation of people from the less developed peripheries
to the more advanced central regions. The big cities sprouting in the course of 
urbanization absorbed large rural crowds, and their massive flow thoroughly 
transformed entire countries and societies, operating as a kind of melting pot that 
blended increasingly heterogeneous and multiethnic populations. 
 The new interpretations of migration discussed in the literature on modern 
migration (Haitzinger, Hegedűs, and Klemmer 2014) state, most notably that 
population movements are becoming massive and occurring on a global scale. 
Structural changes caused by modernization offset structural mobility worldwide, 
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triggering in turn mammoth sized relocations within and across countries. 
Everywhere, modernization involved the influx of populations. People previously 
inhabiting numerous small villages and employed in the agrarian sector moved 
into the cities, centers of industry and commerce. 
 A particular source of conflict stemming from massive and global migration 
lies in the modern political transformation, namely, in the national character of 
the modern political state and community. The new world order shaped by the 
ideals of capitalism, market economy, enlightenment, liberalism and democratic 
community has been constrained by its new framework involving a strict link 
between a political and economic community and a territory. The nation, however, 
represents a community of shared identity; a community where the sovereignty of 
the state embodying the political will of the community of individuals depends for 
its legitimacy on a territorial principle (ius solis) or the principle of primordial 
ethnic and cultural lineage (ius sangvinis), possibly on both. Evidently, the two 
concepts of the nation state imply different relationships between individuals and 
the community they constitute. Yet the two concepts are alike in the sense of strictly 
drawing the borders of the political and cultural community and distinguishing 
people who belong to a nation from those who do not, and thus are strangers. All 
of this involves setting up physical, legal, administrative or symbolic boundaries 
which can be crossed but with great difficulty or not at all.
 Migration requiring border crossing is called “emigration” from the perspective 
of the sending country and “immigration” from the standpoint of the receiving 
country. Viewed from either perspective, the dual nature of modernity (the spread 
of the globalized market system with the new social relations grounded in capital-
ism on the one hand and, on the other, the territorially insular modern political 
state with its legal and administrative apparatus resting on nationalistic principles) 
gave rise to profound controversies about the free movement of people and mas-
sive migration.
 Structural mobility set off by the modern era, globalization, and the rising 
population flows caused by new social and regional inequalities found an obstacle 
in the enclosure and insulation of nation states generating, up to the present day, 
insurmountable tensions and conflicts at the micro and macro levels, that is, 
affecting individuals and societies alike. In Europe and the contemporary advanced 
world, the nineteenth century was predominantly the age of the modern nation 
state’s development, a process of differentiation and insulation. In contrast, the 
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twentieth century may be defined as the age of increasingly massive migrations 
transcending, even ignoring, the borders of the nation state.
 In studying the decisions migrants make about leaving their homeland, it is 
interesting to question whether alternatives to emigration existed for them, or 
if setting out to start a new life elsewhere was meant to be a lasting or temporary 
solution. Finally, it is also very important to consider whether the motivation was 
personal or derived from communal concerns.
 Massive migrations caused by structural conflicts have varied greatly. There 
has always been politically motivated migration, where individuals may be forced 
to emigrate on account of their political views or the political situation in their 
country threatening their safety or very existence. Religiously motivated emigra-
tion has a long history as well. Oftentimes natural catastrophes compel people to 
leave their homeland and seek shelter in another country. Genocide and depor-
tation may prompt others to flee their country. From a legal or ethical standpoint, 
these cases present no dilemma; offering help to such people is the host countries’ 
fundamental obligation. The diverse cataclysms of the twentieth century offered 
tragic examples of such types of movements, and hardly does the twenty-first 
century seem to bring about any relief from them.
 The plea of economic migrants is more tenuous. Hopes for a better life and 
the search of a secure and solid livelihood have driven vast numbers of people to 
move. And they continue to do so even though their aspirations may not fit with 
the majority population’s hospitality in the selected country of destination.
M O R A L  C O S M O P O L I T I S M  O R  N A T I O N A L 
S E L F - C E N T E R E D N E S S ?
There is no natural environment where an individual would be at home ab ovo. 
Jesus Christ said of himself—but could have implied if of all humans—that “foxes 
have dens and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to lay his head” 
(Matthew 8, 20).3 Being “at home” is a peculiar aspect of our socially constructed 
reality, the borders of which are negotiated with groups that have already settled. 
Whether these borders could be rightfully closed by any single group in front of 
3  In the New International Version, see http://www.biblestudytools.com/matthew/8.html.
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non-group members (strangers) is a question subject to dispute. Could there be 
justification for a group to disallow entry to human beings driven by need and 
destitution to the territory it controls simply because those individuals are strangers 
to their land?
 The nation state as the organizational arrangement of the modern world raises 
this question quite acutely. The territorially separate modern nation states protect 
their borders and, in the name of national sovereignty, maintain the right to 
determine who may or may not enter their land. Yet, does any nation state have 
the right to allow entrance to their own citizens and keep strangers out of the terri-
tory under their control? After all, we are talking of human beings, whose natural 
equality should preclude discrimination on the basis of citizenship (Nagy 2012).
 This dilemma surfaced in a most dramatic manner at the international meet-
ing in Evian convened on July 6–15, 1938, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
in order to address the rescue of the German Jews, whose existence came under 
threat in national socialist Germany. The outcome of the meeting was disappointing. 
Of the thirty-one participating countries, only Dominica in the Caribbean ex-
pressed its intent to host 100,000 refugees. The other countries renounced it entire-
ly. Eventually, merely 800 refugees managed to enter Dominica. Forty years later, 
Walter Mondale could state, rightfully, that in Evian the self-respect and decency 
of the civilized world was at stake. If each of the participant nation states at 
the meeting had been ready to host 17,000 Jews, the Jewry of the German Reich 
would have survived (Mondale 1979). 
 Nonetheless, in 1938 the participant countries concluded that “the involuntary 
emigration of people in large numbers has become so great that it renders racial 
and religious problems more acute, increases international unrest, and may hinder 
seriously the processes of appeasement in international relations” (Bartrop 2018, 
114). Instead of initiating meaningful action, the group established a permanent 
bureau in London run by a president, four vice presidents, and a director. 
 This dilemma is still present and will not likely disappear any time soon. 
To address it, two diametrically opposite solutions have been proposed with argu-
ments for and against both of them (Miller 2016). The moral cosmopolitan argument 
states that the rights of free movement and choice of residence are universal, irre-
spective of birthplace and membership in any nation state’s political community. 
The Earth is the shared habitat of humankind and there is no justification for why 
some groups would have more right to control certain parts of it than any other 
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groups. This viewpoint would be viable if there was a global state of which 
every person would be a lifelong citizen. The same rules would apply to everyone’s 
movement and choice of residence, being citizens of this global state, similar to 
the way citizens’ movement within the territory of their state is regulated by 
uniform rules.
 Moral cosmopolitanism has two variants, of which the stronger one dismisses 
every type of affiliation, be it to a nation, a city, the family, a social circle of friends 
or a workplace. The bonds universally affecting every human life are to be more 
powerful than the loyalties dictated by belonging to specific groups. The weaker 
variant states that someone in trouble should enjoy special attention. Someone 
afflicted with problems must be preferred over an unafflicted person. From the 
state’s perspective, this principle implies the imperative of helping strangers in 
need even when they are not members of the legally determined community 
inhabiting the state’s territory.
 The other solution’s premise is that people belong to groups defined by spheres 
of familiarity, comfort, and a state of acceptance. Beyond these spheres lies the 
unfamiliar: strangers and people living in foreign lands. The distinction between 
the members of one’s own group and those of others is not arbitrary, it is based 
on the shared experience of a common history and culture. It commands, at the 
present time, responsibility for one another as well as collective efforts to sustain 
life (Walzer 1983). Communal bias is an inevitable reaction to the original condi-
tion of humans as strangers to one another. Viewed from an evolutionary perspec-
tive, strangers would have been doomed to perish, had they not formed ties and 
groups through which to survive in geographical space and historical time (Smith 
and Szathmáry 1999). However, once groups were formed, the duality of familiarity 
versus strangeness became established along with the inevitable preference of 
members of one’s own group over those of other groups. After settling down, the 
communal existence of the group became inextricably linked with the territory 
that it controlled. It was in ancient Athens where the state as the citizens’ political 
community emerged, making it possible for citizens to live in a space of freedom, 
as opposed to the strangers who lacked the civic freedom to vote and lived under 
the constraints of necessity.
 In modernity, the country is the nation state’s territory—determined via in-
ternational recognition—where the nation state’s citizens reside bound together by 
special rights and obligations that do not apply to others. The rights of all human 
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beings were laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by 
the United Nations in 1948. Point 1 of Article 13 of the Declaration states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the bor-
ders of each state.” According to Point 2, “[e]veryone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Point 1 of Article 14 
unequivocally claims that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.” Point 2, on the other hand, states that “[t]his
right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non- 
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.”4
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966. It came into force 
on March 23, 1976 and, as of 2014, has been signed by 168 states. Protected rights 
were extended to the rights of children and minority individuals. Unlike the Dec-
laration, however, the text of the Covenant makes no mention of the rights to 
property and asylum. 
 The motivational background of migration is provided by personal needs 
which, if they are unsatisfied, may propel people to move out of their place 
of residence and seek new places where they may expect to have their needs ful-
filled. Unmet needs of security and comfortable living may urge some to change 
residence. Another powerful motive is the unfulfilled need for freedom. There 
are additional social needs that, when left unsatisfied, cause people to feel unrec-
ognized, humiliated, and undignified. It comes hardly as a surprise that, given 
the psychological proximity produced by new informational and transportation 
opportunities, many residents in countries afflicted by deprivation and oppression 
aspire to live in a wealthy and free country. Thus, they set out to travel on land, 
on water, and by air only to find themselves unwelcome in their destination and 
possibly even forced to return to their country.
 The international law currently in effect appears to support the weak rather than 
the strong perspective on moral cosmopolitanism. The cited Point 1 of Article 
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that individuals perse-
cuted in their home country have the right to apply for asylum in other countries. 
Persecution due to political and religious reasons or sexual orientation constitutes 
a state of need that can only be met by granting the victim asylum. Other states of 
4  See https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
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need include war, famine, epidemics, and environmental disaster. The latter, how-
ever, do not necessarily qualify as a reason to grant an asylum. Economic migrants 
might try their luck without the support of the law. Family reunification may also 
grant migration.
 Once a refugee is granted asylum, national communities are obligated to make 
every effort to help them become full members of the community. The state cannot 
discriminate against anyone based on how they have obtained citizenship status.
 Nations states have the right to determine to whom they do or do not grant 
asylum. Legislation regulating the granting of asylum is rooted in the idea of 
national sovereignty and the primacy of national interests. The human right of free 
movement contradicts the right to national sovereignty, which at present predom-
inates. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the right to national self-deter-
mination often hinges on the international state of affairs. When, in the name of 
so-called “national self-determination,” the national borders are redrawn, the move-
ment of people alters as well, to the effect that individuals who were formerly citi-
zens of one country now face each other as “strangers” separated by new borders.
T Y P E S  O F  M I G R A T I O N 
The concept of migration and the category of “migrant” are subject to diverse 
interpretations and designations, depending on whether the two concepts refer to 
the life trajectory and social circumstances of the individual or they explain social 
processes and group relations.
 In the broadest sense of the term, everyone is a migrant who leaves their birth-
place or place of residence. If the movement occurs from one location to another 
within a country, we call it internal migration; if it involves moving to another 
country, it is called outer migration or international migration. In contemporary 
public discourse, migration usually refers to the latter.
 Market mechanisms and economic processes extended by globalization and 
transcending the confines of the nation state have furthered regional inequalities, 
thus dividing the world into core and peripheral regions (Wallerstein 2005). 
Population flows from the periphery to the core involving individual relocation 
across borders are often designated as economic migration. In a narrow sense, this 
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refers to the movement of a labor force in response to the pull of labor markets. 
However, in a broader sense, all relocations fall into this category if they are moti-
vated first, by material aspirations that include an individual’s efforts to improve 
his other living conditions, pursue a career, ensure a livelihood and obtain an 
education; second, by destitution, impoverishment and the overall deterioration 
of a person’s living standards; and third, by new opportunities created by the un-
fettered flow of capital, labor, services, information, and knowledge. This type of 
migration may be regulated or irregular, legal or illegal, voluntary or externally 
constrained, short-term or long-term, individual or as a family. Nowadays, it is
increasingly common for migration to involve not one but several movements, 
usually encompassing the country of origin and one or more countries of destination. 
Traditionally, this pattern of relocation has been prevalent in seasonal agricultural 
and construction work, but white collar and highly specialized professional 
migration characteristic of more advanced societies follows a similar pattern. The 
so called “secondary effect” of economic migration derives from relocation driven by 
the need for families to reunite, following the main breadwinner’s move abroad. 
The magnitude of secondary migration is growing in line with the growing scale 
of migration. The United States offers an apt example where, by the turn of the 
millennium, two thirds of legal and long-term immigration cases fell under the 
rubric of family reunification (Figure 4.1.). 
Figure 4.1. The portion of family unification (percent) in all migration cases 
(million persons) in the period between 1995 and 2001
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2010
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 The prototype of political—in contrast to economic—migration is by and 
large forced migration. Whether due to persecution through war and other forms 
of violence5 or “persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a specific social group or political beliefs,”6 seeking refuge motivated by fear and 
the hope of survival is a particular type of migration. A political refugee may fur-
thermore be a person whose life is not directly in danger but indirectly threatened 
by treacherous conditions infringing on their right to personal liberty, security 
or human dignity.7 The general and universal acknowledgement of the refugees’ 
legal status was not attained until the second half of the twentieth century (Nagy 
2012). Not coincidentally, the extraordinary upheavals of the past century and the 
ensuing mass movements and flights from persecution led to the adaption of the 
United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention granting refugee status to those who 
met a set of criteria that involved recognition of their unique predicament and the 
application of special determination procedures.
 Fleeing to escape persecution is ubiquitous in human history. Its intrinsic 
components are external necessity, the absence of regulation, calamity, and the 
transitional nature of the situation. As soon as the conditions compelling this 
movement disappear, refugees lose their special status and become subject to the 
same treatment as regular migrants, frequently ending up repatriated. 
  Some crises such as natural catastrophes, global ecological transformations 
like climate change and attendant fluctuations in the world’s water supply may 
be long term, but they are not regulated separately by international law. These 
processes may also provoke migration of yet another type. 
G L O B A L  T R E N D S  O F  M I G R A T I O N
When investigating the global trends of migration, one may clearly see its continuous 
and even growth over time across the world. During the past half a century, the 
proportion of individuals born in a country other than their current residence has 
more than tripled. The rise was somewhat slower until the 1980s but, ever since, it 
5  The 1967 Amendment of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
6  The 1951 UN Refugee Convention. 
7  For a short overview of the theories of migration, see Hautzinger, Hegedűs and Klenner (1994). 
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has been soaring (Figure 4.2). In 2015, the number of people living in a country 
different from their birth place was about 243 million. Of the 243 million, less 
than ten percent fell into the category of non-economic migrant, that is, dwelling 
outside of their birth country as a refugee.
Figure 4.2. The size of global migration flow over the period between 1960 and 
2015 (million persons) 
 We see a different picture when we shift our perspective from the migrants 
and the sending countries to the effect of migration on the host societies’ demo-
graphic composition. From this perspective, the impact of migration appears less 
dramatic: merely 3.3 percent of the entire population of the totality of the world’s 
countries may be regarded as first-generation immigrants—only 0.7 percent more 
than in 1960. This figure, of course, varies across continents and countries (Map 4.1). 
Extreme cases include the United Arab Emirates (83.7 percent), Qatar (73.8 percent), 
Bahrein (54.7 percent), Andorra (56.9 percent), and Macao (58.8 percent) with 
more than a half of the population being first generation immigrants.    
 The countries where immigrants make up 30 to 50 percent of the population 
include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Hong Kong in China, Singapore, Oman, Luxem-
bourg, Lichtenstein, Monaco and Gibraltar. Compare this to the respective figures 
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(in percentages) in the United States (14.3), Canada (20.7), Australia (27.7), Germany 
(14.9), Russia (7.7), France (11.1), Spain (14), Sweden (14.3), and Great Britain (11.3).
Map 4.1. Countries of the world showing the size of immigration in relation to the 
host countries’ population,* 2005.
 * Darker shades signify countries with larger intake of immigrants. 
Source: Population Division. United Nations–Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/.
 The image shows a great deal of variation. In the next chapter, we will offer an 
overview of the most salient theories regarding migration. In light of the global 
trends of population flows, however, we would like to pose this question: would 
the wealth, success, and economically advanced status of the destination countries 
explain migration there from the less developed regions and countries? Disre-
garding the cases where migration rates are very high or high for specific reasons, 
we will find that a positive answer to the question may be generally valid but does 
not offer a full explanation. For example, as regards to Canada, Australia, and the 
United States, their special status as a traditional destination for migrants as well 
as the fact that their statehood is firmly embedded in the history of continuous 
immigration, are crucially important. In the case of European countries, historical 
traditions, the colonial past, geopolitical as well as language and cultural factors, 
are no less significant considerations.
 A more tangible answer can be given to our question by examining possible 
significant correlations between, first, economically and geographically diverse 
regions and continents and, second, the size of migration (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1. Migrant stock and the fluctuation of the size of migration according 
to economic and geographic regions during the period between 1990 and 2013 
(number of individuals in million and fluctuation in percentages) 
,
Number of migrants (million) Annual fluctuation (million)
Annual average in-
crease (percentages)













Global 154.2 174.5 220.7 231.5 2.0 4.6 3.6 1.2 2.3 1.6
Developed 
regions
82.3 103.4 129.7 135.6 2.1 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.3 1.5
Developing 
regions
71.9 71.1 91.0 95.9 –0.1 2.0 1.6 –0.1 2.5 1.8
Africa 15.6 15.6 17.1 18.6 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.9 2.8
Asia 49.9 50.4 67.8 70.8 0.1 1.7 1.0 0.1 3.0 1.5
Europe 49.0 56.2 69.2 72.4 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.4 2.1 1.5
LAC* 7.1 6.5 8.1 8.5 –0.1 0.2 0.2 –0.9 2.2 1.8
NA** 27.8 40.4 51.2 53.1 1.3 1.1 0.6 3.7 2.4 1.2
Oceania 4.7 5.4 7.3 7.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.5 3.1 2.6
Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision–Migrants by Age and Sex. United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013. United Nations database, POP/DB/
MIG/Stock/Rev.2013/Age).
* Latin America and the Caribbean region
** North America
 Even though the most advanced regions of the world demonstrate a higher 
capacity to accept immigrants, the developing regions narrowly lag behind them. 
Since the 2000s the difference in the annual increase of immigration between the 
advanced and developing regions is negligible. Likewise, our comparison across 
continents shows that the concept of the “East-West slope” is reductive: Europe 
and Asia barely differ in the number of immigrants and the differences in trends 
over time are small. The figures for North America are significantly lower than 
those for Europe and Asia, and even diminish somewhat over time. Finally, even 
Africa attracts many migrants despite its lower values of development compared 
to the other three continents, and the size of immigration has been continuously 
growing. 
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 A more accurate understanding of interrelations is to be had by looking at 
the size of migration between the continents as well as within them. The columns 
of Table 4.2 indicate the migrants’ location of origins, while the rows show their 
current residence. 
Table 4.2. The population size of emigrants and immigrants according to eco-
nomic and geographic regions, 2013 (million persons) 
Current 
residence




regions Africa Asia Europe LAC* NA** Oceania Other Global
Developed 
regions
53.8 81.8 11.3 38.9 48.8 31.0 2.4 1.6 1.6 135.6
Developing 
regions
13.7 82.3 19.7 53.7 9.7 5.7 1.9 0.2 5.1 95.9
Africa 1.3 17.3 15.3 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.4 18.6
Asia 9.7 61.2 4.4 54.0 7.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 3.6 70.8
Europe 40.1 32.4 8.7 18.7 37.9 4.5 1.0 0.3 1.5 72.4
LAC* 2.7 5.9 0.0 0.3 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.0 0.2 8.5
NA** 9.6 43.5 2.0 15.7 7.9 25.9 1.2 0.3 0.0 53.1
Oceania 4.1 3.9 0.5 2.9 3.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.1 7.9
Global 67.5 164.0 30.9 92.6 58.5 36.7 4.3 1.8 6.7 231.5
Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision–Migrants by Age and Sex. United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013. United Nations database, POP/DB/
MIG/Stock/Rev.2013/Age).
* Latin America and the Caribbean region; ** North America.
 Migration takes place primarily from developed regions to other developed 
regions (53.8 million persons). Even taking this into account, the number of 
migrants moving from developed to less developed regions is not insignificant 
(13.7 million persons).
 Few eyebrows will be raised by the finding that there is a vast flow of migra-
tion from less developed to developed regions (81.8 million persons). But isn’t 
it remarkable that the movement from a less developed region to another less 
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developed one barely differs in size— in fact, even surpasses the former figure 
(82.3 million persons)? This finding clearly indicates the fallacy of assuming an 
unequivocally positive relationship between migration’s destination and highly 
developed regions. We can obtain an even more nuanced picture by observing the 
movements between and within continents. By looking at the cells with figures for 
intra-continental migration and, subsequently tallying them, we will see that half 
of the total migration of 231.5 million people took place not between but within 
continents. At the risk of oversimplification, we may argue that migrants’ desti-
nation is the neighboring country and the surrounding ones. Thus, the miscon-
ception that in 2015 all migrants were headed to Europe can easily be disproved. 
Whereas the internal migration of Europe amounted to nearly forty million, only 
nine million migrants arrived here from Africa and nineteen million from Asia. 
The other side of the coin is that 28 percent of all African migrants and merely 20 
percent of all Asian migrants settled down in Europe. Overall, Europe’s exposure 
to migration does not strike us as dramatic, especially bearing in mind the size of 
population at close to a half billion as against the 34.5 million people arriving here 
from outside of Europe.
Figure 4.3. The size of international migration in eight EU countries in the period 
between 1960 and 2015 (million persons) 
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 Finally, let us look at the shifting size of migrant populations in a set of European 
destination countries over the period between 1960 and 2015. Table 4.3 is noteworthy 
as it shows the widely diverse trends of all-European immigration by country.
 Figure 4.3 shows migrant population in absolute numbers for eight selected 
countries over time. As it ignores the size of the host population, this may be misleading. 
Thus, while immigration into countries with a small population size may have a low 
absolute value, it may have a large value when related to the entire population.
 France exhibits the most even growth: as early as the 1960s the number of im-
migrants was already quite considerable, and it has been increasing continuously. 
Great Britain of the early 1960s witnessed relatively modest numbers and propor-
tions of immigration followed by a steep rise in the 1990s, which led to surpassing 
the French in the 2010s. The last country to become a migrant destination is Ger-
many, which experienced a sharp increase bump in the 1980s. Up to the present 
day, the inflow to Germany here has been continuous, spectacularly exceeding 
both the sizes of British and French immigration. It should be noted that the trend 
has been almost the same in Spain and Italy where immigration was a relatively 
unimportant social issue until 2000, only to soar rapidly between 2000 and 2010 
and consolidate at around the size of six million people. 
T H E O R I E S  O F  M I G R A T I O N
With the vast expansion of migration, the social sciences have become keener to de-
scribe, understand, and explain this phenomenon following the birth of a scientific 
disciplinary field called migration studies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). With an 
essentially interdisciplinary and comparative approach and perspective, migration 
studies have been seeking to build a theoretical framework to describe processes 
related to migration, develop a specific methodology challenging the traditional 
research paradigm of the social sciences, and, conduct increasingly painstaking 
quantitative and qualitative investigations. Previously, two paradigms predomi-
nated conventional sociological research. 
 First, the structuralist-functionalist approach studied social systems and phe-
nomena from a primarily sociodemographic perspective, focusing on the social 
structure, stratification, mobility, inequalities, and power relations of dominance 
I    159 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   M I G R A T I O N ,  N E W  M I N O R I T I E S . . .
and subordination. Naturally, this approach was characterized by methodological 
individualism based upon the assumption that social issues could be interpreted 
within the framework of social systems. It dismissed relationships between ter-
ritories defined by nationality or broader perspectives transcending boundaries. 
A major turn occurred with the emergence of a new approach in the 1960s which, 
treating individual countries as unique entities, began to study economic, political, 
social, and cultural national specificities spanning borders and to compare them 
across countries or regions. From this evolved the paradigm of international 
comparative empirical research. Yet even this paradigm remained within the 
perspectival confines of methodological nationalism, since the unit of inquiry re-
mained the society organized within the framework of the nation state (Sík 2012). 
  This perspective could not be a viable starting point for migration studies 
since the nation state may be one but not an exclusive interpretive framework for 
the migration process whose very significance is its transcendence of borders and 
boundaries. As well, the motives of migrants could only be understood from 
a perspective with a larger scope than the nation state.
  The first broader theoretical attempts of interpretation emerged from the area 
of economics. Paradoxically, these first theories still carried the traces of method-
ological nationalism with their main question being, what macroeconomic pro-
cesses and interrelationships are responsible for the ever more intense and massive 
movements of populations? 
 Neoclassical economists explained migration by fundamentally identifying 
it with the flow of labor force governed by the macroeconomic rules of supply 
and demand (Todaro 1976). To simplify this idea, international migration may be 
viewed as the flow of people from poor to wealthy countries. The dimensions of 
migration are regulated by labor supply and demand between particular countries, 
perceptible in wage differences that determine the size of migration. Countries 
with sizable excess labor and low wages are expected to instigate a movement to 
countries with paucity of labor and higher wages. This process could be countervailed 
by the inverse movement of capital. Based on the macroeconomic migration model, 
economists presumed that, at the macro-level, individuals would follow rational 
principles when deciding to stay in their homeland or move to another country.
 New economic theories challenged earlier explanations of migration phenom- 
ena by focusing on the migrants’ decision about migration, which earlier theories 
had ignored. Economists sought to answer the question, why do some people decide 
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to emigrate and others do not? Such decisions are not made by individuals but by 
the family or, to put it in economic terms, by household communities. These micro- 
economic units negotiate, in light of family resources, needs and opportunities, 
whether to should stay or leave. If they leave, should they do it together or rely on 
some form of division of labor within the family? Should the migration be short 
term, temporary or permanent (Stark 1991)? Invariably, there are macro and 
microeconomic push-and-pull effects underlying these decisions (Grigg 1977) in 
the context of the sending as well as the host countries. Once those effects are taken 
into account, the decisions are fundamentally rational based upon the balancing 
of the pros and cons. Another important consideration is risk-taking or some 
form of collective (family based) cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the magnitude of 
migration is no less significantly influenced by the deteriorating economic situation 
in the migrants’ country of origin. 
 A more recent theory is premised on the concept of the dual labor market 
(Piore 1979), connecting the micro-level individual and macro-level market per-
spectives. In more advanced societies the internal labor market is characterized by 
a duality: internal supply and demand crucially affect the labor force and the wages, 
on the one hand; on the other hand, there is a secondary labor market involving 
the effects of immigration and wage differentials. The interrelationship between 
the two markets influences, first, the extent to which the host country is open (or 
closed) toward labor pressure from the outside and, second, the opportunities 
presenting themselves for immigrant labor. This is where demand for cheap labor 
must be reckoned with, but the dual labor market also shapes migrants’ assessment 
of the benefits of employment in the host country. Brain drain is a central aspect of 
the dual labor market, and so is the cutthroat competition between the internal and 
the external labor force because migrant work occupies specific economic niches.8
 A number of new theories address the problem of migration by moving beyond 
the realm of economics. One example is the world-system theory placing migration 
trends into the context of broader, globally construed historical and geopolitical 
systems such as core and peripheral countries, differences and inequalities between 
regions, North versus South and West versus East as global frameworks of popu-
lation flows (Wallerstein 1974; Lechner 2009). Mention should be made of the 
increasingly compelling theories that explore, either locally or globally, the con-
tribution of demographic processes like under- and over-population and demo-
8  The concept of economic niche refers to sectors or economic profiles occupying a market segment.
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graphic pressure to the shaping of migration trends. Likewise, the effects of global 
ecological changes appear to be an increasingly relevant issue.
 Network analytic approaches combine sociological and economic perspectives 
(Massey et al. 1993) with a focus on the role of migrants’ relationship networks 
and the resultant social capital in the migrants’ decisions about relocation. Typically, 
these studies have investigated the ways in which ties with family members and 
acquaintances affect migrants’ departure, arrival, and integration into the host 
society. Cost-benefit calculations and, regarding the accumulation of social capi-
tal, the assessment of one’s social network are no less important factors of migra-
tion, in addition to the use of internet-based info-communicational technologies. 
Another branch of research probes the process of institutionalization associated 
with migration, whereby an increasingly extensive and sophisticated system of 
institutions is created in order to support the migration process itself and the 
migrants’ full integration into the host society. Impressively rich theoretical liter-
ature and research has been dedicated to studying how migrant diasporas evolve 
and what their role is in the process of relocation. 
 The multiplicity of theories seeking to elucidate and explain migration exist 
parallel to or in contestation with one another. A cumulative causal explanation 
has arisen, too, with the goal of synthesizing and integrating these theories into 
an all-encompassing framework (Massey 1990).
 The role of politics cannot be dismissed in describing and making sense of 
migration. Either viewed from the sending or the host country’s perspective, the 
political circumstances of the relevant countries exert a substantial impact on the 
migration process, along with the resultant legal and administrative border control 
and the policies regulating emigration and immigration. Political crises and re-
pression prevailing in the migrants’ homeland should not be overlooked either in 
cases of economic or involuntary migration. Of special importance are the host 
country’s migration and refugee policies, the procedural regulations concerning 
immigration, and the workings of the relevant institutions in terms of their effects 
on the magnitude, direction, and consequences of migration. 
 We are aware of the large body of social psychological literature based on re-
search of transnational migration dealing with problems of assimilation, integration 
and segregation. This literature proves the multifaceted nature of voluntary and 
involuntary types of migration with different outcomes resulting various forms 
of accommodation (Berry 1997; Marsh and Ahn 2009; Hamilton 1985; Levitt and 
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Jaworsky 2007). In our book, however, we are focusing mainly on the research car-
ried out by one of the authors of this book in 2009. The models developed on the 
basis of our case study are generally are in correspondence with former and later 
theories of transnational migration. Consequently, we shall pay less attention to 
these theories, opening the space for further interpretation of our results.
 The proliferation of theories has turned migration into one of the most popu-
lar empirical research areas in the social sciences. One main branch of inquiry is 
concerned with macro-level societal relations, another focuses on individual and 
micro-level issues. 
 By adopting the latter perspective, following Massey, we tried to build up 
cumulative causal explanatory model encompassing the broad array of effects behind 
migration. In this chapter we shall present the results of a research aimed at to 
understand migration in terms of complexity and multicausality. First, we analyze 
the conflicts of integration and cultural (language-based and religious) collisions 
between migrants and the host society from the viewpoint of new minorities. Then, 
we discuss the challenges posed by the immigrants’ assimilation, acculturation, in-
tegration and segregation. Third, we will look at the diverse integrational strategies. 
Our central assumption derived from the model multicausal theory of migration 
was that in coping with the challenges of accommodation in the host country 
immigrants will resort to diverse integrational strategies due to their ethnic and 
cultural background, career aspirations, and the climate of the host country.
T H E  S O C I A L  I N T E G R A T I O N  O F  M I G R A N T  G R O U P S 9 
Based on a case study prepared in 2009, in this subchapter we discuss the paths 
available to various migrant groups. The goal of the research was to shed light 
on the composition and sociodemographic traits of the migrant population (citi-
zens from a third country) living in Hungary, as well as the factors affecting their 
integration. We were moreover interested in the migrants’ contribution to the eco-
nomic, political, and cultural life of Hungary.
9  With co-author Mária Székelyi’s consent, in this chapter we used the results of an earlier publication 
(Örkény and Székelyi 2010).
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 Since becoming an independent sovereign nation state in the twentieth cen-
tury, Hungary has remained an ethnically and culturally rather homogeneous 
society. Despite experiencing several waves of migration in and out of the country, 
Hungary has become a destination for economic migrants only following the 
regime change of 1989, when it opened up to foreign residents, who began to 
form new migrant minorities.
 This fledgling multicultural landscape attracted social scientists’ attention to 
issues like the immigrants’ social integration, and, more specifically, how the 
everyday life of society was transformed by this growing segment of the population. 
The question as to how an immigrant with a different language, culture, and, 
possibly religion can fit in, build a career, and grow roots in Hungarian society has 
also developed into an important area of study. We were curious to learn whether 
immigrants—lacking roots, possessing limited resources and little or no social net-
works—can find a job, housing, provide for themselves and their families, and 
ensure their children’s education. In other words, we asked whether migrants can 
find a home in Hungary or whether they find themselves on the edge of society, liv-
ing in some kind of grey or black zone? The host society’s restraint from hostile be-
havior toward “otherness” is a necessary condition for an immigrant to successfully 
integrate. Integration is thus an achievement that reflects not only the immigrant’s 
efforts but of the openness of the host population and the country’s policies as well. 
 Various immigrant and migrant groups adopt diverse strategies, and have 
varying opportunities to accomplish their goal of settling down in a manner they 
too would consider successful. When we asked six different migrant groups about 
their reasons for leaving their home country and their hopes regarding their settle-
ment in Hungary, we expected each group to display markedly different strategies. 
The comparative analysis of the six groups gave an insight into, first, the degree 
to which Hungary, twenty years after the regime change, has been capable of inte-
grating various migrant groups, and, second, the ways diverse migrant strategies 
fit in with general schemas of integration.
 In our study, we first discuss the various facets of the stories related by mem-
bers of six immigrant groups about their immigration and their efforts at integra-
tion. Subsequently, we will explore the strategies these migrants adopted to ensure 
a successful life in Hungary.
 In selecting the specific migrant groups for investigation, our main consider-
ation was to represent the broadest possible spectrum of the immigrant population 
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residing in Hungary. Therefore, six groups, each represented by a sample of two 
hundred individuals, were contacted with a questionnaire.10 The six groups as a 
whole provide an accurate picture of more than eighty percent of the entire immi-
grant population of Hungary including ethnic Hungarians from across the border 
(further referred to as “ethnic Hungarians”), Ukrainians, Arabs, Turks, Chinese, 
and Vietnamese people. None of the migrants of our study were born in Hungary, 
all of them arrived legally from outside of the EU’s borders (from a third country), 
none had Hungarian citizenship, and all of them were older than eighteen years.
 Drawing on the theoretical points discussed earlier, we addressed the follow-
ing issues: to what extent did rational deliberations associated with economic 
migration—such as job opportunities, expertise, income expectations, higher living 
standards—affect the respondent’s decision to migrate, and how were such con-
cerns present later in their career? How did particulars such as their cultural back-
ground, social networks, language proficiency, and social capital affect their ability 
to fit in to Hungarian society? How has migration and switching countries shaped 
their personal identity? How have their interests and activities in social and public 
life changed? What do they think about the country’s general social climate, and 
what kinds of hurdles or rejection did they face in interacting with the majority 
society? What conflicts did they persistently experience throughout the migration 
process, and what goals did they set for the future?
 Regarding these questions, the referential space of the answers cannot be 
overlooked. One salient aspect of migrants’ life is that it involves constant moving 
across various political and social spaces, complicating its very interpretation. 
Whether talking of their career, successes, failures, or future, the meaning of their 
responses is negotiated in the referential spaces associated with the migrant’s 
home and host country, the more immediate and the wider inter-group environ-
ment. On Figure 4.4 we show the most significant referential group relations in 
which our respondents’ lives are lived. Our questions were formulated according-
ly: whichever dimension of their lives was addressed, we solicited their valuation 
in that particular dimension, so they could also compare their own situation with 
that of others from various perspectives.
10  Sample taking was based on the snowball method, with representative sample segments. The sam-
ple size was 200 respondents in each group, weighted by gender, age and education. The language of 
the questionnaire was optional: either the native language or English, or Hungarian. The fieldwork was 
based on face to face interviews. Later, based on the available macro-statistical information the sample 
was weighted according to age, gender and education.
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Figure 4.4. Migration strategies and the referential spaces of successful migration 
 Based on our theoretical considerations, preliminarily we identified three types 
of migrant strategies: the assimilationist strategy, which involves the migrant’s 
complete structural fit into the host society, their break from the home country, 
a complete shift from the original to the new culture, and the radical transforma-
tion of their personal identity. On the opposite end is the segregationist strategy 
entailing the individual’s structural “coexistence” with the conditions imposed by 
the host country without, however, giving up their original personal, social, and 
cultural identity. The segregationists nurture powerful ties with their homeland 
while maintaining substantial distance vis-à-vis the host country. Finally, the third 
strategy is called transnational, since these migrants are not attached to just one 
country. The primary motivation is economic, and integration is structurally func-
tional but temporary. We assumed that this type of migration produces a hybrid 
identity as the issue of “belonging to a place” on a personal level is downplayed.
 Let us now proceed from the theoretical discussion to a closer look at the 
actual situation of our immigrant groups to examine whether it conforms or not 
to our assumptions.
Homeland
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A) The Demographic Characteristics of Migrant Groups
A truism in the classic literature of migration is the observation that young people 
and men are overrepresented in the migrant population. In our sample as well, 
there was a gender disparity with men comprising 60 percent of the population, as 
compared to Hungarian society, and the average age was as low as 39 years. How-
ever, the gender imbalance was characteristic of the Turkish and the Arab groups 
only, where men exceeded 75 percent; in the other four groups men and women 
were equally represented. The samples showed barely any difference in terms of 
age among the groups, with the exception of the Turkish respondents. This group 
was younger than the other migrant groups with an average age of 34 years.
 The microsocial environment carries special significance for migrant people. 
The family provides more than support and security in the conventional sense. 
Spouses and the kinship group, depending on ethnic affiliation, may greatly facili-
tate the process of integration into the local diaspora and the majority society as 
well. With the exception of the Arab and Turkish groups, most of the migrants 
were married or cohabitated with a partner. Most families had no children at the 
time of the survey. This applied especially to the Arab and Turkish members of 
the sample, 80 percent of whom were childless. Only among the Vietnamese was 
it common to have children (47 percent). More than 90 percent of the Chinese 
and the Vietnamese respondents were married to someone of their own ethnic 
group. The percentage of migrants with a Hungarian spouse was relatively large 
among the Arabs and the ethnic Hungarians (30 percent). 
B) The Sociological Characteristics of Migrant Groups in Hungary 
In each of the six migrant groups of our study some people arrived several decades 
ago, while others were new immigrants (see Figure 4.5). Among the Ukrainians, 
the Turks, and the Arabs there was a relatively large number of newcomers; the 
Chinese migrated into Hungary in the wake of the regime change, taking advan-
tage of the opening up of new markets. In contrast, the majority of the Vietnamese 
were living in Hungary for a longer period of time, with more than one third of 
them settling down during the state socialist time. The migration of ethnic Hun-
garians—meaning Transcarpathia and Voivodina as third countries—happened 
continuously following the regime change.
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Figure 4.5. The length of stay in Hungary by the ethnicity of the migrant group 
(percentages) 
 The need to obtain Hungarian citizenship seemed keenest among the ethnic 
Hungarians, even though for most of the Ukrainians, too, it appeared a desirable 
prospect. Only a minority of the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Turks, and the Arabs 
considered obtaining citizenship, however, among the Arabs the figure was relatively 
significant (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6. Need expressed to obtain Hungarian citizenship, by ethnicity of mi-
grant group (percentages)
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 Regarding their level of education, we see that the number of migrant individ-
uals with secondary and postsecondary schooling was high in every group, and 
very few reported to have low schooling (see Figure 4.7). This is particularly note-
worthy in comparison with relevant data from the host country: the latter show 
significantly lower values. Therefore, it is small surprise that, for most migrants, 
immigration to Hungary caused no setback in their careers. On the contrary, the 
generally lower level of education of the Hungarian population allows one to as-
sume that there would be robust opportunities of integration and career building 
for these newcomers. 
 A litmus test of successful migration is the migrant’s ability to obtain a proper 
position in the host country’s labor market. Our data clearly demonstrate that in 
all the six groups, largely due to the migrants’ younger age and higher education, 
the number of the employed is high (more than two thirds). Given the dominance 
of younger people and the nature of migration, students represent a sizeable group 
(19 percent).
Figure 4.7. The composition of migrant groups according to educational attain-
ment (percentages)
 The first marked difference between the various migrant groups concerned 
the nature of their employment. Our Arab and Chinese respondents were reluctant 
to disclose their status in the labor market; one fifth of them refused to give an 
answer on this topic. Most of the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Turkish migrants 
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worked as entrepreneurs. The Vietnamese tended to run one-person businesses, 
while the Chinese and the Turks worked with several employees. Of the Ukrainians, 
especially the ethnic Hungarians among them, a relatively high percentage were 
menial workers; virtually all of them were employees. Few Ukrainians operated 
independent businesses. Among the Arab migrants, there was an equal number of 
independent business owners and employees. 
 To get a job and make a living in a foreign country is merely one aspect of 
successful migration. Equally important is whether the new job represents upward 
or downward mobility relative to their social position in their home country (see 
Figure 4.8).11 More than half of our respondents (54 percent) could maintain their 
previous occupation, 20 percent experienced obvious upward mobility, and 7 per-
cent moved down the social ladder. For 20 percent of our sample, the mobility was 
horizontal.
 Most migrants (except the Vietnamese) did not experience either upward or 
downward mobility. In every group, the number of those moving “upwards” sur-
passed the number of individuals moving “downwards.” Only among the Vietnam-
ese could striking shifts in occupational status be witnessed but mostly in horizontal 
direction. 
Figure 4.8. The mobility trajectory of migrants in the new county, according to 
ethnicity (percentages)
11  To study this question is only possible among respondents who had a job in their homeland and 
are active in Hungary’s labor market as well. This explains why the table only contains 510 respondents 
of the 1200 individuals questioned.
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C) The Social Psychological Aspects of Migration
We have established eight points of reference within the social psychological space 
that members of our six groups inhabited, each signifying an object of attachment. 
Our respondents were asked to assess the extent of their attachment to each 
object on a seven-point scale. We started by inquiring about their attachment to 
the country they had left. Subsequently, we asked them about the strength of their 
ties to their own ethnic group living in their country of origin. The next question 
concerned their link to members of their own ethnic diaspora, and finally we 
asked them about their attachment to their own diaspora in Hungary. Questions 
concerning the ties to their own ethnic groups were followed by questions about 
how they related to Hungarians not belonging to their ethnicity and to Hungary 
as a country. We were furthermore curious about our respondents’ connections 
with other migrant groups living in Hungary; the final question probed their attach-
ment to Europe. 
 The results can be seen on Table 4.3 and Figure 4.9. The data in 4.3 shows 
quite compellingly that the structure of the social psychological space inhabited 
by migrants in Hungary is quite similar, irrespective of their country of origin. 
The first two strata of “in-group” affiliation—marked by one’s homeland and own 
ethnic group in that country—is substantially stronger in every group than the 
affiliation with the “out-group.” Remarkably, however, in all the groups except 
the Chinese and the Arab, attachment to Hungary surpasses both the solidarity 
with the diaspora at large and their own ethnic group in Hungary. The weakest 
connection, invariably, was reported toward other migrant groups in the country. 
Attachment to Europe is not as strong as to Hungary among any of the groups but 
the Vietnamese. Nonetheless, it is more powerful than ties with the diaspora—
again, excepting the Vietnamese (See Table 4.3). 
 Looking at one respondent of the in-group versus out-group relationship, the 
proximity felt by one’s own ethnic group toward the host population (measured 
with the Bogardus scale), we may observe that the Ukrainians position themselves 
the closest to the Hungarians and the furthest away from the Vietnamese and the 
Chinese. The Turks and the Arabs feel less close to the Hungarians than the Ukrai-
nians, but the distance is smaller than in the case of Vietnamese and the Chinese 
(see Figure 4.9). 
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Table 4.3. Levels of attachment in various migrant groups (averages on a 7-point 
scale)
Attachment to Ethnic Hungarian Ukrainian Chinese
Vietnam-
ese Turkish Arab
their country of origins 4.24 5.26 6.12 5.80 5.86 5.48
own ethnicity in their country of 
origins
5.62 5.59 5.94 5.42 5.71 4.81
their own ethnicity in the diaspora 
at large
5.72 5.06 4.92 5.15 4.74 4.14
their own ethnic group in Hungary 3.89 3.96 3.80 5.90 4.11 3.00
the Hungarians 4.99 4.76 4.14 5.25 4.26 4.13
Hungary 5.55 5.45 4.70 5.57 4.75 4.57
other migrant groups living in 
Hungary 
3.04 3.29 3.59 5.29 3.40 3.02
Europe 4.33 4.42 4.48 5.85 4.27 3.92
Figure 4.9. The social distance felt toward Hungarians, according to ethnicity of 
migrant group (scale averages*)











172    I N A T I O N  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 We have assessed the permeability of the borders between in-group and out-
group by measuring social trust (Figure 4.10). In the Granovetter sense of the concept, 
social trust is a weak bind serving primarily to ease interactions and communi-
cation between strangers and thus, allow them to assume that future interactions 
will take place to promote mutual advantages and cooperation (Granovetter 1973). 
Negotiating the boundary between the in-group and the out-group is the trickiest 
task for ethnic Hungarians since the category “Hungarian” applies to their own 
group as well as to the population of the host country. The Hungarian in-group, in 
their case, refers to migrants from their own country. Yet, the beneficiary of their 
highest level of trust is not this particular group but the one they left behind. The 
least trusted group is “Hungarians” in general, wherever they are. The situation is 
similar for the Ukrainians, the Chinese, and the Turks even if they do not have to 
deal with the ambiguity of boundaries as the ethnic Hungarians do. In all these 
groups, the highest level of trust was felt toward the people they left behind in 
their homeland and the lowest toward Hungarians. The Vietnamese, however, are 
more trusting toward members of the out-group (that is, the Hungarians) than 
toward their own ethnic group, whether residing in Hungary or in Vietnam. The 
Arab respondents, while most trusting toward fellow Arabs of their home country, 
have more faith in “the Hungarians” than in the Arabs living next door.
Figure 4.10. The level of trust expressed toward Hungarians, one’s own migrant 
group, and one’s fellow countrymen left behind, by ethnicity of migrant group (av-
erages on a 5-point scale)12
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 In the course of the research, we questioned respondents directly as to whether 
they had experienced discrimination (Figure 4.11). Less than 10 percent of the Turks, 
but more than half of the Chinese and the Vietnamese reported discrimination. 
Between 20 and 30 percent of the members of the other groups also reported 
discrimination. The common experience of unfairness among ethnic Hungarians 
from Transcarpathia and Voivodina (in Ukraine and Serbia respectively) surprised 
us since neither their “looks” nor their language revealed their migrant status, how-
ever, it might be the case that their dialect reveals the place their origin. 
 Across all groups, we observed that neighborhoods and schools were the most 
welcoming but migrants encountered adverse reactions in Hungary’s other public 
spaces and institutions. The sites where discriminatory behaviors were experienced 
varied widely according to ethnicity, foreboding a corresponding diversity of 
strategies used by migrants in their efforts to settle down in Hungary.
 Migration is a long-term enterprise affecting multiple generations’ lives and 
its success depends on overcoming language barriers between the immigrants 
and members of the majority society. Ethnic Hungarians, whose mother tongue is 
Hungarian, did not face such a hurdle, even though their accents and vocabulary 
could make them conscious of the gap between their dialect and the one spoken 
by “mainland” Hungarians. While only a minority reported to be proficient in 
Hungarian in the other ethnic groups, a relative majority said they were keen to 
learn it (see Figure 4.12). A fairly large group (20 percent) of the Chinese, Turks, 
and Arabs expressed no desire to learn Hungarian. 
 Children’s education constitutes a large part of the families’ migration project. 
The families that anticipated their children growing up in the host country would 
naturally enroll them in the national public school system. Our data shows that 
this preference was highest among the ethnic Hungarians and the Vietnamese 
(see Figure 4.13). Among members of the other groups, sending their children 
to a Hungarian school was far from regular—least so within the Chinese and the 
Arab groups.
12  “How much do you trust in the Hungarians?”; “And in your diaspora living in Hungary?”; “And the 
people living in your homeland?”
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Figure 4.11. Experiencing discrimination due to migrant status, according to the 
migrants’ ethnicity of (in percentages)13
Figure 4.12. Proficiency in the Hungarian language, according to the migrants’ 
ethnicity (in percentages) 
13  Did you experience any discrimination in Hungary?
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Figure 4.13. Willingness to integrate into national society: choice of school for 
children according to ethnicity of migrants (in percentages) 
 Communication with family and friends in the home country is essential for 
migrants to connect with the in-group, which has been remarkably facilitated by 
the use of internet. We could read from our data that such contacts were inten-
sively maintained by the members of all the groups (see Figure 4.14). Most Arabs 
contacted their loved ones at least once a month. The other groups communicated 
with relatives at home less frequently; the Vietnamese and Chinese respondents 
reported the lowest level of contact with their fellow countrymen at home.
 On a cultural or symbolic level, another indicator of emigrants’ ties with their 
home country is the observance of holidays. Not only does this act express a person’s 
belonging but makes it visible to both the in- and the out-group’s members (see 
Figure 4.15). Immigrants who celebrate exclusively their own culture’s special days 
will most likely refuse to assimilate or integrate themselves. In contrast, those who 
only observe the host country’s holidays are generally keen to fit in. Integration is 
signified by immigrants celebrating both their old and the new country’s holidays. 
Ignoring holidays indicates a sense of rootlessness. Examples of all these behav-
ioral variants were found in each group. Overlooking holidays was quite common 
among the Arab and the Turk diaspora. Celebrating both cultures’ special days 
could most typically be seen among our Vietnamese and Ukrainian respondents. 
send to a Hungarian school not send to a Hungarian school
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In none of the groups did we find many who stuck to their old homeland’s hol-
idays exclusively. Not surprisingly, the ethnic Hungarians dismissed all but the 
Hungarian holidays.
Figure 4.14. Frequency of communication with relatives in the home country, by 
the ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)
Figure 4.15. Observance of Hungarian national holidays and holidays of the home 
country, by ethnicity of migrants (in percentages)
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 The life of a migrant person inevitably involves being positioned between two 
worlds, which raises questions of belonging. Drawing on responses given to a mul-
tiple choice question regarding cultural and symbolic attachment, we identified 
four distinctive types (see Figure 4.16). Attachment to the country of origin was 
strongest among the Vietnamese and weakest among the ethnic Hungarians. The 
“rootless” made up a rather high percentage among the Arabs and the Ukrainians 
(35–40 percent) as opposed to the much smaller percentage measured among the 
Vietnamese and the Chinese. Those celebrating Hungarian holidays exclusively 
were just a few in all the groups except for ethnic Hungarians, who experienced 
little difficulty performing the habitual rituals of cultural and symbolic belonging 
to Hungary. The “double allegiance” was most prevalent among the Vietnamese, 
albeit not uncommon among the others either, except for the ethnic Hungarians.
Figure 4.16. Types of cultural and symbolic attachment by ethnicity of migrants (in 
percentages)
 The strength of boundaries between the in- and out-groups was measured by 
questions probing the composition of our respondents’ social networks (Figure 
4.17),14 which generally showed segregation across all the groups. Ironically, this 
applied even to the ethnic Hungarians, whose friendships were evenly distributed 
14  On the figure illustrating the social network’s ethnic composition, the network described by the two 
situations is represented by the sum of the ties. The family members and relatives, however, were left 
out due to the obvious fact of representing the same ethnic group as the respondent.
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between their own diaspora and native Hungarians. The Turkish and the Ukrainian 
respondents boasted the largest number of Hungarian ties, although not exceeding 
20 percent of their whole network. In every group, most friendships were formed 
with people of the same ethnicity residing in Hungary. This trend was most con-
spicuous among the Vietnamese and the Chinese.
Figure 4.17. The ethnic composition of migrants’ social networks, by ethnicity (in 
percentages)
D) Strategies of Migration
In the subsections above we offered an overall demographic portrayal of six migrant 
groups residing in Hungary. The groups included relative newcomers as well as 
residents of several decades. Their trajectories were as diverse as the extent to 
which their cultural, language, and religious backgrounds differed from those of 
the local population. This implied that these individuals had varying levels of the 
connection to Hungary and the Hungarian people, diverse perceptions of the 
hardships of migrant existence, and a variety of assessments as to whether their 
settling down in in this country was a positive or, on the contrary, an unfortunate 
move to be reversed. The ethnic Hungarians were spared the language barriers; 
the other groups had to cope with the challenge of learning Hungarian as well as 
the host society’s prejudices against immigrants. 
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 Upon moving to a foreign land, immigrants have several strategies available 
to them, whether they are drifting along or bent to make deliberate choices. They 
may be eager to learn the country’s customs and language, obtain citizenship, and 
settle down for good. Alternatively, short of opportunities or led by their beliefs, 
immigrants may seek sanctuary in their diaspora, enlisting the help of fellow mi-
grants to find a job, speaking mostly their own language, and avoiding social life 
with Hungarians—in sum, segregating themselves from the host society. There is 
a third option, which researchers refer to as transnational migration. The lifestyle 
of such migrants is not restricted to the host country but involves moving between 
the old and the new countries. By virtue of relocation, moreover, migrants become 
part of a global system held together by economic, financial, and personal relation-
ships. Within this system the migrants’ main goal is to improve their material con-
ditions, their quality of life and possibly run a successful business. They select or 
change their destination countries in response to emergent opportunities. Trans-
national migrants utilize a broad array of cognitive skills—the norms of everyday 
interaction, language proficiency, a general knowledge, smart dressing—and may 
adjust to the local expectations. This type of migration can easily accommodate 
segregationist strategies since such migrants are motivated by economic interests. 
In his study of the Chinese diaspora in Budapest, Pál Nyíri (2002) presented the 
following succinct characterization of the typical transnational migrant: “[The ma-
jority of the Chinese] continuously adapt to their environment as they negotiate 
numerous considerations such as potential income and mobility, right to legal 
residence, and access to schooling for their children to ensure an improved quality 
of life and advancement on the social ladder.” 
 The three migration strategies could be recognized in some measure in our 
research study as well. We assumed that those who adopted the assimilationist 
strategy had been living in Hungary for a longer time and would decide to come 
to Hungary again, were they to select a country of destination again. We assumed 
furthermore that these individuals spoke an intermediate level of Hungarian at 
the minimum, and did not insulate themselves from members of the host society. 
The assimilationists thus would have a reasonably large number of Hungarian 
people in their social network and might even have a Hungarian spouse. Trusting 
the country’s institutions, this type of migrant would have their children attend 
a Hungarian language school. Overall, they would consider their migration eco-
nomically successful and would be far more content with their life than those who 
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had adopted a different strategy. Our hypothetical migrant would likely believe 
that immigrant life is agreeable in this country and would endeavor to obtain a 
Hungarian citizenship. Their group would have the largest number of homeowners, 
another marker of the intent of staying in Hungary for good. 
 The segregationist strategy was typically found among those people who had 
been forced to leave their home country for political reasons rather than seeking 
economic prosperity. Either way, these immigrants did not lose interest in the 
issues of their original country; their attachment to it was unbroken. Trusting 
the diaspora more than members of the host society whose language they barely 
speak, the segregationists’ social ties were, by and large, confined to their fellow 
countrymen and women. Migration led to downward mobility for them. Feeling 
uprooted, this type of migrant was more trusting toward their old country’s rather 
than Hungary’s institutions. Additionally, they sustained cultural ties with their 
homeland, keeping its customs, and observing its holidays. The segregationists 
believed that immigrants meet with a great deal of hardships in Hungary and they 
would have been better off if they had never left.
 The transnational strategy presented the most difficulty to capture on an em-
pirical level. Migrants wielding this strategy left their country for economic reasons 
and would readily do so again if given the option. Yet by no means would these 
individuals want to become Hungarian citizens: as soon as a better opportunity 
would arise in another country, they would have no second thoughts about moving 
on. Our transnationalists spoke no Hungarian, nor did they plan to learn it. 
Their children attended mostly international schools. Despite being surrounded 
by an extremely extensive social network and many friends, they did not trust the 
Hungarians or other migrant groups, although they felt no hostility towards them. 
While they did not demonstrate much interest in their home country’s politics, 
they nurtured intense relationships with the fellow countrymen across the border, 
in service of their business transactions. Having achieved higher living standards 
in Hungary, transnationalists may be viewed as successful migrants. Yet in assess-
ing their living standards, they compared them to European ones. They expressed 
strong faith in the European Union institutions and would be prepared to settle 
down in some further away EU country. Returning to their homeland was not on 
their wish list.
 We did not expect that the various migrant strategies would be clearly iden-
tified in the individual careers of our migrant groups. However, we expected to 
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recognize the dominant strategies whose characteristics could be isolated with the 
help of cluster analysis. The three cluster groups showed three prominent strate-
gies (see Figure 4.18). The first group consisted of the assimilationists, and as the 
figure shows, their percentage widely varies across the migrant groups. The second 
group was made up of individuals who did not regard Hungary as their final desti-
nation. Migrants who self-segregated in some manner constituted the third group. 
It is worth noting that when setting up our typology of migrant strategies, we took 
into account our subjects’ stated intention to move on or stay in Hungary and also 
examined which elements in their lifestyle predominated: those suggestive of a 
long-term tenure15 or a transient stay?
Figure 4.18. Migration strategies by ethnicity of migrant groups (percentages)
 Our initial expectation was that the ethnic Hungarians would wholeheartedly 
adopt the assimilationist strategy, considering the widespread idea that their main
goal crossing the border is “reunification with the mother country.” To our sur-
prise, while such an option was quite attractive to them, merely two thirds of 
the respondents identified with the assimilationist plan (64 percent). In terms 
of living standards, the ethnic Hungarians appeared successful on account of the 
obvious improvement they had experienced after moving to the country. Their 
acclimatization was evident in the trust they expressed toward the institutions 
15   This explains why the answers given to the direct question “Would you consider moving on?” 
might differ from the strategies characterizing the given migrant group. 
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and the people of Hungary, the predominance of local Hungarians in their social 
networks, and, finally, in the finding that neither returning to their homeland nor 
migrating to a new place occupied their thoughts. 
 Some 28 percent of the ethnic Hungarians fell into the category of transnational 
migrants. However, their case nonetheless deviated from the classic type of trans-
national migration because these individuals were not linked to a geographically 
scattered global community on economic, religious or political grounds. Their plan 
to keep moving on seemed to be motivated by material or career aspirations, despite 
being firmly connected to Hungary. This interpretation may be substantiated by this 
group’s unfavorable judgment of their living standards as compared to how assimila-
tionist ethnic Hungarians assessed their own situation. The transnationalists’ project 
of moving on would certainly be assisted by their very extensive web of social net-
works consisting of ethnic and native Hungarian as well as foreign friends.
 The segregationist strategy among the ethnic Hungarians (8 percent) signifies 
frustration and having to live on the margins of society. In the segregated 
subgroup the level of distrust toward Hungarian institutions is high—2.6 on 
a 5-point scale, and wariness toward Hungarians was even higher with an average 
value of 2.3. Such strong distrust shows a severe underlying discontent. The Trans- 
carpathian Hungarians who adopted a segregationist strategy did not fare well 
economically after their migration into Hungary. They estimated their living stan-
dards to be lower than those of other ethnic Hungarians and, unlike the latter, 
migration caused them to contend with poorer conditions than they had in their 
home country. Somewhat oddly, they were socially isolated, had a relatively weak 
network of connections (one or two friends at most) including few, if any, native 
Hungarians (only amounting to 7 percent of a small network). What may offer a 
measure of optimism is the relative shortness of their stay in Hungary at the time 
of the research. It is quite possible that the sociological snapshot taken of their 
lives merely reflected the initial hurdles of immigrant existence.
 A relative majority of the Ukrainians were transnationalist migrants (44 per-
cent). Based on our data, their strategy too deviated from the classic transnationalist 
model in that their purpose was simply to migrate on due to material needs. The 
transnationalist Ukrainians held unusually large social networks exceeding more 
than six friends of various nationalities, indicating the mobilization of their large 
social capital in their migration project. They will enjoy the benefits of this capital 
as they cross the next border.
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 One third of the Ukrainian respondents was categorized as assimilationist. 
They experienced the largest improvement in living standards, they shared a general 
sense of contentment, and planned to settle down and stay in Hungary. Contrary 
to our assumptions, only 22 percent of the Ukrainian group could be deemed seg-
regated. Their economically less successful trajectory compared to the prosperity 
of fellow Ukrainians could not be explained by their short stay in Hungary. Only 
half of them had a solid employment as opposed to the other two sub-groups, 
three fourths of whom held a full-time job.
 The greater part of the Chinese migrant group also lived in segregation (59 
percent). The Chinese diaspora appeared extremely insulated in every respect. 
Only two strategies seemed to work effectively for them: segregation or trans-
nationalism (32 percent). Evidence suggests that it was not the strength of their 
ties to Hungarian society but their embeddedness in the diaspora that influenced 
their choice between the two strategies. Members of the segregated group were 
not employed in a family business, nor did they possess sufficient funds to start 
their own venture. Instead, they worked for non-related Chinese employers. This 
may be part of the reason of their low living standards and experiencing the least 
improvement with regard to their living conditions in the homeland. The transna-
tionalist Chinese group, in contrast, was strikingly well off, their living standards 
were high, and they reported to be fully satisfied with their overall situation. 
Despite organizing their livelihood and career on a global scale, part of this group 
(20 percent) appeared adapted to Hungarian society, as evidenced by purchasing 
real estate, sending their children to Hungarian schools, and so forth. In some sense, 
Hungary played a pivotal role in their plans. These individuals may be instrumen-
tal in creating an opportunity to develop a Hungarian-based international virtual 
business center. 
 The other two migrant groups where the percentage of segregated individuals 
was high were the Vietnamese and the Turkish. New immigrants arriving from 
geographically and culturally distant countries tend to become closeted in a seg-
regated status. Over time, they have the chance to join the assimilationist group 
whose members are able fulfill their material and career expectations: 42 percent 
of the Vietnamese and 14 percent of the Turk diaspora in Hungary adopted this 
strategy. When their initial hopes are not met, the members of the segregated 
group are likely to switch strategies and become transnationalists. This may, how-
ever, be a deceptive label, since these individuals had lived in the country for some 
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time without attaining, either objectively or subjectively, genuine success in terms 
of career or living conditions. Their dissatisfaction, then, urges them to leave and try 
their luck in another country. There is a great difference between the Vietnamese
and the Turkish respondents in that the former were committed to assimilate 
themselves, while such an option was seldom available for the latter group. For the 
Vietnamese, the assimilationist choice was more readily accessible as they moved 
to Hungary at a young age (around the time of the regime change) and many of 
them were educated in Hungary. The assimilation of Turkish migrants was stron-
ger among those who were secular. 
 The Arab respondents in our study utilized all the three strategies with re-
markable frequency. This may partly be due to the continuous influx of Arab mi-
grants to Hungary, starting already during the socialist era. Most of them reported 
their intent to assimilate themselves (44 percent), while many others belonged to 
the transnationalist group (32 percent). The factors underlying the three strategies 
are identical to those seen among the Vietnamese and the Turkish migrants. The 
assimilationists had stayed in Hungary for the longest time and had attained the 
highest living standards. In the least advantageous situation, we found individuals 
stuck in segregation, while the group classified as transnationalist could not be 
assessed as particularly successful, either. This may surely go some way in explain-
ing why these migrants were considering moving on to some other country and 
arranging their stay in Hungary accordingly. In choosing to move on, they did 
not envision to join the global Muslim diaspora. On the contrary, it was an act 
of cautiously distancing themselves from the religious community, an assumption 
supported by their relatively weak affiliation with the Muslim faith. Thus, what we 
saw within the Arab migrant group also defied the classical notion of transnational 
migration; it could best be regarded as traversing borders repeatedly in hopes of 
a better life. 
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P L A C I N G  T H E  S O C I A L  I N T E G R A T I O N  O F  H U N G A R Y ’ S
M I G R A N T S  I N  A  E U R O P E A N  C O M P A R A T I V E  P E R S P E C T I V E 
Of the inhabitants of the European Union, 4 percent (20 million people) were born 
in a country that is not member of the Union. Owing to global circumstances fueling 
migration, the size of this population continues to grow year by year.
 The 2014, data on the education level of all the working-age immigrants (between 
the ages of 20 and 64) shows that 25 percent have a diploma from a postsecondary 
educational institution, close to one half (48 percent) have a high school diploma, 
and 37 percent have a lower level of schooling. In 2014, 56.5 percent of the EU 
population that had migrated from a country outside of the EU was employed. 
Earlier, this percentage was 4 percent higher, and unemployment since then has 
risen correspondingly. In 2014, virtually half of the EU immigrant population 
faced the prospect of poverty and exclusion. Earlier this challenge only affected 
45 percent of them.16
 Public opinion in the host countries vary. Typically, countries with a small 
immigrant population are more likely to be hostile to immigrants than countries 
where that proportion is larger. According to a survey made in 2008 on a represen-
tative sample encompassing eight countries,17 xenophobia was rampant in Hungary, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Poland. It was less intense in France, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Germany (Figure 4.19).18 Extreme xenophobia was observed among 
a particularly large number of Hungarian respondents.19 Where immigrants are 
many, one may surmise, xenophobia is a lesser phenomenon.
 The Hungarian case can be considered extraordinary not just because the high 
level of general xenophobia and extreme level of opposition to immigration found 
in 2008. From an 11-year retrospective we have witnessed a continuous rise of the 
already high rate of xenophobia and extreme anti-immigration attitude. That was 
not the case in the other countries taking part in the 2008 research. Since 2010, 
the ruling party in Hungary has recognized the huge political potential hidden in 
16  See http://www.mipex.eu.
17  See https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1587786.
18  The indices of general xenophobia were produced by aggregating the answers provided to multiple 
questions. Xenophobia was measured on a 4-point scale where high values referred to strong negative 
sentiments. 
19  By removing the answers of those extremely agreeing with the statements repudiating migrants, we 
will have an index of answers expressive of extreme views.
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xenophobic rhetoric. The government elected in 2010 and subsequently reelected 
two times based a very effective, in fact permanent, campaign on xenophobia 
which is probably responsible for the moral panic and political hysteria prevalent 
in the wild sections of Hungarian society in 2019. We cannot tell how long this 
unleashed fear of migrants who are not coming to Hungary will continue.
Figure 4.19. The level of general and extreme xenophobia in eight European 
countries in proportion to the entire sample (percentages)
 A survey conducted in 2012 produced comparable correlations. The native 
citizens of the studied countries were asked to respond the question concerning 
the legal equality between native citizens and immigrants. The researchers found 
that in some countries like Cyprus, Hungary, and Lithuania, 60 to 70 percent 
of the respondents gave a negative answer as opposed to countries like Norway, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Estonia where the negative responses 
amounted to 10 to 20 percent.
 A 2014 study indicated that immigration to the EU elicits “negative sentiments” 
in 57 percent of citizens, but the percentage in Western Europe is much lower 
than in the Baltic and Central European region. Immigrants need to grapple 
with difficulties in countries where their numbers are low and therefore a high 
level of hostility is directed at them. 
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 Anxieties induced by the actual or imagined size of migrant influx prepared 
the ground for political parties on the extreme right fringes, which never before 
was as successful as in the election of the EU Parliament in 2014:20 25 percent of 
the votes in Denmark, France, and Great Britain went to candidates of the ex-
treme right parties. In Austria, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, 
15 percent of the voters preferred the extreme right-wing candidates. In Sweden 
and in Greece the figures were above 10 percent. 
T H E  M I P E X  R E S E A R C H
The countries of Europe have exhibited differential capabilities and willingness 
to integrate immigrants. The process of integration is considered effective when 
it affects all the essential facets of the immigrants’ lives. In a recent procedure, 
experts with ample experience in handling problems in relation to immigra-
tion were asked to evaluate their own countries’ capability to cope with these 
issues (MIPEX study).21 Data was supplied by independent civil organizations 
(NGOs, research institutes, think tanks). In Hungary, this data was given by ICCR- 
Budapest Foundation. The experts filling out the questionnaires included András 
Kováts (Menedék Hungarian Associations for Migrants), András Kádár (Helsinki 
Committee), and Boldizsár Nagy (Central European University/Eötvös Loránd 
University).
 In the survey, participants evaluated 8 areas: (1) navigating the labor force; 
(2) family unification; (3) training and schooling; (4) civic activism; (5) long-term 
settlement; (6) securing citizenship; (7) access to health care, and (8) discrimina-
tion. Each area was qualified from multiple angles. The final outcomes are shown 
on Table 4.4 with the ranking of the 31 countries based upon the experts’ eval-
uations. We have complemented the original table with additional data: the per 
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1 Sweden 78 0 47,229 14,3
2 Portugal 75 1 27,624 7,5
3 Finland 69 2 40,838 5,4
3 Norway 69 1 67,445 13,8
5 Belgium 67 2 43,800 12,9
6 Germany 61 3 46,896 14,9
7 The Netherlands 60 –8 48,317 11,1
7 Spain 60 0 34,899 14
9 Italy 59 1 35,811 8
9 Denmark 59 10 45,451 9
11 Luxembourg 57 2 93,174 43,3
11 United Kingdom 57 –6 40,676 11,3
12 France 54 1 41,018 11,1
13 Ireland 52 1 51,119 15,9
14 Austria 50 3 47,031 15,2
15 Switzerland 49 1 58,731 28,9
16 Estonia 46 1 27,995 16,4
17 Hungary 45 1 25,895 4,7
17 Iceland 45 – 45,269 10,7
17 Czech Republic 45 3 30,895 4,0
17 Romania 45 1 20,526 0,9
21 Slovenia 44 0 30,508 11,3
21 Greece 44 –2 26,773 11,1
23 Croatia 43 – 21,169 17,6
24 Bulgaria 42 3 18,327 1,2
25 Poland 41 5 26,210 0,9
26 Malta 40 2 34,544 8,0
27 Slovakia 37 0 29,210 3,3
27 Lithuania 37 1 28,210 4,9
29 Cyprus 35 0 30,770 18,2
30 Latvia 31 2 24,541 13,8
31 Turkey 25 1 20,188 5,81
* Supplemented by the ratio of per capita national income and by the proportion of non-native 
population living in that country.
** Hundred points scale.
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 The indicators of the MIPEX policy show a great deal of disparity among the 
various European countries. Integration that is successful in the various areas is, 
predominantly, characteristic of the advanced Western countries like Sweden, Fin-
land, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. The less advanced eastern European 
countries are found on the lower half of the ranking, with their index being con-
sistently below 50 percent. Last on the list is Turkey with a mere 25 percent value 
on the 100-point scale. This state of affairs gives some food for thought, in light of 
the fact that this country is the immigrants’ gateway to Europe.
 Besides the general trend, one may observe some surprises. In terms of its 
integration policy, Portugal is remarkably successful (second on the list), and 
so are Spain and Italy (with their seventh and ninth spot, respectively). Estonia, 
Hungary, and Romania perform relatively well, too, even though they rank six-
teenth and seventeenth, that is, they are positioned on the lower part of the list. 
It may seem odd and discouraging that the immigration policy and integration 
procedure of some developed countries with large immigrant populations exhibit 
mediocre results, such as Great Britain, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, 
Switzerland, and Austria. This too may give rise to some unease as far as Europe’s 
future acceptance of migrants and refugees is concerned. In addition, these 
countries boast of a relatively high GDP per capita, thus one may infer that the 
magnitude of disposable resources does not necessarily guarantee success with 
the integration of migrants. 
 Inspecting the temporal dimension of change, it is apparent that the ranking 
of European countries based on their performance in integration is relatively 
stable, even though significant changes are detectable in some instances. Denmark, 
for example, has made a big leap forward, while the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom have fallen behind.
 The last column of the table clearly exhibits how uneven the distribution of 
foreign-born residents is across the EU’s territory: in some countries, their pro-
portion is high and elsewhere it is low. The largest percentage can be observed 
in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Given the rationale of migrants, the trend of 
wealthier countries attracting more immigrants than the poorer ones is no surprise. 
Portugal stands out as an exception. In some other less wealthy countries as well, 
the presence of non-EU residents is sizable, which is traceable to the given countries’ 
peculiarities in more recent history. For example, in Estonia the size of the Russian 
population is large owing to its Soviet past. Similarly, in the wake of Yugoslavia’s 
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collapse and the following civil war, many people from Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia were forced to relocate to Croatia and Slovenia. There must be an 
increased attraction among migrants for countries where the GDP per capita and 
the proportion of foreign-born residents are both relatively high. Along with these 
factors, migrants may presume that well-functioning institutions and practices 
are in place to facilitate settling down. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the ranking of 
countries on the basis of expert evaluations does not always corroborate such 
assumptions.
 With the help of these evaluations the MIPEX indicator can illuminate how 
successfully the political and policy apparatus of a country can tackle the economic, 
sociopolitical, and cultural challenges posed by immigration. Numerous sociolog-
ical studies conducted on this topic over the past years have inquired about how 
migrants themselves viewed their experiences; how successful or not they deemed 
their migration, and what they thought about the prospects of integration into 
their country of destination.
T H E  L O C A L M U L T I D E M  R E S E A R C H
The LOCALMULTIDEM Research22 sponsored by the EU7 grant system took place 
in 2008. The goal was to compare migrant groups residing in various European 
cities in terms of their political, social, and cultural integration. Furthermore, 
the project included the collection of data on the attitudes of the host society. The 
field work utilized representative samples in all countries. The interviews were 
recorded either in the official language of the host country or the respondents’ native 
language, depending on the respondents’ preference. The data was weighted accord-
ing to age, gender, and educational level.
 In each country, the LOCALMULTIDEM research questioned migrants rep-
resenting a substantial population. Part of the questions were formulated to accom-
modate the migrant group’s specificities. In searching for general characteristics 
of immigrants in the 6 countries, we may only consider identically formulated 
questions, irrespective of the religious and ethnic background of the respondents.
In each case, one question concerned the respondent’s length of stay in the country. 
22  See https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/28802/reporting.
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In addition, it was very important to learn if the respondent spoke the official lan-
guage of the host country. Of no less interest was the inquiry about the strength 
of the subject’s ties to the host country as well as to the country from where they 
had migrated. Several questions were formulated to examine the extent to which 
the immigrant person was integrated into the host society and the degree to which 
they sustained relationships with the previous homeland. Interest in the news, 
communication, active discussion of political issues, civic participation, and 
membership in various organizations all formed part of the research study. Yet 
another set of questions inquired about the composition of family and friendship 
circles and their ethnic and religious homogeneity.
 Trust and distrust are integral issues when it comes to social integration of 
various kinds. In this study, separate questions scrutinized the trust subjects felt 
toward the in-group as opposed to the out-group consisting of members of the 
majority society. Trusting social institutions constitutes another level examined in 
relation to the institutions of the host country and the EU. Further valid questions 
threw light on discrimination perceived by every migrant minority and another 
inquired about the ease or hardships of fitting in with the majority society. 
 Altogether we identified 31 questions that were posed in all the 6 countries 
participating in the research. Subsequently we set up variables using the answers 
to the questions, which made a cluster analysis possible. The analysis enabled us to 
isolate 4 distinct groups of migrants. The properties of the various groups offered 
a clear picture of the challenges of integration into the majority society, many of 
them quite similar to the variations of integration strategies found in our investi-
gation of migrant groups in Hungary.
1. Migrants with a Double Allegiance
The first group was comprised of migrants with a “double allegiance.” Owing to 
their shared religious and ethnic background, the group members had close ties 
to one another and no weak connections to the members of the majority (Granovet-
ter 1973). Hence the distrust they expressed toward the members of the host 
society. Having spent a relatively extended period of time in their chosen country, 
these individuals still maintained relationships with the country from where they 
had migrated. While the ethnic composition of their family was homogeneous, 
their social connections were not. Members of this group reported a great deal of 
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confidence toward the host country’s institutions but far less confidence toward 
the people whom they meet on a day-to-day basis. Many of them had learned the 
official language of the host country but some had not.
2. Active Migrants
The second category was set up for the active and self-conscious migrant who did 
not necessarily stay in the country where they first stopped. They were the ones 
most closely resembling the type of the transnationalist migrant of Hungary. The 
members of the group lived in ethnically homogeneous families. Their network 
of acquaintances, too, were made up of individuals like themselves. They lacked 
weak connections helping them integrate into the majority society, and they did 
not necessarily speak the host country’s official language. These migrants had not 
been living in the host country for long. While attached to the host society with 
medium level intensity, their relationships with their country of origin were lively 
and rich. They were politically active and engaged in civic, ethnic, and religious 
organizations. Quite trustful toward the institutions of the host state and the EU, 
they nonetheless believed that the migrants’ situation is treacherous.
3. Segregated Migrants
The third group consisted of new and segregated immigrants with low level of 
connection to the host society and strong ties to their fellow migrants. Their families, 
similarly to their social networks, were ethnically and religiously entirely homoge-
neous. They, too, found their migrant existence onerous and experienced virulent 
discrimination from the majority. Members of this group were passive and un-
interested in the news whether originating in the host country or their homeland. 
They did not speak the language of the majority population.
4. Alienated Migrants
The members of the fourth group had the most ethnically mixed families and their 
circle of friends was mixed as well. They had been long term residents of the host 
country, did not nurture relationships with their homeland, and neither did they 
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care about it. It seemed as if they had been living in a vacuum, which accounts 
for the “alienated” label. They showed distrust toward their own kind as well as 
the majority society. Likewise, the alienated migrants expressed no faith in the 
host country or the EU’s institutions. Civic and political activities had no real 
attraction for them. However, they had never sensed being overly discriminated 
against and did not find their status as migrants too difficult. Most of them spoke 
the language of their host country.
 The results of this research do not offer any other conclusion but that the 
probability of first-generation immigrants’ integration into the majority societies 
of Europe is quite low. In the case of second and third generation migrants, how-
ever, the four types predict different levels of probable integration. The isolation of 
the segregated group appears to be enduring—a condition neither the majority, 
nor they themselves seem intent to alleviate. The active group, as mentioned 
earlier, will likely adopt the transnational strategy, which we believe involves their 
further migration within the diaspora that cuts across national, religious and cul-
tural borders. The best chances for the success of integration may be ensured by 
the “double bind” type of migration, striking a balance between the original and 
the acquired collective identity. With the alienated type, the original identity is 
ineffectual and distant, while no new one has been acquired. If this state of affairs 
persists, the next generations of young people born into such families may become 
susceptible to assume a “long distance collective identity,” propelling them to 
engage in radical or extreme acts, since they perceive themselves to be living, 
social-psychologically speaking, in a kind of nowhere land.
 The distribution of the four migrant groups is not uniform in the six countries 
of the research study as may be viewed on Figure 4.20.
 The percentage of double bind migrants is low in Italy (14 percent) and Hun-
gary (8 percent), jeopardizing the future integration of the migrant population. 
The active migrants’ percentage is highest in Switzerland (35 percent) and Spain 
(35 percent), while lowest in France (5 percent). Strikingly high is the ratio of the 
segregated group in Hungary (53 percent) and Italy (56 percent), although segre-
gation, if voluntary, does not provoke conflicts between minorities and majorities. 
The alienated represent a significant presence within the French immigrant popu-
lation (62 percent), justifying the anxiety about how the majority versus minority 
relations will play out in France. The distribution of the various types of groups 
looks most balanced is in Switzerland and Spain.
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Figure 4.20. Types of migrants in six European countries (percentages)
 Looking at the sociodemographic variables of each group, we find many more 
men than women among the active group. In the rest of the groups there is no 
significant gender difference. As regards the variable of age, the segregated and 
the alienated are younger than the double bind and the active groups, a difference 
attributable to the longer tenure of the latter groups in comparison to the former. 
The segregated and the alienated have more students in them than the other two 
groups. The percentage of unemployed varies between 11 and 14 percent across all 
the groups. Economic activity is highest among the active group’s members, while 
idleness is certainly not prevalent in the other groups either: 61 to 62 percent are 
entrepreneurs, employees, and taxpayers, which underscores the benefits of 
migration for the local economy.
 The LOCALMULTIDEM study offered an invaluable opportunity to evaluate 
various aspects of migrants’ integration from both the host society’s and the migrants’ 
perspectives, by posing the same set of questions to a sample taken from each 
group (Figure 4.21 a–d).
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Figure 4.21. Assessment of the difficulties of integration by the host society and by 
migrants in six countries of Europe, * 2008 (averages on an 11-grade scale)
a. Difficulties in the admission process
b. Difficulties in finding a job
 * The number on the figures varied in terms of how many countries provided valid answers to 
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c. Cultural and religious rejection
d. Perceived xenophobia
 Oddly, overall we found no drastic deviations between the migrants’ and the 
host society’s assessments. As a trend—irrespective of the migrants’ ethnicity 
and the host country—both the problems of fitting in and finding a job were 
assessed as “medium” hard: respondents assigned these items the value of “6” on 
an 11-point scale. Regarding the difficulties of acceptance, “6” was the assessment 
of the majority respondents in Spain, Italy, and Hungary, even though in these 
countries immigrants perceived their problems as more severe by assigning it the
value of “8” on average. Also, in these countries, the majority did not properly 
sense the immigrants’ real challenges to get a job. In other words, as a social problem, 
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it appears underestimated. In the other countries, the perspectives of the majority 
and the migrants offered completely overlapping assessments. 
 Interestingly, no divergence was found between the host society and the im-
migrants when it came to evaluating the level of cultural rejection experienced 
in their shared social existence. At the time of the survey, in 2008, neither group 
perceived explosive tensions in this regard, averages hovered around the value 
of “4.” In general, the research subjects expressed the belief that their host society 
tends to respect migrants with different cultural backgrounds. 
 In reacting to the statement according to which “The host society is perva-
sively xenophobic,” more noteworthy variations occurred among the countries.23 
In most of them, though, the immigrants and the host society agreed in their 
views of xenophobia being of medium intensity, although a slightly lesser value 
was assigned by citizens of the host country. We were genuinely surprised by the 
Hungarian response wherein immigrants perceived xenophobia to be of medium 
intensity as opposed to the majority members’ claim of it being pervasive! 
 To sum up, the general trend to be observed was that in 2008 respondents 
evaluated the difficulties associated with various facets of integration as of moder-
ate intensity in the researched countries with no significant national differences.
T H E  I C S  R E S E A R C H
With regard to integration challenges posed by the migration flow to Europe, 
we look at the findings of relatively recent research, the Immigrant Citizens Survey 
(ICS) conducted in seven EU countries in 2012.24 The goal of this project was to 
supply data for professionals in the field of European immigration policy on six 
areas concerning the outstanding challenges of integration, based on the socio-
demographic, cultural, and ethnic background of immigrants. The areas included 
employment, language acquisition, family unification, civic activism, the bureau-
cratic procedures authorizing long term stay, and obtaining citizenship. The research 
subjects were recruited among third country immigrants who already were citizens, 
whose naturalization was in progress or, who had been residing in the country 
23  This item, unfortunately, was not included on the questionnaire used in Switzerland and France.
24  See https://www.migpolgroup.com/_old/diversity-integration/immigrant-citizens-survey/.
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for more than a year on a temporary basis. The central question addressed the 
process of integration into the host country as experienced by the immigrants 
themselves, including the problems they faced. The participant countries were 
Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The research was 
conducted on quasi-representative samples of each country’s migrant populations, 
constructed via random sampling using accessible registers and a corrected snow-
balling method.
 The data to be published here presents a synthesis of the ways in which the 
immigrants, based on their personal experiences, evaluated the success and/or the 
challenges of their migration. We have set up scales in four dimensions (obtaining 
citizenship, job search, validation of diplomas from the home country, and language 
acquisition) in order to measure the various aspects of problems reported in the 
given area. These four dimensions have been complemented with the aggregate values 
of subjective satisfaction measured in various areas. The cluster analysis involving 
the five scales allowed us to distinguish five distinct groups (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5. The organization of the cluster structure measuring the success of 
integration, with the adjustment of individual dimensions
C l u s te r s
Socially 
unintegrated
Regarding migrant status 
Unintegrated Frustrated Segregated Integrated
Obtaining citizenship 0.00 3.42 –0.22 –0.21 –0.24
Job search 0.39 0.58 0.81 0.43 –0.58
Domestication of diplomas 
from the old country
3.18 –0.01 –0.24 –0.28 –0.26
Language acquisition 0.18 0.12 –0.27 2.02 –0.38
Subjective contentment –0.12 –0.15 –0.71 –0.32 0.45
N 533 410 1715 920 3411
 Regarding their sizes, particularly the last three groups stand out. In the last 
group called integrated, no aspect of the process looks problematic and it is linked 
with a high level of subjective status contentment. On the opposite end there is 
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the group of frustrated individuals where the personal level of discontentment 
is particularly high, in congruence with the level of attendant problems in finding 
a job. There is also the group of segregated individuals among whom the status of 
discontent is somewhat lower but who experience considerable problems in finding 
a job and learning the language. The first two groups are relatively small in size 
with medium level of status contentment. The first group reported difficulties in 
integration on several areas, while the second one experienced failure, particularly 
in acquiring citizenship and in the labor market.
 Table 4.6 demonstrates the occurrence of the various types in the countries of 
the research.
Table 4.6. The distribution of the types reconstructed with regard to integration, ac-
cording to countries (percentages)
Clusters
All Regarding migrant status
Socially unin-
tegrated Unintegrated Frustrated Segregated Integrated
Belgium 5.1 11.3 25.4 13.4 44.8 100.0
France 16.5 11.4 19.7 14.3 38.1 100.0
Germany 1.9 20.3 8.4 69.4 100.0
Hungary 5.6 2.7 17.3 26.0 48.4 100.0
Italy 2.6 42.1 26.5 28.8 100.0
Portugal 15.3 8.8 28.1 8.0 39.8 100.0
Spain 8.7 0.4 19.9 3.0 68.0 100.0
All 7.6 5.8 24.5 13.0 49.0 100.0
 It is particularly the integrated group where national differences seemed most 
spectacular. According to our data, in 2012 two countries excelled in achieving 
successful integration according to migrants’ experiences and reports: Germany 
and Spain, with more than two thirds of their migrants achieving successful 
integration. Hungary and Belgium belonged to the countries with medium level 
of success, while France and Portugal exhibited unexpectedly poor performance. 
200    I N A T I O N  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Italy was reported to be unequivocally the least successful in that year. The latter 
results are interesting with regard to Italy and Portugal because they contradict 
those of the MIPEX index. One cause of the discrepancy may lie in the fact that 
the MIPEX index evaluated the efficacy of integration through the workings of 
the integration policy’s principles, institutions and procedures, as opposed to ICS 
providing a view of the workings of integration from the immigrants’ perspectives.
 In France, we found a high percentage of those who lacked citizenship and 
were not integrated socially. In Hungary there were a high number of segregated 
migrants, and in Portugal the group of frustrated migrants was relatively large. 
Also, quite high was the proportion of this group in Italy.
 This data may not necessarily reflect the present-day situation of migrants 
in Europe. Yet the similarity between the time marked by the 2015 refugee crisis 
and this earlier period of time is notable. The itinerary of migrants in Europe seems 
to have corresponded to the differential performances of integration in various 
European countries. The data indicates the crucial dissimilarities characterizing 
migrants’ experiences in terms of the migration process, settling down, fitting in, 
and integrating into European society.
T H E  P A R A D O X E S  O F  F R E E  M I G R A T I O N
Homo sapiens have evolved through nomadic experiences. The groups that could 
transcend natural constraints were the ones which, forced by the challenges of 
movement, adopted innovative adaptive strategies. The anatomical and neurological 
changes that played a vital role in successful adaptation, made the formation of 
distinct human social existence possible (Berwick and Chomsky 2016). As opposed 
to wandering across the Earth, settling down turned out to be the prevailing principle 
of survival for the majority of humankind. Yet there has always been a minority 
that has remained nomadic. Sedentary living has never eradicated movement, 
migration, and relocation, which is a source of both fear and hope for the settled 
majority.
 Human history, as established earlier, has been the history of people’s migra-
tion. The novelty of the modern age is not that many more people embark on 
a journey from many more places compared to earlier movements, but that the 
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obstacles created by humans to control or impede movements are more numerous.
Obstacles have existed before as well, even though their character was shaped by 
nature rather than society. The transportation and communicational conditions 
of the premodern era did not thwart people’s ability to move. However, waters, 
mountains, and deserts did limit travel both for individuals and groups changing 
locations in geographical space.
 Following the prehistoric wanderings, more and more places on Earth became 
inhabited by humans who carried in them the neural mutation enabling the de-
velopment of language. The multiplicity of languages, customs and bodily features 
was an effect of the scattering of groups producing ethnocentric realities, each of 
which was predicated on the distinction between the in-group and the out-group. 
Inherent in this distinction was the emergence of conflicts fostering in a large 
measure the maintenance of identities.
 The identity of migrant groups initially depended on keeping track of blood 
lineage. Members of the group were the individuals whose mothers belonged 
to the group. Boundaries between the groups were regulated, not by territorial 
arrangements, but by descent, the latter being independent of the former. The 
physical space populated by the members of the group grew to be an intrinsic part 
of the ethnocentric reality, the borders of which may have been imaginary, but no 
member of the group could steer clear of the midst of meanings imposed on that 
physical space. The more generations participated in their transmission, the less 
they could steer clear of the meanings so that, for the members of each new gener-
ation entering life, these meanings appeared a tangible and taken-for-granted reality, 
without which they could not have developed and sustained their self-identity.
 In the premodern areas, the borders of the territory inhabited by the group 
were primarily mental constructions observed both by the group’s members and 
the approaching strangers. The difference created on the psychological level, how-
ever, was monumental since the inhabitants of the territory—the people who 
had settled there—considered it to be their own. Everyone else was classified as 
a stranger on account of not having been born there. The strangers may have 
arrived in the territory for any number of reasons, yet never assumed it was their own. 
Borders were marked by guards and gates but remained easy to pass. Townsmen 
protected their towns by walls. Even in our days, the Great Wall of China serves 
as a preeminent example of how a settled people can protect an entire territory 
against strangers’ attacks.
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 Migrations were by no means always peaceful. Peoples moved from one area 
to another and some groups occupied other groups’ territories. Borders were redrawn 
according to shifting inter-group relations but were never erased. 
 Border protection following the logic of the Great Wall is a tool employed by 
the nation states of the modern era, involving the definition of border crossing as 
a legal act. The right of the nation state to distinguish its own citizens from any 
other states’ citizens implies that crossing the border is easy for some and difficult 
for others. Furthermore, it can legally take place at specified spots only. In the 
twenty-first century, massive migrations induced by global processes and multiple 
causes have added special urgency to the question as to whether, irrespective of 
citizenship determined by the blind chance of one’s birth, is it possible to grant 
everyone the right of free movement. This would inevitably undermine the sover-
eign nation state’s right to admit or exclude strangers. Consensus has already been 
attained on the imperative of granting admission to asylum seekers persecuted 
due to their political beliefs, religious, ethnic, or sexual identity. In other cases, 
there exists no international convention permitting individuals’ unobstructed free 
movement on the globe, irrespective of existent or non-existent guarded borders.
 The literature addressing issues of migration is unanimous in claiming the 
economic benefits of migration for the host country. Those who are pressured to 
leave their country for economic reasons tend to be performance oriented. Edu-
cated or not, they desire to find their niche in the host society’s division of labor.
 From a human rights perspective, it is hard to argue against free migration, 
since no one is responsible what native country the lottery game of chance has 
offered them. Those unhappy with their birthplace will find it difficult to accept the 
idea of living their entire life in a place where they have to remain poor (Nagy 2011). 
Whereas one cannot object to the right of free international migration on a human 
rights basis, culture-based counter-arguments are compelling. Walser (1983) has 
proposed counter-arguments to migration referring to the community principle, 
and stating that the government can rightfully protect the integrity of the national 
community (understood in the historical and cultural sense of the term) comprised 
of the majority of its citizens from large numbers of immigrants with dissimilar cul-
tural backgrounds. This especially applies to immigrants who cannot or do not want 
to integrate into the host society, refusing its values and norms. 
 When a host country is faced with a truly massive flow of immigrants with 
shared cultural backgrounds among them, it is not surprising that the majority 
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nurtures resentment and fears of becoming a minority themselves. These anxieties 
may become more powerful if the migrants’ language(s) and religion(s) are different, 
in addition to following a set of moral and sexual codes other than those of the 
host society. In a democratic regime, this kind of resentment may easily provide 
fuel for political agendas that will not be undercut by a reasoning grounded in 
liberal rationality.
 It is global injustice affecting humankind as a whole that produces modern 
migration on a global scale. Yet it would not be sensible to expect migration to 
be the royal road of restoring justice. If, as a result of migration, the host society 
develops ghettos, segregation, and isles resisting social entropy, nothing but the 
importation of global injustices has been achieved, causing severe conflicts 
between the anxiety-ridden majority and the frustrated migrant minorities. Conflict 
sensitivity furthermore is the property not of the first generation of migrants but 
of their offspring finding themselves in an identity vacuum. Benedict Anderson 
(1992) has coined the phrase “long-distance nationalism” to describe the kind 
of idealized identity that frustrated second and third generation migrants secure 
for themselves as an exit from the identity vacuum. In view of the twenty-first 
century’s global migration processes, we would prefer to talk of “distant collective 
identities” drawing its contents not on a national but a religious knowledge base. 
“Long-distance nationalism” and “long-distance collective identity” bear a similarity 
in possessing an intangible rather than a materially existing—economic and 
political—reality.

S U M M A R Y
Our first research question concerned testing the validity of Szűcs’s theory in our 
times, specifically at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first. Our data makes it clear that the differentiation of the three regions 
has shortcomings and missing parts and it requires more precision. In our book 
we have maintained the type of logic employed by Szűcs and constructed a re-
gional typology that pays more attention to differences in modernization. Within 
the Western European region, we distinguished between the core countries of 
the region and the countries of Scandinavia. It seemed prudent to differentiate 
European countries off the continental mainland, including the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. We treated the countries of southern Europe as a fourth region, which 
was something Szűcs did not take into consideration. The fifth region is the classic 
area of Central Europe. And finally, the Eastern pole was represented by Russia 
and Turkey.
 The Szűcs theory is supported by the data concerning the inclusivity of the 
national category, which clearly shows that moving from West to east in Europe, 
the logic of national exclusion grows in strength. National pride as an emotional 
foundation for spontaneous national identity formed relatively similarly in all 
the examined national societies and showed high level intensity everywhere. The 
East-West regional differences instead appeared in the character of cognitive con-
structions that confirmed and explained pride. Moving eastward the weight of 
modernization causes justifying and explaining pride gradually decreased. The 
exception to this trend was Turkey, and we deal with the reasons for its exceptional 
status in the appropriate chapter. Ethnocentrism, which is the defining emotion 
for national identification, is present to varying degrees in the national societies 
of the study and depends on their regional situation. Ethnocentrism feeds Eastern 
European national identities most, although it is considerably weaker in the core 
countries of Europe and in southern Europe.
 Our data shows that nationalism has significant potential in all the countries 
of the study but moving eastward from the West this potential increases. Our data 
on xenophobia show that between 1995 and 2013 there was an average decrease. 
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Within this average, Western Europe decreased from a lower initial starting point, 
while xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe is relatively high, despite decreases. 
Research conducted in Western Europe since 2013 show that this tendency has 
continued, despite the migration crisis of 2015, while in Eastern Europe it rose 
to unprecedented heights (Örkény 2019; Messing and Ságvári 2019). 
 In summary, the answer to our first research question holds that by making 
Szűcs’s regional division more precise, the divergence between given regions rooted 
in modernity still holds, and that based on the affective point of view of national 
identity, convergence is undeniable. Wherever in Europe people live, spontaneous 
association with the nation is a self-evident feeling. Whether this leads to the 
development of an inclusive, bourgeois “civic nationalism” or an exclusive ethno- 
nationalist national identity depends on modernization paths. The regional division 
described by Szűcs is as such still valid today, given that it is apparent that civic 
nationalism is stronger in the West, and the ethno-nationalist interpretation is 
stronger in the east. This dual mechanism is well illustrated in Figure 2.23.
 Our second research question is closely related to the set of problems brought 
up by the first. Based on our results we can state that the original form of the 
cultural nation versus civic nation dichotomy has lost its relevance. On the other 
hand, we feel that among the six regions there are two (Central Europe and Eastern
Europe) in which the political nation has undoubtedly been established, but 
where the foundation of the political nation concept is derived from the cultural 
nation definition expressed in an exclusive manner. The cultural nation compo-
nent legitimates the political nation, which as such becomes “liquid.” The focal 
point of the nation state is not the legally protected citizen, but instead belongs 
to the national community, which is much less legally tangible. A poor compro-
mise between political and cultural approaches to the nation is well illustrated in 
Hungary’s new Basic Law of 2011, which replaced the regime change constitution. 
Similar tendencies are seen in Poland, Ukraine and Romania. In contrast, the other 
four regions have seen the political nation maintain its earlier solid contours, 
allowing for cultural nation interpretations to enter national discourse, competing 
with the challenges posed by efforts to have historical or new national-ethnic cultural 
identities prevail.
 Our third research question concerned the integration of new minorities arising 
from migration. We identified four strategies, each of which is empirically possible:
assimilation, integration, segregation and transnational migration. The prevalence 
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of these depends on the given national history, modernization patterns and the 
cultural characteristics of minorities. As such, the appearance of the four strate-
gies across countries was very divergent. We saw that each of these strategies 
is possible, but in terms of the future, it is transnational migration that appears 
to be the most promising, given a capability of maintaining an original identity 
while connecting to an overarching identity. The risk of this strategy is that it will 
come into conflict with the ruling majority’s national identity. Transnationalism is 
the polar opposite of segregation, in which neither the majority nor the minority 
can come out on top. Assimilation is a possible solution, but it requires significant 
self-sacrifice on the part of immigrants. Integration is a working consensus of 
coexistence, which requires continuous maintenance and mindfulness on the part 
of both the majority and all minority groups.
 The volume’s fourth and most important research question was the state of 
European identity in the various regions. It appears that psychological-cultural 
considerations were a low priority in the gradual construction of the European 
Union vis-a-vis the infrastructural construction of economic, political and legal 
unity. The founders may have thought, paraphrasing Marx, that “European exis-
tence” would create “European consciousness.” Based on our data, it is clear that 
this has not been the case or has only been carried out to a very limited degree. 
Regarding spontaneous identification, we found that its psychological attraction 
is lowest in all European countries, and European self-identification is particularly 
weak in the United Kingdom, Russia and Turkey. But in all member states we see 
that compared to local, regional and national identities, European identity is always 
weakest. The proportion of those skeptical of the EU in 2013, with the exception 
of the United Kingdom, did not exceed one-quarter of the population anywhere. 
Measured Euroscepticism was lowest among EU core member states. This attitude 
was most prevalent in the societies of the recently acceded Eastern European states, 
where they were just a hair shy of one-quarter of respondents. This is interesting 
because these countries have been receiving an unprecedented level of resources 
from the EU through structural cohesion and agricultural funds.
 The proportion of those unquestioningly supporting EU membership was 
visibly highest in the core countries and in the countries of northern Europe and 
was remarkably low in the new member states. Splitting in two positive attitudes 
toward the EU we see that support for decision mechanisms that encompass all 
EU member states was highest in the United Kingdom and Ireland, which points 
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to a contradictory relationship in the UK. Viewing the EU as a representation of 
profit resources is most common in the countries of southern and eastern Europe 
(35 and 34 percent), in which we can recognize a realist perspective.
 The situation of European identification is not actually bad, recognizing that 
throughout the European Union’s development the conscious cultivation of Euro-
pean identity has not taken place and has not become a part of the political 
socialization of maturing generations. We can assume that one of the reasons for 
this is the lack of a constructed common European narrative and symbolic space. 
From the start of nation building in the case of given nation states, the cultural 
and political elite paid attention to national symbols, celebrations, cultural and 
historical narratives and the organization and construction of the semantic space 
organized around the name of the nation. These steps have not been taken in the 
case of European identity. From among the several examples at hand we focus on 
the case of Euro banknotes that look like play money. These banknotes do not take 
advantage of the potential for presenting persons, stories, narratives and symbolic 
elements of a united Europe. This was an opportunity that was used effectively 
when national banknotes appeared. In light of this it is surprising that support for 
membership is relatively significant in the societies of the member states.
 Our sixth question was a methodological dilemma. The most important ele-
ment of our methodological innovation was the handling of data on not a national, 
but on a regional level. The regional division theoretically had the goal of catching 
the Szűcs type of regional differences in the act. The core of our innovation was 
in further refining the Szűcs typology further, and as such we managed to break 
down the entire sample into statistically comparable groups with similar popula-
tion numbers, in which the population levels also contributed to partially evening 
out inequalities.
 The seventh question was how the appearance of new minorities arising 
from twentieth century migration, which hit Europe like an avalanche, changed 
intergroup conflict potential in the given countries, a potential that had existed 
previously. We also wanted to examine how the challenge of new migration mo-
bilized right wing radicalism and populism in both the West and the East. The 
new Muslim minorities arriving from outside Europe introduced new elements 
into Europe’s usual group-focused enmities’ (GFE-s) patterns. The new intergroup 
experience was formed by the appearance of the unsecularized group following 
Muslim religious-cultural patterns, a group that had not been effected by secu-
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larized European Judeo-Christian traditions. In the name of fear and anxiety 
this experience further transformed the illusory correlation in which the majority 
society locates a causal relationship between terrorism and Muslim identity.
 Migration pressure did not appear in a uniform manner across Europe’s eastern 
and western halves. In the European Union’s western, northern and southern 
countries, beginning in the 2010s, migration pressure increased continuously. In 
the Union’s Eastern European countries, the number of immigrants was consis-
tently low. Xenophobia against immigrants, fed by affective and cognitive phases 
of rejecting other groups, appeared in both Western and Eastern Europe. According 
to our data on Western Europe, rejection of and discrimination against new 
immigrants was limited by the democratic civil society’s tolerance of otherness. 
In a paradoxical manner, in the Eastern European countries, where new minori-
ties based on immigration did not appear, levels of xenophobia reached unprece-
dentedly high levels and then continued to increase. In both west and east, right-
wing radicalism and populism did not hesitate to take advantage of the expanded 
political opportunities connected to the existence of negative and fear-inducing 
attitudes towards new immigrant minorities. We discovered that the use of these 
opportunities affects only a minority in Western European countries (on average 
approximately 20 percent). In contrast, in the countries of Eastern Europe (par-
ticularly Hungary and the Czech Republic), from the point of view of increasing 
political influence, anti-immigrant rhetoric and moral panic raising offers unpar-
alleled opportunities for political gain.

E P I L O G U E
The completion of the final draft of our book coincided with the 2019 European 
Parliament elections. The results of the elections show that in all the member states of 
the European Union there are present those populist, xenophobic, nationalist and 
extreme right wing phenomena that we examined sociologically in this volume. 
We see in the elections results the confirmation of the validity of our analysis, as 
the results showed that in the societies of Europe—with a few exceptions—those 
forces that envision survival and the guarantee of development through human 
rights, democracy and the strengthening of the rule of law form a majority. These 
results further encourage our expectation that by maintaining the path of cooper-
ation in achieving the economic, political and cultural goals the European Union 
will be able to face the challenges of globalization.
 A comparison of the election results with the analyses in this volume also reveals 
that in certain member states the extreme, xenophobic, populist and nationalist 
tendencies form a majority, and as such these countries find themselves contra-
dicting the mainstream established through the results of the European Union 
parliamentary elections. This is a challenge the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission must master for the Union to be influential in the globalized politi-
cal, economic and cultural playing field.
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